# Russia Fill-In DA

## 1NCs

### 1nc – Russia DA

#### First/Next Off is the “Russia Fill-In DA”

#### a. Uniqueness: Russian arms sales are stable, but limited by strong market dominance by the US – they have to capacity and desire for rapid growth.

Bisaccio, 6/25 [Derek, Author at Defense & Security Monitor, “Russian Officials Tout Arms Exports Despite Sanctions,” 6/25/19, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2019/06/25/russian-officials-tout-arms-exports-despite-sanctions/]

Russia has maintained its arms exports portfolio despite pressure from external sources, Russian officials have said, and the volume of sales should rise in the future. Speaking to Zvezda TV at the ARMY-2019 military exhibition, the head of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, Dmitry Shugayev, said on Tuesday, “We all know well under which pressure Russia is, especially its defense industry. It is important to stress that our partners are also under very strong pressure and this is an example of unfair competition, as there are attempts to oust us from traditional markets and prevent us from entering new markets.” Russia has said that its annual arms exports usually amount to around $15 billion. Commenting on the figure, Shugayev added, “Nevertheless, we are retaining this level of $15 billion and will be keeping it and increasing it, doing everything possible for that.” Particularly following alleged Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Washington has sought to tighten the screws on Russia’s defense industry through sanctions, such as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, as well as diplomatic and political pressure on third-party countries that import Russian arms. The most high-profile example of the U.S. pressure campaign is the ongoing spat between Washington and Ankara over the S-400, a Russian surface-to-air missile system that Turkey purchased and expects to begin receiving in July. The U.S. has warned Turkey that the buy will result in economic sanctions and also Turkey’s ejection from the F-35 fighter jet program. Washington is also warning India, another prospective S-400 buyer, against acquiring the system. Besides pressuring foreign countries, the U.S. is also looking to incentivize the purchase of American-made weapons by offering financial assistance to countries that switch from importing from Russia to importing from the United States. Shugayev emphasized that the measures have not deterred Russia. “The sanctions have failed to push through the main task of ousting Russia from the world arms market and they have also failed to make our partners turn away from us,” he said. He noted that Russia “confidently hold[s] the second place” in weapons sales by countries. Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov said that Russia currently occupies a share of around 20 percent of the world’s arms trade. While that figure can be difficult to verify, the international organization SIPRI recently identified Russia as having a share of about 21 percent, behind only the United States. As part of its bid to boost arms sales, Russia is devising a new strategy of military-technical cooperation with foreign partners, Russian President Vladimir Putin said earlier this week. He noted, “With an eye to ensure the efficiency of our activities in the sphere of military technical cooperation with foreign countries, a draft strategy of military technical cooperation has been elaborated. It envisages coordinated measures of political-and-diplomatic, financial-and-economic and technical nature.” President Putin added that the strategy should account for “new factors” that create challenges, such as “tougher competition and the aggressive use of unfair methods of political blackmailing and sanctions,” referring to the U.S. efforts to inhibit Russian arms sales.

#### b. Link: Russia capitalizes on US arms reductions – those exports are key to their financial and political dominance over the west – it’s zero-sum.

Borshchevskaya ’18 (Anna, Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, PhD George Mason University, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Chapter 8 of Russia in The Middle East, ed. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (PhDs), December, produced by the Jamestown Foundation, December 2018, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Russia-in-the-Middle-East-online.pdf?x87069)

Russia is the world’s top arms exporter, second only to the United States. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has emerged in recent years as Moscow’s second most important arms market after Asia. Moscow has made great strides in this region since Vladimir Putin came to power, and especially in recent years, after it embarked on major military reform following August 2008. Arms sales matter to the Kremlin because they are a major source of financial gain, but these arms sales are also a tactical foreign policy instrument for wielding influence. Russia’s arms—generally speaking—are well made, sometimes on par with the US, and well suited for the region’s needs. These platforms and armaments are also more affordable than Western weaponry. The US simply will not sell weapons to certain countries, which, therefore, turn to Moscow. Politically, Russian arms come with few strings attached and thus are a great choice when a country wants to diversify away from the West, or at least signal such an intent. Moscow has made inroads with traditional clients such as Iran, Syria and Egypt, but also diversified toward countries closer to the West, such as the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Turkey. Russia’s overall influence in the region is growing in the context of Western retreat. The Russian defense sector has problems, but also demonstrated improvements, learning and flexibility. Undoubtedly, Russia’s arms sales to the MENA region will continue to present a challenge for American interests in this region in the coming years. Introduction Russia is one of the world’s top arms exporters, second only to the United States since at least 1999.1 In recent years, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region emerged as Russia’s second most important arms market after Asia. From 2000 to 2016, almost a fifth of Russia’s arms exports went to the MENA region.2 To put this in perspective, in 2009, Moscow sold approximately $9 billion worth of arms to this region. In 2016, it sold $21.4 billion.3 Many of these sales are upgrades to existing packages.4 Since 2000, Moscow also diversified from traditional Soviet-era regional clients. Since officially coming to power in May 2000, if not before, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia’s image as a Great Power in the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism— for Russia to win, the West had to lose. His approach to the Middle East is the extension of former Russian prime minister Evgeniy Primakov’s vision of a “multipolar world,” driven by desire to prevent the West from dominating any region, and curb Western support for democratization efforts in other countries. For the last 17 years, Putin worked to regain political influence and raise Russia to the status of a competitor to the United States by increasing emphasis on Russia’s business interests—primarily arms, energy and high-tech goods such as nuclear reactors.5 Russia’s economy remains over-reliant on raw materials and natural resources, but the defense industry is one technology-intensive sector where Russia holds an international leadership position. Domestically, Russia’s defense industry is a major source of employment. Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his emphasis on modernizing the armed forces, especially the navy, on May 7, 2012, on the same day as he took office as president for a third time.6 Internationally, the Russian defense industry is a source of important revenue. Thus, Putin lamented in February 2012 about Iraq and countries undergoing the Arab Spring, “Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts.”7 As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”8 Yet, arms sales entail far more to the Kremlin than mere financial gains. They are also Moscow’s tactical foreign policy tool for wielding political influence and changing power balance dynamics. Indeed, in July 2012, Putin said that arms exports are “an effective instrument for advancing [Moscow’s] national interests, both political and economic.”9 In December 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia’s arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries.10 And Moscow’s chief goal—regime survival, which it hopes to achieve through reduction of Western influence—runs counter to Western interests and values. Thus, in the MENA region, Moscow courts virtually everyone, and competes with the West whenever an opportunity arises. Arms exports are a major component of these efforts.

#### c. Impact: Unchecked Russian influence risks extinction

Fisher ‘15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist @ VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)

That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It’s not just a difference in rhetoric. It’s a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

## UNIQUENESS

### UQ – Arms Sales Low

#### Russian arms sales and their defense industry are low now

Stratfor ‘19 ( American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview, 4-29-19, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-defense-industry-finds-itself-tailspin)

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing busines**s**.

#### Russia losing global arms sales even as the total number increases and US – best reflection of military influence

Bershidsky 3/12 (Leonid Bershidsky, 3-12-2019, "Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-market-share, Accessed: 6-25-2019, MWM)

Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. More Violent Times The number of violent conflicts around the world [Chart Ommitted] Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program \* Use of armed force against civilians by governments or organized groups \*\* Wars between states or between states and rebel groups \*\*\* Conflicts in which no warring party is a state The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter. Russia on the Retreat Global share of major arms exports [Chart Ommitted] Source: SIPRI SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

### UQ – Economic Restraint

#### Russia is seeking to become a world super-power but doesn’t have the economic might – arms sales are key to their economy.

Muraviev 18 (Alexey D Muraviev; Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies, Curtin University; 2-18-2018; "Russia not so much a (re)rising superpower as a skilled strategic spoiler"; https://theconversation.com/russia-not-so-much-a-re-rising-superpower-as-a-skilled-strategic-spoiler-90916; Conversation; accessed 6-29-2019; LR)

Russia keeps posing a massive intelligence puzzle to the West: it is never as weak as we may want it to be, nor is it as strong as we fear it may be. So, how can we classify Russia as an international power? It is not the Soviet Union reincarnated, so it is not a reborn counterpoint to US global supremacy. Nor does it intend to be. But it remains a major strategic spoiler of the US’ ambitions to retain its rules-based global order. Moscow is trying to strengthen its relationship with like-minded major powers. China is one of Russia’s comrades-in-arms, although not a formal ally. China and Russia are not forming any sort of anti-Western/anti-US alliance; both great powers have their own national agendas. Over the past ten years, Russia and China have developed very close military ties, but their economic relationship remains uneven and quite low on the common strategic agenda. They are de facto engaged in soft competition across Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific. But their intention to change the status quo in support of their ambitions aligns with their security and strategic agendas, at least for now. Just like China, Russia seeks to maximise its strategic autonomy by aggressively fending off any perceived challenges to its national interests or sovereignty. The time cannot be better. US President Donald Trump keeps puzzling allies by reversing major political decisions of previous administrations, while prioritising an inward-looking approach to running his country. And he is no match for Vladimir Putin in terms of experience, charisma, domestic popularity and global influence. Try a simple experiment: search any publication about Russia published by the Australian media and try to find an article on anything Russia-related that does not have a reference to Putin. We see in Putin a manifestation of Russia’s ambitions; its political, military, economic and even sport successes and failures; defence of traditional values and criticisms of the Western way of life. Putin wants for Russia a “place under the sun”: that is, dominance over the immediate neighbourhood combined with Russia’s recognised right to have interests in other parts of the world. The big question is: does modern Russia have what it takes to be a global superpower? The reality is there is no definitive answer to that. On the one hand, Russia possesses key elements of a superpower: it is self-sufficient when it comes to natural resources and it is an energy superpower; it is a space power with a developed sovereign capability; it has a world-class scientific capability; it is the second-biggest military superpower in the world behind the US. Finally, it has global ambitions and a global agenda. On the other hand, like China, Russia does not have a civilisational agenda – a competitive political model that could be an alternative to Western liberalism based on a free-market economy. After all, the Cold War was a clash of competitive socioeconomic systems supported by geopolitical and military-strategic competition. There is none of that today. Second, Russia does not have the economic might of China and its intertwined economic interaction with the US. The Russian economy has suffered a great deal from the tight sanctions regime implemented after the Ukraine crisis, and is only beginning now to show signs of recovery. That is not to say Russia has lost the economic means to support itself and its global ambitions. Over the past two years, it has achieved a major breakthrough in exporting grain and other agricultural produce, making it one of the top-three foreign currency earners. In 2017 alone, Russia earned some US$20.5 billion by exporting agricultural produce. Russia’s energy exports also remain high. In 2017, Russian energy giant Gazprom generated total revenue of US$103.6 billion. This year’s revenue is expected to reach US$108 billion. In Europe alone, Gazprom controls 34.7% of its energy market, thus making it an important element of Russia’s regional geoeconomics. The Russian defence sector plays its traditional role of both earning much-needed cash and furthering Russia’s geopolitical agenda. In 2017, Russian arms exports were worth US$17 billion, while the total portfolio of foreign orders of Russian armaments and military equipment is about US$45 billion, effectively retaining the number-two position in global arms sales. Still, Russia has no means of global economic expansionism. It is desperately seeking new economic opportunities and partnerships with other countries that do not want all the power focused on the US. This gives China a strategic lead because of its diversified extensive economic partnerships with the US, Europe and Asia. Yet it would be premature to crown China as the sole superpower rival to the US. Unlike Russia, China clearly lacks political and diplomatic experience – the ability to play complex games on a global chessboard. As an incoming superpower with global ambitions but limited experience in great power politics, China studies carefully the Soviet and Russian experiences and leaves Russia to fight all the major fights at international forums. North Korea and the South China Sea are among the few exceptions where the Chinese show strategic activism. Apart from its extensive diplomatic experience, China also needs Russia’s strategic nuclear and conventional military might. Under Putin, the Russian military managed to close the capability gap with the most advanced Western militaries and transformed itself from a large, under-equipped and understaffed army into an effective, highly motivated and battle-hardened force. Putin has given the once-cash-strapped military machine a massive financial boost – and, more importantly, full political support. Between 2013 and 2017, Russia landed in the world’s top-three nations on defence expenditure, just behind the US and China. In Europe, Russia has remained the single largest defence spender and buyer of major combat systems. From 2012 until early 2017, the Russian military received 30,000 new and upgraded armaments and items of heavy military equipment. The Syria campaign and Russia’s ability to exercise strategic reach has once again made the military factor supported by active diplomacy one of the key determinants of successful realising its national strategic agenda. In short, Russia is a major global power in outlook and reach, locked in a values-based confrontation with the West. But it still lacks all elements of a developed superpower. But what it does most effectively is play the role of a strategic spoiler in times when the world is gradually accepting a new international configuration with a suite of established and emerging great powers that would dominate a future world order.

#### Russian defense industry faltering now which crushes their economy and heg.

Stratfor 19(An American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher, 5-2, “Russia is one of the world's biggest weapons dealers, but its defense industry is headed for trouble,” Business Insider,https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-defense-industry-faces-problems-hurting-military-modernization-2019-5)

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but [the country's defense industry is struggling](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-procurement-plans-reflect-militarys-modernization-struggles-putin) thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5% less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48% year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering from a dearth of funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, [the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-defense-cuts-mean-russias-military) in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and [Western sanctions](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/sanctions-will-widen-russia-west-rift-2019) over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17%. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business. And Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced competitiveness. Russia has long dominated some of the market by offering affordable military equipment without attaching any conditions regarding human rights, but the rise of China's military industry, as well as several smaller producers around the world, has made it much more difficult to compete for contracts. Ultimately, the loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense industry; it also reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases scale-dependent savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the more Russia fails to find foreign customers for specific weapon systems, the more it will become burdened with a higher relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in turn, will further limit Russia's ability to competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby perpetuating the effect. This is why, for example, [India's withdrawal](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-losing-indias-business-could-ruin-russias-defense-industry) from the joint development and production of the Su-57 fighter aircraft last year has cast doubt on Russia's ability to sustain the program in a meaningful way or at an acceptable cost. As a result, Russia has sought — albeit unsuccessfully so far — to export the Su-57 more widely in an effort to find a partnership that would make the aircraft viable.

### UQ – Losing Influence

#### US winning influence zero-sum to Russia via arms sales.

Bershidsky 3/12 (Leonid Bershidsky, 3-12-2019, "Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-market-share, Accessed: 6-25-2019, MWM)

Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. More Violent Times The number of violent conflicts around the world [Chart Ommitted] Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program \* Use of armed force against civilians by governments or organized groups \*\* Wars between states or between states and rebel groups \*\*\* Conflicts in which no warring party is a state The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter. Russia on the Retreat Global share of major arms exports [Chart Ommitted] Source: SIPRI SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

## LINKS

### L – Generic

#### Russia arms has become a reliable and capable alternative to the US – Syria proves.

Millero ’17 (Raymond G. Millero Jr., Air University graduate and USAF commander, “Roots Running Deep: Arms Sales and Russia’s Excursion into Syria” April 6, 2017, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038117.pdf>)

Through Rosoboronexport, Putin has asserted state control over arms sales and used politically sensitive deals with nations to increase influence and assert its foreign policy interests. Specifically in Syria, historical political ties and a long history of weapons purchases from Damascus have enabled Russia to sustain a major ally and maintain an important political and military foothold in the Middle East. As evidenced in 2011, Russia had an estimated US $4 billion worth of outstanding weapons contracts with Damascus. Syria is undoubtedly Russia’s most important ally in the region and is a key country for maintaining influence in the region. Military sales to Syria not only reinforced Russia’s commitment to the Assad regime, but ensured the high tech weapons were enough to thwart the United States goal of ousting Bashar Al-Assad. The advanced weapons and training created a prohibitive environment and increased the risk to military forces of the United States. This forced Washington to reevaluate their stated red line, discontinue pursuing military plans to oust Assad, and weakened United States power in the region. The decision by Moscow to support Assad with advanced weaponry guaranteed Russia had a say in the outcome of the Syrian civil war and galvanized Russia’s desire to be seen as a world power in the Middle East. In addition to contributing sophisticated arms to Syria and bolstering Russia’s image as a world power, the military campaign in Syria also provided a showcase for advanced military weaponry and technology. The employment of Russia’s fourth generation aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, cruise missiles, anti-access and denial weapons, and other technologically advanced systems displayed the capability and reliability of Russian equipment in front of a world stage. Nations trying to decide whether to upgrade and/or purchase Russian equipment and technology were impressed with the demonstration of military might during the campaign in Syria.18 The result was an overwhelming display of sophisticated weapons, which some could argue were not necessarily required for the type of fight in Syria. Consequently, by executing a successful military campaign, Russia was able to realize the strategic goals of its national security agenda, defense and export strategy, and gain power and influence among nations looking for an alternative to Western manufacturers. The resultant marketing effect from Russia’s Syrian campaign has led to renewed interest in arms contracts and a boost in sales totaling $7 billion, according to sources in the Russian government.19 Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said the Syria operation had affected Russian arms sales “extremely positively” by showing Moscow has effective weapons and can challenge western influence.20 Moreover, Pukhov also stated the Syrian operation provided an “excellent opportunity to show off the goods.”21 Indeed, the demonstration of military power resulted in renewed interest in Russian arms and contracts with Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Pakistan. Specifically, Algeria has expressed interest in the purchase of 12 Sukhoi Su-32 aircraft and 40 Mi-28N attack helicopters 8 after eight years of stalled negotiations.22 Undoubtedly, the Syrian conflict enabled Russia to promote its military products, thereby expanding its political influence to new markets. The course of events at the end of 2015 and into 2016 created increased opportunity for Russia to expand its arms sales and reinvigorate staled arms contracts. Prior to the Syrian conflict, there was a perception that Russian arms were of relatively poor quality, resulting in the loss of a number of arms trade customers. However, the successful campaign has done much to counter and assuage these perceptions. The Russian defense industry has managed to gain a foothold in new markets, regain lost positions in a number of countries and continue to develop military-technical cooperation with its traditional partners of China and India. Growing interest among foreign customers, largely due to the Syria campaign, will ensure Russia holds its position in the global arms market and maintain vital political relationships.

#### US ending arms sales causes Russia fill-in.

Rothman 15(Noah, 10-15, Commentary Magazine, “Moscow’s Middle Eastern Adventure,” https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/europe/russia/russia-middle-east-power-play/)

Representatives for the United States and the Russian government held a third round of talks on Wednesday aimed at “de-conflicting” the current crisis in Syria. In plain language, their mutual aim is to make sure that NATO air assets and Russian warplanes don’t accidently engage one another while they are shooting at each other’s opposing proxy forces on the ground. This conference was reportedly quite productive, and that’s probably a good thing. No one wants a mistake, particularly since the Syrian war represents the most dangerous proxy conflict between Washington and Moscow since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since Russian forces began engaging Bashar al-Assad’s adversaries in Syria overtly, Russian forces have repeatedly violated Turkish airspace and painted Turkish warplanes with missile radar. Russian forces have targeted and harassed U.S. drones on three separate occasions, and there have been several incidents in which Russian and American fighter aircraft have come within several kilometers of one another. Russian and Turkish warplanes have had no fewer than 13 dangerous encounters in October alone. Russian aircraft have killed several hundred U.S.-backed fighters on the ground and destroyed valuable stockpiles of CIA-provided armaments. Some of those advanced CIA weapons have been used to great effect in the war that has evolved from a civil conflict into a regional war, and now threatens to become another theater in which the zero-sum game of great power politics is played. President Barack Obama has said explicitly that it is not in America’s interest to engage in a proxy conflict with Russia. Indeed, his abject refusal to provide lethal arms to Ukrainian militants suggests this is not mere rhetoric on the president’s part. Yet since Russia intervened in Syria, the tempo of American airstrikes on Islamist targets has accelerated, and American-backed insurgents claim that they have received even more U.S.-provided weaponry than they did before this new phase of the fight. “Syrian rebels use US-made guided missiles to blow up Russian-made tanks,” the New York Times reported on Tuesday. “The increased levels of support have raised morale on both sides of the conflict, broadening war aims and hardening political positions, making a diplomatic settlement all the more unlikely.” Having attempted to provoke the West into a conflict in Europe in which it declined to participate, Russian President Vladimir Putin has engaged in a war already in progress that Western powers cannot simply ignore. While the Russian adventure in Syria is the most obvious exercise of Moscow’s might in the region, this is not Putin’s first signal that Russia intends to reconstruct the former Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East. In the wake of the ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, America’s near paralytic response to the Egyptian military’s coup finally yielded a decision to withhold military aid from Cairo. Russia quickly filled the void and inked a deal for $2 billion in arms with the new Egyptian government. As bilateral ties deepened, Moscow eventually secured from Egypt a commitment to free-trade relations with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Zone – a trade block consisting of the Former Soviet Republics of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia designed to compete with the European Union. In June, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud made an appearance in St. Petersburg where he signed several technology and trade cooperation agreements with his Russian counterparts. As crude prices contract, the Saudis have targeted Russian dominance in Eastern Europe, but this appearance of competition is illusory. This week, in a woefully under-discussed development in the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin again met with the crown prince in Sochi where they engaged in defense-related discussions regarding the escalating crisis in Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov revealed that the Russian and Saudi representatives agreed to enhance military and intelligence cooperation in the effort to “combat terrorism,” even though both governments are at cross purposes in Syria. Russia’s military intervention in Syria is a compliment to Iran’s expeditionary forces, which now consists of warplanes and thousands of ground soldiers. This dual intervention is an outgrowth of the “long term and multifaceted” military cooperation agreement the two governments signed in January. Even before the terms of a nuclear accord have been implemented, Russia agreed to sell millions of dollars’ worth of advanced S-300 anti-aircraft defense systems to Tehran. This was a deal reached in 2008 but had been suspended indefinitely in observance of United Nations Security Council arms restrictions agreed to in 2010, and that remains in place. This Tehran-Moscow alliance now has a new and, for the United States, deeply embarrassing partner in Baghdad. This Triple Entente for the 21st Century has yielded a trove of actionable intelligence, according to Iraqi officials. “The intelligence sharing alliance, which comprises Syria, Iran, and Russia, was announced last month,” Al Jazeera reported. “Iraqi sources said two Russian one-star generals were stationed at the center.” This is not the only formerly U.S.-dominated sector upon which Russia is encroaching. As the Afghan theater continues to deteriorate and the Taliban increases its reach, culminating in the temporary fall of the city of Kunduz to Islamist insurgents earlier this month, Russia has begun to make preparations to preserve its buffer security zone around that restive country. On Thursday, Russian officials announced that they were examining the prospects of re-establishing military control over the former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. Russia has been augmenting its already substantial military presence in Tajikistan for months, including sending a series of Mi-24P attack helicopters to the country last week. These are not purely defensive capabilities. This robust and multidimensional Russian display in the Middle East is an effort to both reestablish Moscow as a dominant actor in Central and Southwestern Asia. This is a project that has taken on a new urgency as President Barack Obama’s time in office comes to a close. Whoever the next President of the United States is, it is almost certain that they will be less favorable toward extricating the United States from its obligations in this region. In his “60 Minutes” interview on Sunday, the president repeatedly referred to Syria as Russia’s “sole ally” in the region and insisted that there has been no change in Russia’s status in the Middle East since he first came to office. Only in light of the president’s dogged commitment to this delusion does Putin’s reckless and brazen gambit in the Middle East make sense.

### L – Human Rights

#### The plan causes client states to diversify supply through Russia --- the link alone takes out the case ---the US will try, but fail, to regain market dominance after Russia fill the vacuum

Rounds 19 – Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in International Relations (Ray, “THE CASE AGAINST ARMS EMBARGOS, EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA,” *War on The Rocks*, [https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/)//BB](https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/%29//BB)

One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great again is international arms sales. The United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains a distant 23 percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top 100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen estimated at between 16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest client — Saudi Arabia — have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More generally, several authors have penned articles in these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by economic motivations and more by concern about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully disagree with all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase, an outright embargo, like Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016 Turkish Patriot missile request, using the withholding of arms sales as a blunt force instrument of coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often backfires. Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course. Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about demands for direct offsets mistake what is known as “design technology transfer” for the much more difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for now it is worth noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation of an independent defense industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with the appropriate end-user controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it comes to preserving complex production lines for future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but simply because it is unlikely to work. Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior. Consider Indonesia and Egypt. In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase nearly 50 Russian MiG-29M/M2s and more than two-dozen French Rafales. This represented a shocking turn of events after more than three decades of purchasing only American-made fighter jets. It was also driven largely by the U.S. embargo put in place in 2013, after the Egyptian army’s removal of then-President Mohamed Morsi, who had won the presidency in a 2012 election. The embargo caused significant tension between the two states driven by “an Egyptian sense that they were at a point of mortal peril” while the United States was moralizing about democratic reforms. Remarkably, the United States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies, no official U.S. “democracy certification”, and Egyptian military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The U.S. arms embargo as a tool of coercive change was an abject failure. A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the United States with no history of Russian imports, Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to purchase Russian Su-27/30s. While Indonesia was always far more politically neutral than Egypt, this remarkable turnaround in arms sourcing diversification appears to be the result of a U.S. arms embargo implemented in 1999 in response to Indonesia’s apparent human rights violations carrying out heavy-handed military actions in East Timor. Furious at U.S. meddling in something the government considered a domestic issue, Indonesia looked instead to Russia with the specific intent to “overcome the effects of [U.S.] arms sales restrictions.” In other words, Indonesia looked to diversify, not capitulate. Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United States lifted the embargo in 2005. Perhaps most remarkably, even after the United States agreed to give Indonesia 24 F-16s in 2012, the archipelago state still agreed to purchase 11 Russian Su-35s. The U.S. attempt at coercion not only failed but continues to perpetuate negative strategic effects today. Who’s Afraid of Technology Transfer? Another argument for a more restrictive arms export policy concerns direct industrial offsets (those economic agreements in which a supplier invests in the industry of a client state directly related to the arms being transferred) and technology transfer. However, these tools should not be feared. Technology transfer is unlikely to breed meaningful competition for the United States where it matters most, in the medium- to high-end markets, and instead gives the United States a source of political influence. The problem in many analyses is confusion over the type of technology transfer. There are three ideal-typical categories of transfer: material transfer, such as simple diffusion of weapons and machines; design transfer, like blueprints and schematics; and capacity transfer, which involves basic scientific knowledge and expertise within the industrial base. Most technology transfers ultimately fall into the first two categories, despite what a client state might hope for. Consider the 2003 Polish decision to purchase F-16s from Lockheed Martin with direct offsets valued at more than $6 billion. This represented 170 percent of the program value and the then-largest in commercial history. Despite this massive investment, Poland does not design and produce their own fighter jets today, but rather subsections of American-designed systems under license. In fact, direct offsets provided inroads for U.S. industry in the Polish defense industry in a manner that strongly incentivizes the Poles to continue purchasing U.S. aircraft, and indeed Poland appears poised to purchase the F-35 in the near future. Offsets and technology transfer may have helped revive portions of the Polish defense industry and provided some domestic job creation, but it did not create an independent competitor to the U.S. defense industry. This is exactly as expected with material and design levels of transfer. While some of the very largest industrial states, such as India or China, might eventually create a world-leading defense industry, it will remain out of the grasp of most states. Consider China, an unquestionable economic powerhouse of recent decades. Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer, blatant reverse engineering attempts, and hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for help with the most advanced weaponry such as fighter jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radars, and jet engines. If China, the second largest economy in the world struggles so mightily, what threat do smaller, less capable states pose? Capacity transfer, the acquisition of basic scientific knowledge and expertise crafted over decades, cannot simply be uploaded, emailed to another state, or hacked. Rather, it takes decades of intentional and costly investment. For high-end weaponry, where research and development costs remain a prohibitive barrier to entry, the United States and a handful of other advanced economies are likely to remain in the driver’s seat; even with generous technology transfer agreements. Finally, consider some of the negative second- and third-order effects that excessive restriction caused in American unwillingness to commit to selling the U.S.-made Patriot missile system and its underlying technology to Turkey. This was recently posited as a U.S. export restriction success. However, this restraint looks less successful each passing day. Even with significant design transfer, it is unlikely Turkey could obtain the requisite capacity transfer to be self-sufficient in surface-to-air and anti-missile defense systems anytime soon. Conversely, by using U.S. technology, the United States could have legally restricted Turkey’s future export of it. More importantly, Turkey has since agreed to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile system, a blow to U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey. The S-400 purchase will put advanced Russian technology and military advisors inside a NATO ally and tier-two F-35 industrial partner that is a sole-source supplier on several F-35 components. As the Air Force Secretary said last year about Turkey’s S-400 agreement, “Sometimes it’s the United States that’s part of the problem.” Even worse, the United States has since approved the sale of the Patriot to Turkey, with the acting U.S. Defense Secretary recently commenting, “we need Turkey to buy the Patriot.” Was holding back on some surface-to-air missile technology worth the strategic cost? It appears unlikely.

#### Russian weapons more desirable for authoritarian states.

Borshchevskaya, PhD Candidate, 18(Anna, PoliSci @ GeorgeMason, Russia in The Middle East, ed. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (PhDs), December, Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Russia-in-the-Middle-East-online.pdf?x87069)

Why Choose a Russian Weapon? When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the US in terms of quality and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons-learned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next generation, the S- 500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. 14 In addition, the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to deliver after a contract is signed. Moscow is weak when it comes to follow-up support of sales, and Russian weaponry is not always as technically advanced as America’s, but it is good enough for the needs of many markets, and is often far better than what the purchasing countries can build themselves. Russian weaponry is also a good choice for states on a budget. Moscow advertises this fact. For example, in early October 2015, days after Russia’s Syria intervention, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from primarily small corvettes in the Caspian Sea to hit targets in Syria.15 Moscow made a public display of the event, not only to demonstrate Russia’s own might but also to show other countries they need not purchase a large expensive warship to achieve strong naval capabilities, and that Moscow would be happy to help them achieve this goal. Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M- 16?”16 For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt’s anti- Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-2217 (which the US is currently not even exporting). Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from Washington. Moscow, unlike the US, does not prohibit secondary arms sales. This means, for example, that when the US sells weapons to Egypt, the weapon must stay in Egypt.18 But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily resell to someone else for profit may be a preferable option. Moscow also does not burden arms sales with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus, countries turn to Moscow when they wish to signal to Washington that they have other options if they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions. At the same time, some Arab states are genuinely interested in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several GCC states bought Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the America, invests effort across the MENA region to sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option: Moscow does not have to replace the US. Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages including quicker delivery and better negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made major inroads during the Putin era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.

#### The US will currently limit Russian influence with an unrestricted arms sales policy ---the plan disrupts that strategy and cedes diplomatic turf to Russia

Economist 18 (The global arms trade is booming. Buyers are spoiled for choice. Increased competition between suppliers means buyers have the upper hand., [https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/the-global-arms-trade-is-booming-buyers-are-spoiled-for-choice)//BB](https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/the-global-arms-trade-is-booming-buyers-are-spoiled-for-choice%29//BB)

ONLY a few months ago, Canadians were earnestly debating whether or not the country’s Liberal administration was right to go ahead with executing a $12bn contract to deliver armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia. The government said it would, but acknowledged its critics’ concerns by agreeing to adopt a version of an international treaty that limits arms sales to rogues (see article). However, things took a different turn. It was the Saudis who plunged the deal into uncertainty. After Canada’s foreign minister urged the release of some political prisoners on Twitter, the Saudi government declared that all new business with Canada was suspended. This left Canadians unsure if the kingdom still wants the arms deal. And if the Saudis do walk away, plenty of other countries will be happy to supply armoured cars. “They could get their combat vehicles from Turkey, South Korea or Brazil,” says Pieter Wezeman, a researcher at SIPRI, a Stockholm-based think-tank. In the United States, meanwhile, Congress has been pressing the administration to implement the letter of a law that would force countries to make a hard, instant choice between buying American or Russian weapons. But the Pentagon is hinting that America’s huge diplomatic power does not quite stretch that far. Defence officials argue it would be better to accept that some countries will go on buying Russian weapons for a while, in the hope they will gradually kick the habit. Both these developments reflect the volatile (and from a Western viewpoint, barely controllable) state of the global arms market. Total demand is growing, the number of sellers is rising and the Western countries that have dominated the business are less confident of shaping the playing field. Above all, buyers are becoming more insistent on their right to shop around. For the likes of India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, “this is a buyer’s market,” says Lucie Béraud-Sudreau of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think-tank. Speak softly and sell a big stick The numbers show that the global commerce in conventional weapons is still dominated by the United States. But America feels strangely nervous about maintaining that role, and this year it has adopted a more aggressive sales posture. Under a policy proclaimed in April and mapped out in more detail last month, American diplomats have been told to promote weapons sales more actively and speed up procedures for approving them. At first sight, American apprehensions seem puzzling. There are several ways to measure the arms market, but America comes out on top of all of them. SIPRI has studied the volume of cross-border weapon transfers over the five years to December and compared them with the previous five years (see chart). The size of the world market rose by 10% between the two periods. In the more recent one, America’s slice of this expanding pie was 34%, up from 30% in the previous five years. America and its five nearest rivals (in descending order Russia, France, Germany, China and Britain), account for nearly 80% of total transfers. Britain, meanwhile, claims that last year it jumped to third place among global arms exporters, as measured by the value of their sales. According to the Defence and Security Organisation, a government body, America bagged 53% of the global business, its “highest-ever market share”. This left 16% for Russia and 12% for Britain, double the share taken by France. In part, the jumpiness in Washington, DC, stems from the entry to the market of new competitors, especially China. In part it reflects new products and technologies where America will struggle to keep its lead. Both these challenges were highlighted by the appearance at last year’s Paris Air Show of a Chinese military drone that looked very like the American unmanned aircraft that have been used for assassinations, for example in Pakistan. Hitherto, America has been willing to share these powerful drones only with close European allies. A new policy will broaden the range of customers and thus lessen the risk that China will dominate a market that could soon be worth $50bn a year. China has long been better known as a buyer of arms, mainly from Russia, than as a seller. A big share of its arms deliveries have gone to close allies such as Pakistan. But it has enormously increased its capacity to make and sell its own weapons, including ships and submarines. Meanwhile, American arms-export policy has been a delicate balance between, on the one hand, seizing economic and geopolitical opportunity and, on the other, being careful not to share technologies which could destabilise war zones or be used against the United States. But such caution can be counter-productive. At a panel discussion in Washington this month, a defence-industry advocate lamented that, because of America’s technology-transfer curbs, France had won from it a contract to sell airborne radar to India. “I like the French, but I like American industry even more,” he grumbled. In another Franco-American contest over technology, France is finding it hard to sell more Rafale combat aircraft to its prize arms customer, Egypt, because the accompanying Scalp cruise missile incorporates American know-how, the transfer of which to third parties is barred. France has promised to develop its own technology, but Egypt may not have the patience to wait. Egypt’s government has also been a keen purchaser of Russian equipment, including aircraft and attack helicopters. For defence-equipment manufacturers such as Britain and France, export sales matter ever more as a way to maintain their own industries. Britain’s edge in military aviation may depend on its sales to Saudi Arabia. And the Royal Navy’s ambitious building programme got a boost when Australia said it would buy British for a new range of frigates. France wants to develop a new air-to-air missile, but only, as Florence Parly, the defence minister, put it, if it can get foreign customers. Such desperation adds to the frenzy of market competition. So does the utter indifference Russia and China display towards their customers’ human-rights policies. So too does the growth in the number of countries that have graduated from being mainly buyers of weapons and knowhow to sellers—Turkey, the Emirates and South Korea, for example. Japan, which boasts a huge defence industry, is entirely new to the market. It plunged in when the government lifted restrictions on arms exports in 2014. It competes, albeit from a fairly weak position, with China for Asia-Pacific customers. As for Russia, SIPRI calculates that its share of the global market has slipped (to about 22% in 2013-17). But it offers a blend of tried-and-tested hardware and, to a few customers, superb know-how, especially in air defence. That creates a dilemma for America, which hopes soon to sell weapons worth $6bn to India, but is dismayed by that country’s determination to acquire S-400 air-defence systems from Russia: missiles that could ward off potential threats from China or Pakistan. Other countries intent on continuing to buy Russian include Indonesia and Vietnam. Jim Mattis, America’s defence secretary, has implored Congress not to be too harsh with Russia’s customers, so long as they pledge gradually to reduce their reliance. In a letter leaked in July to Breaking Defense, a specialist news service, he told a congressman: “We are faced with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to decrease Russia’s dominance in key regions.” But that could only happen if America were free to sell its own weapons. For customers, that means that for the foreseeable future they can keep both American and Russian weapons in their arsenals.

### L – Saudi

#### Ending sales to Saudi Arabia means they shift to Russian weapons – those weapons are more dangerous and solidify their influence in the region – that turns the case.

Rogan ‘19 (Tom, Middle Eastern Politics @ School Of Oriental And African Studies, “Blocking Saudi arms sales, the Senate endangers civilians and a critical alliance ,” 6-21, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blocking-saudi-arms-sales-the-senate-endangers-civilians-and-a-critical-alliance)

A bipartisan group of senators on Thursday responded to Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen and its assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by moving to block the Trump administration's arms sales to Saudi Arabia. But this is bad news both for civilians in Yemen and for American interests. It is fortunate that Trump is likely to veto the legislation. Why is it bad news? Well, ask yourself another question: what is more accurate, an advanced American guided bomb or a Russian bomb? That will matter when the Saudis turn around and start buying bombs like the BETAB-500 and FAB-500 that the Russians have been using to smash Syria apart. It will mean Yemeni civilians will face greater vulnerability. We should be pushing the Saudis to be more judicious over Yemen. But the irony here of politicians saying they want to save civilian lives but achieving the opposite effect is inescapable. Now ask yourself another question: whose interests would be served by Saudi alienation from America? Answer: Russia, along with various Islamist terrorists. This is no small concern. Russia's strategic gambit in Syria has never ultimately been about saving Bashar Assad, but rather about making regional actors see Moscow as a better partner than America. Senate actions like Thursdays thus play perfectly into Russia's hands. And while that explains Sen. Rand Paul's, R-Ky., support for this legislation, it doesn't account for Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. Regardless, we should fear Russia's consolidated leadership in the Middle East. Because Russia will be for the region both arsonist and and fireman, and it will sell a nice chunk of weapons in between. It will mean more disorder and more sectarian hatred. And it will mean a Saudi crown prince freed of U.S. pressure to reform his archaic society so that it doesn't end up becoming ISIS 2.0. Moreover, there is no question that overt rebukes to the Saudis are certain to spark Saudi reprisals: the centrality of honor and respect in Arab culture ensures it. Senators are deluding themselves if they think any good will come of this. The opposite is true.

#### Saudi switches to Russian arms if the US withdraws – growing influence.

Har-Zvi, PhD, 16(Shay, The Return of the Russia Bear to The Middle East, Middle East Security Studies, 120, https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/msps120.pdf)

Despite this, the latter half of 2015 saw signs of change in the bilateral relationship. It seems that a visit made to Russia in June 2015 by the Saudi crown prince and defense minister, Mohammed bin Salman, paved the way for new forms of cooperation between the two countries. According to media reports, during this visit six agreements were signed, in the areas of energy, defense, and nuclear power, among others.81 Subsequently, it was agreed that Saudi Arabia would invest $10 billion in projects in Russia, and in November 2015, the two signed a series of agreements on increased economic cooperation.82 There has also been an increased level of coordination between the leadership of the two countries. Putin met for the first time with King Salman bin Abdulaziz in mid-November, during the G20 summit, and the two also held several prior phone conversations.83 The Saudi foreign minister expressed this trend in an interview with Al-Hayat, in which he said that despite differences regarding the Syrian issue and the supply of arms to Iran, the two countries need to expand their cooperation because of their common interests, which include oil, among other things.84 The visits made to Russia by the Emir of Qatar and the King of Bahrain in early 2016, a offer further testimony to the warming relations between Moscow and Riyadh. It seems that, for Russia and Saudi Arabia, despite traditional tensions, the current realities of the Middle East provide opportunities for cooperation, given the growing threat to regional stability from Islamic State, and the implications for the global oil market of the lifting of sanctions on Iran and the likely rise in supply. Furthermore, closer relations serve both countries’ political interests vis-à-vis the United States, although their motivations are different. For Russia, this is an entry into another state seen as being pro-American, with the potential for eroding Washington’s influence in the region (the “zero-sum game”). For Saudi Arabia, this is a way for it to signal to the American administration its displeasure with the United States’ conduct on the Syrian issue and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, and that it has an alternative to being dependent on America.

#### Saudi Arabia buys from Russia in scenario of a cut of US arms sales – connections already in place Turak ’18 (Natasha, correspondent for CNBC, “Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift eastward”, October 23, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/23/threats-of-us-sanctions-could-accelerate-a-saudi-shift-eastward.html>)

As the fallout over the killing of Saudi journalist and U.S. resident [Jamal Khashoggi](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/21/trump-europe-call-saudi-account-of-khashoggi-death-incomplete.html) continues, age-old alliances are being tested. In contradiction to President [Donald Trump,](https://www.cnbc.com/donald-trump/) who has voiced opposition to any interference in U.S. weapons sales to [Saudi Arabia,](https://www.cnbc.com/saudi-arabia/) members of Congress are openly [calling for sanctions](https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/10/15/us-could-put-sanctions-on-saudi-arabia-over-khashoggi-case-says-rbcs-helima-croft.html) on America’s number one arms customer. German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday announced a hold on arms sales to the kingdom for the time being, a move lauded by many in the international community. But some now fear that severing arms sales to the Saudis will simply push them to turn eastward. “If the U.S. and West in general move toward some meaningful sanctions of Saudi Arabia, we would be joking to imagine that the Saudis would just sit down and accept it,” Ayham Kamel, head of Eurasia Group’s Middle East and North Africa practice, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe” Monday. “The Saudis I think will begin to tilt — they were already doing that beforehand — they’ll be doing more business with China and Russia. I doubt Mr. Putin would’ve given the Saudis much trouble with this crisis as Mr. Trump has.” Saudi Arabia has already been increasing business with the Russians and the Chinese. In June, [Vladimir Putin](https://www.cnbc.com/vladimir-putin/) hosted Saudi Crown Prince at the Kremlin, where the two agreed to “expand cooperation in oil and gas matters” after working together on output deals to stabilize markets amid fluctuating global crude prices. And October of last year saw the first-ever visit of a Saudi monarch — King Salman — to [Russia,](https://www.cnbc.com/russia/) during which a $1 billion joint investment fund was created and 15 cooperation agreements were signed in the areas of technology, defense and agriculture, including Moscow’s readiness to sell Riyadh its S-400 missile defense system.

#### Saudis shift to Russian bombs – more dangerous.

Goldenberg and Thomas, MAs, 18(Ilan, Senior Fellow @ CNAS, International Affairs @ Columbia, Kaleigh, Conflict Resolution @ University South Carolina, 12-5, “Give Saudi Arabia a Take It or Leave It Deal,” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902)

Walking away from supporting the Saudi-led war in Yemen and ending U.S. mid-air refueling might give Washington the moral high ground, but it will do little to stop the killing. The Saudis view the threat in Yemen as crucial to their interests, so U.S. pressure to end the war altogether will fall short of causing real change. To the Saudis, the threat of Iran establishing a foothold on their southern border is much more vital to their interests than procuring U.S. weapons. Rather than walk away from Yemen, they will buy Russian bombs or use less sophisticated weapons and tactics that will kill even more civilians. Americans will have washed our hands of a morally unacceptable situation, but civilian deaths and the threat of famine will actually get worse, and the world will look on and do nothing.

#### Saudi shifts to Russia if America won’t sell.

CRS 17(Congressional Research Service, “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy”, 10-11, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171011\_R44984\_9c5999ba29006bc29d0363590f5e21d9c3183668.pdf)

Saudi Arabia has tried to diversify its arms sources, including through a concerted effort in recent years to expand its own defense industrial base. In May 2017, shortly before President Trump’s visit, Deputy Crown Prince (and now Crown Prince) Mohammed bin Salman announced the creation of a government-owned company called Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) to manage production of air and land systems, weapons and missiles, and defense electronics (perhaps in imitation of the UAE’s much more established state arms conglomerate, the Emirates Defense Industries Company or EDIC; more below). The establishment of SAMI represents a step toward the government’s goal that 50% of Saudi military procurement spending be domestic by 2030.46 Several parts of a potentially high-value package of arms sales announced during the President’s May visit include arrangements for the actual production of certain items to be carried out in Saudi Arabia. For example, a $6 billion agreement between Lockheed Martin and the Saudi Technology Development and Investment Company (known by its Arabic acronym, TAQNIA) includes plans for the assembly of 150 Blackhawk helicopters in Saudi Arabia.47 U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), has periodically opened opportunities for other suppliers like Russia. Top military officials from the two nations had a meeting in Moscow in April 2017 at which Saudi Arabia, according to a Russian government account, provided a list of possible arms procurement requests.48 That was followed by a state visit by King Salman to Moscow in October 2017, the first ever by a Saudi monarch, during which Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to a number of arms procurements, including S- 400 missile defenses.49 China has also contemplated greater arms sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.50 On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, King Salman and President Xi Jinping signed a series of agreements worth $60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in the kingdom that will manufacture military UAVs for Saudi Arabia’s expanding drone fleet.51 Canada signed a $15 billion deal for armored vehicles with Riyadh in 2014.52

#### Cutting sales causes Saudi to shift to Russia.

Stone, MA, 18(Rupert, Freelance Journalist, Phil @ University London, 10-15, “As Saudi-US relations hit rock bottom, could Saudi turn to Russia or China?” TRT World, https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/as-saudi-us-relations-hit-rock-bottom-could-saudi-turn-to-russia-or-china-20887)

As US-Saudi ties have weakened in recent years, the kingdom has started looking elsewhere for support. With Congress jeopardising arms sales, the Saudis have found an unlikely new partner in Russia, its former Cold War adversary. King Salman visited Moscow in 2017, the first ever trip there by a reigning Saudi monarch, in which $3 billion worth of arms deals were signed. Saudi and Russia also agreed, in 2016, to limit oil production and boost prices. There has been Russian interest in bidding for the planned but delayed public offering of Saudi Aramco, and signs of nuclear cooperation. Riyadh also has decent relations with China, the main customer for its oil and, increasingly, a supplier of weapons. US influence in the region is waning, while Russia’s and China’s has grown. A number of countries are therefore cultivating ties with Moscow and Beijing to recalibrate their foreign relations away from Washington. Turkey and Pakistan, long-standing US allies, have both strengthened their links with Russia. Like Saudi Arabia, they have had US arms sales restricted by Congress. The Khashoggi affair may therefore deepen existing rifts between Saudi Arabia and the West, accelerating a split that was already underway. The journalist’s murder, if it is proven, could cause permanent damage to the US-Saudi relationship and dramatically reshape the geopolitical landscape.

### L – Geographical Areas

#### Specific countries that the new Human Rights emphasis would target:

#### 1. Africa – it’s a potential growth market for Russia.

Connolly, PhD, and Sendtad, MA, 17(Richard, Russian + East European Studies @ Birmingham, Cecilie, Econ @ Bergen, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia”, Chatham House Royal Institute For International Affairs, March, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)

Sub-Saharan Africa Like Latin America, Africa is a market of modest importance to Russian arms manufacturers. It accounted for 3 per cent of Russia’s total arms exports between 2000 and 2016, with sales by volume concentrated in Sudan (0.9 per cent), Uganda (0.6 per cent) and Ethiopia (0.5 per cent). While the volume of sales is not large from Russia’s perspective, Figure 11 shows that the country has been the dominant supplier of weaponry in a number of countries: accounting for 44 per cent of imported weapons in Eritrea (or 54 per cent if one includes the two Su-27 aircraft that were imported from Ukraine in 2002–03), 50 per cent in Ethiopia, 50 per cent in Sudan and 74 per cent in Uganda. Russian manufacturers are also competitive in Angola (accounting for 28 per cent of arms exports to the country), Ghana (22 per cent) and Nigeria (22 per cent). Figure 11: Russian arms sales to Africa, 2000–16 While Russian arms are competitive across sub-Saharan Africa, most of the region’s countries are comparatively poor. Defence spending in absolute terms is therefore too modest for Africa to become a destination of real commercial significance. This will not change unless economic growth accelerates at a sustained rate across the region. Nevertheless, Russian exporters appear keen to strengthen their position, with officials from Rosoboroneksport describing Africa as a ‘growth market’.70 Russian suppliers appear to be prepared to tailor their approach to the African market by focusing on the provision of either older equipment or of service and repair facilities.71 Regardless of whether the region grows in commercial importance, Russia’s importance as a supplier of armaments there means that it could exploit any political capital that might be gained from this position by seeking to acquire basing rights for its armed forces, or by supporting its energy and mining firms in gaining rights to exploit African natural resources.72 However, Russia is not the only country to be making such efforts on the continent. It faces stiff competition from China, which has been a growing source of arms and has provided increasing support to African countries in the development of their natural resources.

#### 2. Latin America – Russia trying to sell now.

Connolly and Sendtad ’17 (Richard, Russian + East European Studies @ Birmingham, Cecilie, Econ @ Bergen, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia”, Chatham House Royal Institute For International Affairs, March, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)

Latin America Latin America accounted for 4.6 per cent of total Russian arms exports between 2000 and 2016. More than 80 per cent of these shipments consisted of supplies to Venezuela, supplemented by modest volumes of exports to Peru and Brazil. The regional arms market tends to be dominated by European and US suppliers, or by domestic suppliers, as is the case in Brazil, the largest military spender in the region (see Figure 10). The relatively small volume of military spending across the region, as well as a tendency among the majority of its countries to enjoy close political ties with the US and Europe, means that the prospects for expanding Russia’s markets outside Venezuela appear bleak. However, that has not stopped Rosoboroneksport from trying, with efforts under way to market small warships, helicopters, submarines, missiles and fighter aircraft across the region.67 Figure 10: Russian arms sales to Latin America, 2000–16 Venezuela has the fifth-largest defence budget in the region.68 It has bought a wide range of weapons systems from Russia in recent years, including BMP-3, BTR-80A and T-72 armoured vehicles, air-defence systems, and Mi-8MT/Mi-17s helicopters. However, Russia’s entrenched position in the Venezuelan market faces two threats. First, the future of Venezuela’s defence budget is uncertain due to the extreme economic difficulties afflicting the country. Most of Venezuela’s arms purchases from Russia were funded from the boom in hydrocarbon prices in the early 2000s. However, after two years of relatively low oil prices, Venezuela has experienced a severe recession, which is likely to restrict the government’s ability to continue spending on military procurement. Second, Russia has faced increasing competition from China in recent years: indeed Chinese suppliers accounted for 90 per cent of Venezuelan arms imports in 2015.69

#### 3. Asia – It’s a key export market for Russia.

Connolly, PhD, and Sendtad, MA, 17(Richard, Russian + East European Studies @ Birmingham, Cecilie, Econ @ Bergen, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia”, Chatham House Royal Institute For International Affairs, March, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)

Asia Asia is by far the most important export market for Russian arms. Not only does the region contain Russia’s two largest customers, China and India (together responsible for 56 per cent of all Russian arms exports in 2000–16), it also includes significant customers such as Vietnam (5.6 per cent), Myanmar (1.4 per cent), Malaysia (1.3 per cent), Kazakhstan (1.3 per cent) and Indonesia (1.1 per cent). In total, Asia accounted for 70 per cent of Russia’s arms exports in 2000–16. This should not be surprising given that the region is the fastest-growing armaments market in the world, with brisk economic growth rates and simmering international tensions fuelling rising defence expenditure across the region.28 Figure 6: Russian arms sales to Asia, 2000–16 As illustrated in Figure 6, Russia is the dominant supplier of weapons across large swathes of Asia.29 Between 2000 and 2016, it was responsible for 43.1 per cent of the weapons exported to the region. By way of comparison, over the same period the US accounted for 24.6 per cent of arms sales to the region and China for 6.8 per cent. Even in those Asian countries that do not account for a large share of Russian exports, such as Myanmar, Turkmenistan and Mongolia, Russia is often the primary or a prominent source of arms supplies. In recent years, it has attempted to enter markets traditionally dominated by other powers. For example, efforts to increase sales to Pakistan, traditionally supplied by China and the US, are beginning to bear fruit.30 Indonesia has tended to purchase weaponry from European countries, but Russia has also made inroads into that market and accounted for over 20 per cent of Indonesian arms imports in 2000–16. Indonesia is now being targeted by Russia as a potential purchaser of Su-35 aircraft and Varshavyanka-class submarines.31 Russia is also targeting countries that have traditionally sourced armaments from the US. Recently, it has shown a willingness to exploit the deterioration in relations between the US and the Philippines to carve out sales opportunities there.32 The three principal Asian markets for Russia’s weapons are India, China and Vietnam (see Figure 7). During the 1990s, and in the early part of this century, China was its largest customer. However, for the past decade, this position has been occupied by India, with Vietnam emerging as an increasingly significant customer since 2010. Figure 7: Major Asian importers of Russian arms, 2000–16 (TIV, million constant 1990 $)

#### 4. Middle East – Arms sales are central to Russian expansion – shift likely

Wormuth, MA, 19(Christine, Senior Advisor @ CSIS, Former Under Secretary Defense For Policy @ DOD, Public Policy @ Maryland, “Russia and China in the Middle East: Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition,” Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 5-9, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT511/RAND\_CT511.pdf)

Arms sales are also a central component of Russia’s engagement in the Middle East. Fifty percent of Russian arms sales go to the Middle East, up from 36 percent in 2015.5 Russia’s military involvement in Syria not only has enabled Moscow to field test a wide array of new weapons and delivery systems, but also has served as a highly visible advertisement for Russian equipment. Although U.S. military equipment is seen as the gold standard in the region, countries in the Middle East are often frustrated by the foreign policy conditions attached to U.S. arms sales and the slowness of the U.S. arms sale process, which includes a requirement to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge. As a result, Middle Eastern leaders see Russia as a highly viable alternative source of armaments. In 2014, Egypt signed a $3.5 billion deal with Russia, and Iraq became the second largest importer of Russian arms after India. Russia has also signed deals with the UAE, and both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reportedly in discussion with Moscow to purchase the advanced S-400 anti-aircraft system.6

### AT: Aff is Small

#### Each new market creates economies of scale that lowers prices and improves quality

Caverley 18 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jonathan, “AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME,” *War on the Rocks*, [https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/)//BB](https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/%29//BB)

A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else.

#### The US must play the spoiler

Gurak 18 – senior fellow at the Potomac Foundation and was deputy director general of Ukraine’s state-owned arms manufacturer Ukroboronprom 2014–18. (Denys, “How to Push Back Against Russia? Ukraine's Defense Industry Could Help.,” *National interest*, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-push-back-against-russia-ukraines-defense-industry-could-help-32242)//BB](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-push-back-against-russia-ukraines-defense-industry-could-help-32242%29//BB)

The global balance of power is in transition. A global order that was established after World War II and the collapse of Soviet Union is now evolving and often dysfunctional. We are witnessing the expansion of a multipolar world, and the risk of conflict is intensifying due to an increase in the number of influential players around the world. Ukraine is at the epicenter of these changes and the interests of many of the world’s major powers. It is the key to balancing Russia’s global ambitions. Since its military aggression in Ukraine in 2014, and even earlier, starting with its war with Georgia, Russia has continuously tried to destabilize and diminish the global-security system. This was done with only one aim: for Russia to reassert itself under a new post–Soviet sphere of influence with new borders, both physical and psychological. President Vladimir Putin made this clear in 2007 during his speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he complained that “the United States has overstepped its national borders, and in every area.” Of the tools Russia uses to gain geopolitical influence, the most crucial is the “diffusion of tactics.” These tactics involve various methods of influence, ranging from military conflicts to the manipulation of national political and economic systems through disinformation and proxies, as well as cyber warfare. Faced with such threats, Western political and security systems are vulnerable. Democracy requires public trust and a bureaucratic consensus to survive. Putin knows this, which is why he has sought to undermine these pillars of democratic stability. Similarly, the United States and its allies should respond to the Kremlin’s challenges by attacking Russia where it is most vulnerable: its exports of fossil fuels and exports of weapons. In the oil and gas sector, the West has been assertive in countering Russian aggression by sanctioning Russia’s energy industry and exporting shale oil and gas from the United States. But in the defense industry and defense trade, on the other hand, there has not been the same level of action by the West. This is where Ukraine has a critical role to play. There are just a few countries in the world that have full cycles of defense production. Only the United States, France, Russia, China, and Ukraine cover virtually all technological capabilities in the defense space. **Russia’s arms trade poses threats to global security**. The Kremlin uses defense technical cooperation as a means to achieve its geopolitical goals. Moscow pursued this policy during the Cold War by dividing the world into sectors of strategic influence. Back then, the United States was the counterweight to this destructive Soviet strategy, and it **must once again assume this role**.

### AT: Interoperability

#### Russian arms are preferable over American arms - inexpensive, competitive, robust, and streamlined sales system

**Borshchevskaya ‘17** (Anna, Senior Fellow and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that specializes in Russia's Middle East policy; U.S.-Russian relations; Russian foreign policy, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East”, December 2017, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-tactical-side-of-russias-arms-sales-to-the-middle-east>)

When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the US in terms of quality and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons learned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. 14 In addition, the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to deliver after a contract is signed.

#### Drones proves countries can operate dual-country tech---and they can transition quickly

Peter Apps, 6-18-2019, "Turkey, the S-400 and the new arms sale geopolitics," Japan Times, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/06/18/commentary/world-commentary/turkey-s-400-new-arms-sale-geopolitics/#.XRE2behKjIU>

Sometime next month, Russia may begin shipping its S-400 air defense system to Turkey. It is a move that divides NATO, may see the Turkish military kicked out of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, and demonstrates just how central yet divisive high-tech weapons exports have become. Throughout the Cold War, weapons shipments from both East and West were vital for entrenching alliances and establishing spheres of interest. While some nations — particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia — embraced cutting-edge U.S. technology, many others purchased Russian — hard-wearing, often cheaper equipment that came with wider Soviet diplomatic and economic support. The world now is rather more complex. A growing number of countries, such as Turkey, Iraq and India, wish to hedge their bets and buy from both. That’s understandable — but changing technology brings further complications. As the current U.S.-Turkey row shows all too clearly, mixing and matching the latest Russian and U.S. systems is something Washington does not take lightly. Last week, Turkish pilots found themselves pulled from flying F-35s in Arizona, an apparent indication of just how seriously the United States takes the issue. If it goes ahead with the purchase, Ankara may also face U.S. financial sanctions, inflicting further damage on an already fragile economy. For Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, this appears a matter of pride. Having felt largely ignored by the U.S. over the Syria war, Turkey has found itself increasingly at loggerheads with Washington. That came to a head after an attempted coup in 2016, when Erdogan seems to have felt the U.S. was too slow in backing him. In some ways, the S-400 is a poorly designed purchase for an insecure autocrat — particularly anyone whose deepest fear is that one day they might face U.S.-backed “regime change.” Developed in the 1990s and refined with lessons from the 1999 Kosovo war, it is intended to provide an integrated air defense that would prevent U.S. or other forces from seizing air superiority as quickly as they did in Kosovo or the two Gulf wars. Among other attributes, that means its users — and almost certainly also its Russian manufacturers — can share data and insights, boosting their preparedness for any attack. That capability, of course, is key to the current U.S.-Turkish standoff. America’s greatest worry is that once Turkey takes delivery of its F-35s — and then uses them in simulated wargames with the S-400 — it will inevitably learn ways in which the aircraft’s stealth characteristics can be detected and targeted. If Russia were to gain that information — and some analysts suspect it might be transferred almost immediately from the S-400’s networks — then the technical edge of one of the most expensive aircraft in recent history would be lost. Already, U.S. and other NATO officials are concerned enough about Russia’s spreading influence, not to mention the way in which regional powers are turning to Russian and Chinese technology over U.S. systems. Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and India are among U.S. allies reported to be considering the S-400. Crucially, none of those states is also part of the F-35 program, meaning the level of concern over secrets being lost is inevitably much lower. Still, the growth of Russian and Chinese arms sales in the region is a clear sign of diminishing U.S. influence. After Washington refused to sell armed predator drones to countries in the region, several states — including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq — have purchased armed Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles that are now a frequent sight in the skies over war zones such as Yemen. **Simpler Russian** and Chinese **technology is also** sometimes **simply faster to get into service — the most striking example being Iraq’s Su-25 Frogfoot** ground attack aircraft, bought from Moscow in 2014 at the height of the Islamic State advance and thrown into action mere days later. For Beijing and particularly Moscow, conflict in the Middle East makes it an appealing sales destination, both for otherwise obsolete equipment and cutting-edge new platforms. In Syria, Moscow has made a highly public point of testing a number of new weapons systems, including unmanned tanks, as well as getting its commanders experience in the messy realities of modern warfare. Fundamentally, such activity in Syria and the Turkey S-400 sale are signs of Moscow’s geopolitical posturing, demonstrating the ability of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian state to extend its will across the Middle East. And perhaps equally importantly, the inability of the U.S. to stop it. When it comes to the S-400s, that puts Erdogan in an awkward position. If he cancels the purchase, he will look weak and burn down his relationship with Moscow. If he goes ahead, however, Washington has a vested interest in exacting a high price, making sure that Turkey regrets its decision. None of it does anything to solve the problems of the Middle East. But it feels like yet another sign of rising international rivalry quietly running ever more out-of-control.

#### Purchasers will choose to sacrifice interoperability with the US after the plan

Benard 18 - visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is managing partner of an American private equity firm focused on Asia and Africa (Alexander, “US needs to sell more weapons as Russia and China fill the breach,” *The Australian*, Press Reader)//BB

The US government blocks weapons sales to foreign countries for various reasons. Congress is often wary of selling arms to countries that could use them to undermine civil liberties. The Defence Department often worries the purchasing country could allow sensitive US technology to fall into the wrong hands. The State Department arms-control bureau has a general aversion to any weapons proliferation on grounds that it could trigger an arms race. These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence, US strategic interests must be given more weight. Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22 per cent of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40 per cent from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators. In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to peel off countries the US has declined to arm. Russia sells aircraft, submarines, anti-aircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to US security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese — such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms — cannot integrate effectively with US technologies. The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the US in the future, pushing a country further out of America’s security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the US needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China. Countries cut off by the US will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the US for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This eliminates a key lever for US influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance. Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from US manufacturers, but was turned down due to concerns around deteriorating governance. Then late last year it acquired a sophisticated missile-defence system from Russia for $US2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of NATO. Vietnam’s relations with the US have been pleasantly thawing, partly because of a common concern around China’s aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The US lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales to sonars and radars. In addition the US has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidises the transactions. Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America’s closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the country’s trajectory and led the US to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over $US1bn of submarines to the Thai navy. Late last year Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval centre with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment. There are more examples around the world. As the US moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.

### AT: Saudi 2030

#### Saudi 2030 Vision fails – Russia fills in short-term – Saudis can’t yet provide for its own.

Stratfor 18 (Stratfor; an American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher; 11-9-2018; "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own"; https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030; Stratfor; accessed 6-29-2019; LR)

Saudi Arabia, flush with money, nestled in a hostile environment and saddled with demographic shortcomings, has long spent freely to bring in weapons from abroad. And over the past five years, driven by its intensifying competition with archrival Iran and a heavy military commitment in the Yemen conflict, this trend has accelerated. During the period of 2013-17, the number of arms systems the Saudi government purchased grew by 255 percent compared with its acquisitions from 2008-12, ranking it behind only India among global arms importers, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. As Saudi Arabia pursues its regional interests, it has increasingly sought to insulate itself from outside influence. To guard against dependence on arms imports, which could subject it to political pressure, it has worked to build up the capabilities of its own defense industry. This shift in philosophy comes as the kingdom's usual arms suppliers increasingly reconsider the extent of their weapons trade with Riyadh because of mounting casualties from Yemen's civil war and outrage over the apparent murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Besides lessening dependence on foreign weapons sources, a mature local defense industry could also play a key role in diversifying the Saudi economy while Riyadh is working to ease its overreliance on energy exports. If the Saudi defense sector can be successfully built out, it could provide jobs for a large number of citizens and help address concerns about growing unemployment. Building the Base for a Defense Industry Saudi aspirations for an indigenous defense industry are certainly ambitious. In its overarching Saudi Vision 2030 economic strategy, Riyadh wants to produce locally at least half of the equipment it will need for security and military use by 2030. To move toward that goal, when Saudi Arabia negotiates major arms contracts with trade partners, it increasingly insists that component manufacturing and final assembly be done in the kingdom. Riyadh has also overhauled some parts of the government structure to oversee the growth of its defense industry. For instance, the General Authority for Military Industries was created in 2017 to coordinate weapons procurement and research and development with an emphasis on local sourcing. In the same year, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), a state-owned defense company with a focus on aeronautics, land weapons systems, missiles and defense electronics, all areas of heavy Saudi need, was founded. SAMI's lofty goals include the creation of more than 40,000 direct and 100,000 indirect jobs in the country by 2030, which, by then, it hopes would add more than $3.7 billion to the kingdom's annual gross domestic product, which stood at about $684 billion in 2017.

[Chart omitted]

Saudi spending on arms imports Saudi Arabia already has made concrete progress in building its defense industrial base. Large Western defense companies employ thousands of Saudis at their plants in the kingdom. Two-thirds of the workers employed by BAE Systems to assemble the Hawk trainer jets it sold to Riyadh, for instance, are Saudi citizens. In March 2018, Boeing and SAMI formed a joint venture partnership with the goal of localizing 55 percent of the service and maintenance work done on Boeing aircraft sold to the kingdom by 2030. According to Boeing, this would create 6,000 jobs or training opportunities for Saudi youths. Wrinkles in the System While Saudi Arabia has certainly laid the groundwork for its defense industry and has made some early progress in developing it, guiding the sector to maturity will be no simple matter. It is one thing to agree on paper to significant technology transfers and local job creation, but it is another to effectively implement such deals. Struggles by defense companies to satisfy stipulations within pending agreements that mandate local sourcing of services and raw materials have led to contract delays. It has also proved particularly difficult for defense companies with well-established and staffed manufacturing plants in the United States and Europe to set up assembly lines in Saudi Arabia, despite the relative simplicity of assembly compared with full manufacturing. The shortcomings of the Saudi educational system have forced defense companies to conduct their own staff training, causing delays and adding costs. A particular problem those companies have run into has been in finding a sufficient number of Saudis who have both the necessary technical skills and the willingness to work on a factory floor. The shortcomings of the Saudi educational system have forced defense companies to conduct their own staff training, causing delays and adding costs. In fact, the choice of who would lead SAMI provides an illustrative point of the larger issue. Taking the helm as CEO of the state-owned defense company was not a Saudi, but rather Andreas Schwer, a German citizen and former head of combat systems at Rheinmetall AG. Moving Away From the U.S. and Europe Beyond the long-term strategy of making its own equipment, Saudi Arabia has also weighed the option of diversifying weapons purchases away from U.S. and European states, which currently satisfy the bulk of Saudi demand. Such an approach not only would allow Saudi Arabia to reduce its dependence on the United States and the European Union, but could also give Riyadh access to countries more willing to overlook its track record on human rights and to offer generous technology transfer rights as part of contracts. The kingdom, for instance, has opened negotiations with Russia over the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in hopes that Moscow would offer a deal better than the U.S. offers on its Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. And Saudi Arabia has purchased large numbers of armed drones from China as the United States continues to refuse to sell such technology to countries in the region. While there are certainly potential benefits for the Saudis in diversifying arms sources, there are considerable limits as well. For one thing, neither Russia nor China is in the position to replace the United States as a present and powerful guarantor of Saudi security against Iran. Even more important, because the Saudi military is equipped chiefly with Western weapons, a major forcewide shift toward non-Western equipment would create serious logistical and training problems in a force already not well-known for its maintenance capabilities or its professional acumen. For those reasons, the Saudi state will have no choice but to continue to rely on its alliances with the United States and, to a lesser extent, European states. This will extend to its arms-purchasing relationship as well. Even in the best of cases, the Saudi defense industry will not be developed enough to give it full independence in weapons sourcing even by 2030. Considering the industry's current underdeveloped state, even if it matures considerably, the kingdom will still have to look abroad for the high-tech weaponry it desires. Saudi Arabia thus will have no choice but to continue to rely on arms imports in the coming years, but that dependence will not preclude it from following an increasingly independent course. Furthermore, given the limits of the kingdom's strategy to find other sources of weapons, Riyadh will remain keen to maintain its significant relationship with Western powers, particularly the United States.

### AT: China fills in

#### Russia is more likely to fill in --- they out-compete China in other competitive markets now

Clifford 15 – undergraduate @ Brown citing Roger Cliff, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council specializing in Asian security (Edward, “An Export to Arms: Is China’s weapons trade as menacing as it seems?,” *Brown Political Review*, [http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/11/export-to-arm-is-chinas-weapons-trade-as-menacing-as-it-seems/)//BB](http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/11/export-to-arm-is-chinas-weapons-trade-as-menacing-as-it-seems/%29//BB)

Furthermore, if weapons sales are the next great game, then China is barely on the scoreboard. Alarmists should recognize that despite China’s 143 percent increase in weapons sales over the last five years, it still only represents 5 percent of the global arms market. Russia, the world’s second-largest producer, has a 27 percent global market share while US exports make up 31 percent. In fact, from an economic and geopolitical perspective, Chinese weapons sales are competing far more directly with Russian than American transfers. Both Russia and China tend to sell weapons known for their reliability, simplicity, and cost-effectiveness — putting them in competition for trade with poorer countries. On the other hand, Cliff points out that American foreign policy has effectively “locked up” many major weapons markets, including South Korea, Israel, and Japan. As a result, Russia and China are left to compete for market space — and by extension, influence — among the nonaligned countries of the developing world. Even there, China is struggling to corner the market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China is currently the dominant arms dealer in just three African countries: South Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. While weapons sales are hardly the defining factor in the relationship between two countries, it is clear that even in South Sudan, where China enjoys an unusually monopolistic relationship in weapons sales, Beijing’s ability to influence decision-making is limited. In a rare divergence from an espoused policy of noninterference in Africa, China committed 800 soldiers to South Sudan as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the commitment of troops was “the responsibility and duty of a responsible power and not because of China’s own interests.” However, a report by the research group Small Arms Survey revealed that China was also backing a 700-strong militia in the Unity State — South Sudan’s oil-producing region — in order to safeguard an oil field. For Beijing, an end to the war would be a win twice over, proving to the world that China is capable of being a geopolitical leader while restoring a semblance of normality conducive to trade. But despite repeated attempts at intervention and mediation, China has struggled to bring its influence to bear in conclusively ending the civil war. Though China is still, in many ways, taking its first steps as a world power, its struggling aspirations for responsible stewardship in Africa are proof that economic ties are not the sole pillar of diplomacy. The wariness of nations in China’s own backyard is testament to this. On account of its vacillations between indifference and belligerence, China’s foreign policy has failed to foster trust with its neighbors. It is unclear to what extent China has attempted to use weapons sales to cultivate relationships with neighboring states, but its perceived aggressions in the South China Sea have certainly had a far more negative impact on regional relations than “friendship prices” on pistols are capable of making up for. Asian nations don’t turn to China — the regional power and a country that they should have every economic incentive to cooperate with — as their sole provider of weapons. While many of the less wealthy Asia-Pacific nations buy with a relative lack of distinction between the United States, China, and Russia, the region’s wealthier countries — and major players in the South China Sea dispute — import their weapons primarily from the United States. And unlike nations that share borders with the United States and Russia, no Chinese neighbor, with the exception of Myanmar, buys weapons in any significant quantity from Beijing.

## IMPACTS

### # – Russia Bad / Revisionism

#### An emboldened Putin and causes prolif and global wars – extinction.

Alexey **Arbatov 18** [PhD, Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations], "In Search of Light at the End of the Tunnel for U.S.-Russian Relations," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6-26-2018 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/26/in-search-of-light-at-end-of-tunnel-for-u.s.-russian-relations-pub-76689

**Putin’s landmark speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference was a signal to the West that Russia no longer intended to play by the old rules and would not follow the course set by the U**nited **S**tates. However, it took Russia’s armed conflict in Georgia in 2008 for the West to understand that Moscow actually intended to stop NATO’s eastward expansion. Medvedev’s presidency between 2008 and 2012 was a short respite (or a reset) in the escalating confrontation between Russia and the United States, which included the signing of the New START Treaty in 2010, the cancellation of a planned delivery of S-300 anti-aircraft missile defense systems to Iran, and the joint fight against terrorism and piracy. **When he returned to the Kremlin** for a third term in 2012, **Putin began to chart a new course in the spirit of his Munich speech**. A bitter historical irony is that, after 2008, then president Obama tried to change the U.S. policy of previous years. As if responding to Putin’s accusations in Munich, **Obama affirmed the rule of law in international politics, the leading role of legitimate international institutions such as the UN** and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), **and the primacy of diplomacy and of multilateral approaches to conflict resolution; Obama also took steps toward** U.S. withdrawal from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, **the cessation of NATO expansion to the east, and radical nuclear disarmament**. In terms of relations with Russia, Obama was probably the best U.S. leader after former president Franklin D. Roosevelt—but it was already too late. Upon **Putin**’s return to the presidency, he **and his associates were determined to drastically change the model of relations with the West that had been in place from the 1990s through his first two terms. Obama’s peace overtures were perceived as** a manifestation of **weakness** at best, or at worst as yet another hoax. **Russia’s relations with the West thus entered the most difficult period of the past quarter century and now bear a considerable resemblance to the Cold War**. It is necessary, however, to emphasize that history does not repeat itself according to a blueprint; the world has fundamentally changed over the past thirty years, whatever nostalgic feelings and ideas borrowed from the past have possessed politicians. **In place of the bipolar world order of the Cold War, a polycentric, non-uniform, dynamic international system is emerging after failed U.S. attempts to establish a unipolar world** under its leadership. Unlike the Cold War, the current confrontation between Russia and the West does not cover all aspects of their relationship and does not involve the rest of the world, which is preoccupied with its own affairs and conflicts. **The world economy has become more integrated and global**, and reciprocal economic sanctions cause mutual, though unequal, damage. **Globalization**, the information revolution, **and continuous innovation in high-tech sectors are eroding the sovereignty of states; these developments are having a powerful impact on** socioeconomic conditions, **international politics, the military balance, and security considerations**. Ethnic and religious conflicts, the disintegration of states and the redrawing of borders, mass migration, Islamic extremism and international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose formidable dangers to civilization. The fight against these trends requires unity among the world’s leading powers and alliances, the strengthening of institutions and norms of global and regional governance, and the consolidation of arms control and nonproliferation regimes. This is even truer of fundamental, politically fraught global problems such as climate change, ecological degradation, epidemics, demographic challenges, and the scarcity of food and other natural resources. For now, however, **the drastic aggravation of military and political tensions between the major centers of power—above all between Russia and the United States and its NATO allies** (and in the future, perhaps between China and the United States and its allies in Asia)—**prevails over the need for cooperation. These tensions threaten to destroy** (however imperfect) **institutions, regimes, and norms of global governance, and they risk leading to a** multilateral, multifaceted **arms race that could cause regional or even global wars, drawing the world into the chaos of economic collapse, lawlessness, and violence**.

#### Expanded Russian influence leads to nuclear war.

Gray 17 – PhD, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (Colin, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Foreword, in *Comparative Strategy*, 36.1)//BB, sex edited

Short of war itself, the international political and strategic relations between Russia and the United States are about as bad as they can be. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the simultaneous conduct of two air independent campaigns over Syria could evolve all too suddenly into a war triggered by **accident or by miscalculation**. There is little, if any, mystery about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations. Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, Putin is striving to recover and restore that of which he is able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance. Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more power and influence. The challenge for the Western World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail, is to decide where and when this latest episode in Russian expansionism will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it **must** and will **be halted**. It is more likely than not that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent years has given a credible impression of opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can. However, there is ample evidence to support this study’s proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision of Russia as a recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Putin’s international political objectives appear largely open today: he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take, preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman [person] to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power. There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia’s hand, but that he also will misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable. Putin’s military instrument is heavily dependent, indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of **nuclear weapons**. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in error could well place us, Russians included, in a world **horrifically new** to all. This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin’s elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and ‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves, including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I). The challenge for the United States today and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and must be done to **stop Putin’s campaign in its tracks** before it wreaks **lethal damage** to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe.

### # - Modernization

#### Renewed defense expenditure funds military modernization --- risks nuclear war

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The United States has to pay attention. Russia may be a power in long-term decline, but it retains the capacity to make significant trouble. Moreover, in recent years the Kremlin has shown a new readiness to use military force. But not all aspects of the modernization program are equally worrisome. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR Russia is modernizing the three legs of its strategic triad. It is procuring eight Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and is halfway through a ten-year program to build four hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is also updating its Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, and officials have reportedly considered reopening the Blackjack production line. Placed in context, however, the strategic modernization program appears less worrisome. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian economy went into free fall for most of the ensuing decade. The defense budget received little in comparison to Soviet times, and most programs, including strategic nuclear forces, were starved for funds. That only began to change in the mid-2000s. The strategic modernization program is replacing a lot of old systems, systems that the Russian military would have preferred to retire earlier had it been able to pay to do so. For example, a large number of Russia’s strategic warheads sit atop SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25 ICBMs, all of which are scheduled to be retired by 2020. If the military had had the resources, it would have retired and replaced the SS-18s and SS-19s years ago. Four hundred ICBMs and SLBMs constitute a major program, but the number seems appropriate for a Russian strategic force that, under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), looks like it will deploy 400–450 strategic missiles. The Borei-class submarines will replace Delta-class submarines, all of which were built prior to 1991. A combination of reliability and resource concerns has meant that most of the older boats performed deterrence patrols at dockside rather than at sea. That may change as more Boreis become operational. In comparison, the U.S. Navy normally maintains about half of its fourteen Ohio-class SSBNS at sea. The fact that Moscow is considering reopening the production line for its aging Blackjack bomber is interesting. Russia currently flies only a dozen of these aircraft (in addition to some sixty older Bear bombers). A decision to resume production of Blackjacks would indicate problems and delays with the next generation PAK-DA bomber, which was originally scheduled to have its first flight by the end of this decade. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR Moscow’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons are more worrisome. To begin with, there is Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile to intermediate range. While such a missile likely will not pose a direct threat to the United States, it constitutes a treaty violation and would threaten U.S. allies, as well as other countries, in Europe and Asia. The outside world has less visibility regarding Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal than Russia’s strategic forces. It appears, however, that the military has developed a range of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, including cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles and aircraft. By contrast, the United States has steadily reduced the number and types of weapons in its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal, which now consists solely of the B61 nuclear bomb. Of particular concern is Russia’s apparent focus on low-yield nuclear weapons—which one official has referred to as a “nuclear scalpel”—coupled with its nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine. That doctrine envisages escalating to de-escalate, that is, using low-yield nuclear weapons as a means to terminate a conventional conflict on terms favorable to the Kremlin. Russia’s unclassified national security strategy says that nuclear weapons would be used only in the event of an attack with weapons of mass destruction on Russia or one of its allies, or in the event of an attack on Russia with conventional forces in which the fate of the state is at stake. The “de-escalation” doctrine, Putin’s references to nuclear weapons in his public statements and the broad modernization of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear forces suggest that the classified strategy could envisage use of those weapons in wider circumstances. That risks lowering the nuclear threshold. And once a nuclear weapon—any nuclear weapon—is used, the possibility of catastrophic escalation would increase dramatically. CONVENTIONAL Russia is also modernizing its general-purpose forces, having set itself a goal of making 70 percent of the army’s equipment modern by 2020. This is coupled with changes in operational tactics, some of which were developed after the Russian army’s poor performance in the 2008 conflict with Georgia. The use of special operations forces in Crimea—referred to by Ukrainians as “little green men” for their lack of identifying insignia—proved effective. The Russians showed the ability to quickly mass fire on targets when regular army units entered Ukraine in August 2014 and again in early 2015. Russia’s conventional forces, however, face limitations. First, it is not clear how much progress Moscow is making in closing the technology gap with Western militaries. Some capabilities are indeed modern, such as the sea-launched cruise missiles that the Russian Navy launched late last year against targets in Syria. Of course, that was a capability that the U.S. Navy demonstrated in force against Iraq in 1991. While the Russian Air Force drops some smart weapons against targets in Syria, the majority appear to be “dumb bombs.” In contrast, most U.S. weapons used against ISIS targets are smart. (This may also reflect Russian rules of engagement, which are less focused on limiting collateral damage.) Moscow faces a new problem of late: the sanctions imposed by the West following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine block certain exports to Russia’s defense industry. Closing the technology gap will likely remain a challenge. A related problem is the dependence of Russian naval shipbuilders on a Ukrainian manufacturer for ship engines, the supply of which has now been cut off. Author Steven Pifer Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative steven\_pifer A second limitation, primarily for the army, is the fact that conscripts still make up a large portion of enlisted personnel. The military took in nearly 300,000 conscripts in 2015. (While Russian officials talk about a million-man military, estimates put total personnel at closer to 800,000.) Conscripts serve for only one year, which hardly suffices to give them the proficiency that their professional counterparts in Western armies achieve. BUDGET WOES A weak budget prevented the Russian military from conducting much modernization between 1991 and 2005. That could prove to be a crucial factor again. Faced with low oil prices and Western economic sanctions, the Russian economy contracted by nearly 4 percent in 2015. Most analysts expect it to contract further in 2016. The government budget for 2016 assumed an oil price of $50 per barrel. In January, the price closed at about $34 per barrel, after dipping to almost $28 per barrel. Russian ministries were told to cut budget expenditures by 10 percent, though it is not clear if this applies to the military. If the oil price remains soft, the defense budget may not escape unscathed. Alexey Kudrin, finance minister during Putin’s first two terms as president, recently said that defense spending cuts “cannot be avoided,” though they might be postponed a short while. That could hinder the military’s modernization effort.

### AT: Arms Sales Not Key

#### Expanded arms sales are vital to future Russian expansionism

**Millero 17** – MBA and Master’s of Strategic Intelligence, Colonel USAF (Raymond, “ROOTS RUNNING DEEP ARMS SALES AND RUSSIA’S EXCURSION INTO SYRIA,” [https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038117.pdf)//BB](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038117.pdf%29//BB)

Abstract Reminiscent of the Soviet era, military arms exports have once again become a major instrument for projecting Russian power and influence, and are integral in bolstering a fragile economy and offsetting the damages caused by Western sanctions. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian War on behalf of Bashar Al-Assad indicates a growing primacy of Putin’s willingness to take calculated risks within the Russian sphere of influence and to use military exports as a political tool to achieve national security interests. In Syria, Russia utilized its military exports to enhance its image as a world power, maintain access, and counter Western influence in the Middle East. In addition to sending advanced weaponry to Syria, Russia showcased its military hardware against Western made weapons, sending a clear signal of Russian reliability and sophistication to nations wanting to upgrade, purchase or diversify their military inventory. The state owned and controlled Russian defense industry remains a fundamental instrument of national power and supports the achievement of Putin’s national security goals. Military sales represents an important aspect to understanding the potential for future Russian adventurism. Hence, future Russian military expansion in what it considers its sphere of influence, with Putin’s goal to reemerge as a great power, can be anticipated through looking at Russia’s defense export sales. The inextricable link between foreign military sales and the achievement of Russia’s national security interests is an important aspect in avoiding the next strategic surprise. Thesis This paper argues that Russia has returned to a pseudo-Soviet style practice of utilizing arms sales as a political instrument to further its national security objectives. Moreover, this paper argues part of Russia’s decision to commit forces into Syria was to showcase their military hardware to the world, thereby renewing interest in purchasing arms. This, in turn, provided Russia additional opportunities to expand their influence and counter the West. Finally, this paper argues there is an **inextricable link** between foreign military sales and the potential for **future Russian adventurism**. Understanding this link is an important aspect to avoid strategic surprise the next time Russia commits military forces in its self-proclaimed sphere of influence.

#### Fill in gives Russia the necessary funds for expansionism

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A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction.

### AT: Russia is Defensive

#### Russia will pursue revisionist expansionism as long as it has the economic capacity to do so --- leads to war

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Russia’s domestic political system under Putin is oriented to expansionist policies and is predicated on recasting Russia as a de facto empire. The inherent revisionism of Russian policy and its fundamental anti-liberalism makes anti-Americanism the default option of Russian policy. Cooperation, where possible is tactical and instrumental, not a result of a strategic rapprochement. This applies to arms control accords where Moscow feels free to break inconvenient agreements. Russia’s overall security policies begin with the presupposition of conflict with most of its interlocutors and thus entails a consistent bias toward the militarization of its domestic and foreign policies. Domestic dissent is equated to treason by fifth columnists linked to external enemies and virtually all elements of domestic policy are viewed through this prism.71 Given these continuing and strongly rooted factors, Russia’s conventional and nuclear buildup will continue as long as Russia can afford it and Putin retains power, even if he must ratchet back the level or scope of this buildup as a result of economic pressures. The dangerous threat environment for the West described above will not change unless there are dramatic changes in Russia’s expansionist goals and Russia’s willingness to use any and all forms of pressure to advance them, i.e., Russia’s grand strategy. Absent such a change in Russia’s strategic goals, U.S. and NATO conciliatory behavior/actions are likely to present an image of disunity and indecision, and thereby potentially provoke further Russian belligerence. The usual Western hope that arms control will address threats and relieve it of the need to respond more forcefully appears particularly fanciful now. Putin is little interested in new arms control and is manifestly willing to violate existing agreements. As will be discussed in Chapters Two and Five, Russia has systematically violated the Helsinki Final Act, all the treaties with Ukraine and other CIS governments on the inviolability of borders, and the 1994 Budapest Accord with Washington, London and Kiev on Ukraine’s denuclearization; it also has broken the INF treaty, the CFE treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe) and its political promises in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Unfortunately, abundant evidence points to the continuing mobilization of Russia for a long-term state of siege with the West, if not actual war, as Moscow continues to insist that it is secure only if all its interlocutors are not. A mobilization policy initiated by 2009 has greatly accelerated since 2013. If Russia cannot escape from the Putin regime’s anti-Western hostility and insistence upon hegemony, the ensuing state of siege will be a source of crises and conflict for years. Perhaps most dangerous is the fact that Putin is not a magician who can control the nationalism and militarism he has inflamed. As the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey said in July 2014, “If I have a fear about this it’s that Putin may actually light a fire that he loses control of.”72 Indeed, crises and conflict are the logical consequences of Putin’s expansionist grand strategy.

### AT: Russia Econ Collapse Bad

#### Diversionary theory is false for Russia – four warrants

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To begin with, the argument that Russia’s near abroad assertion is an attempt to divert attention from internal challenges fails to convince, for four reasons. First, the political survival of the present regime in Moscow was never acutely or seriously threatened. True, there were anti-government protests after fraud-tainted parliamentary elections in December 2011 and prior to Putin’s return to the presidency in May 2012. Putin’s popularity at that time was no doubt lower than during his first terms. Still, all independent surveys show that Putin and his regime continue to enjoy broad support from large swathes of the population (Smyth 2014). This is not to deny that there is real discontent with the government in Moscow, but it is unlikely to pose a significant challenge to the Kremlin in the short to medium term. There are three reasons why. For one thing, there is no united opposition in Russia; for another, the regime can use the state’s coercive apparatus to suppress domestic unrest; and finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Kremlin can fall back on non-democratic sources of legitimacy. Alongside economic growth, which has slowed down in recent years, regime legitimacy is created through the provision of internal order and the promotion of patriotic nationalism within Russia, which is purposefully exploited by the Kremlin (Cannady and Kubicek 2014; Liñán 2010; Rose etal. 2011). In short, the absence of any immediate threat to the Russian leadership casts doubt on the argument that its assertive approach in the region is a case of diversionary foreign policy. Second, almost all scholars agree that in the longer term, regime stability hinges on economic performance (Treisman 2011). Thus, it seems shortsighted and self-defeating for the Russian leadership to pursue overly assertive foreign policies that lead to trade sanctions from the West and economic isolation. Some observers may counter that the Kremlin artificially creates conflicts precisely because it wants to sustain its popular legitimacy at a time of economic crisis. Indeed, it is well documented that approval ratings of the Russian regime have increased in response to high-level conflicts such as the Georgian war in 2008 and the Ukraine crisis in 2014. However, as Daniel Treisman (2014, 386) has shown, “such rallies tend to be short-lived, dissipating within a few months.” He concludes that “Putin’s surge during the Georgia war, which evaporated as the financial crisis struck, can hardly have been worth the war’s economic costs” (Treisman 2014, 386). Indeed, a large number of quantitative and qualitative studies have shown that diversionary war rallies tend to be fleeting. As scholar Amy Oakes (2006, 439) points out, “the hoped for rally-around-the-flag effect, when it arises, is generally short-lived. If the war drags on and requires greater than anticipated sacrifices, the mobilization process will aggravate the social fragmentation it was waged to ease” (see also Fravel 2010, 338; Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Seen from a regime-security perspective, the creation of foreign-policy crises by the Putin government thus appears unhelpful and indeed counterproductive. Third, and relatedly, it is noteworthy that several decades of research on diversionary war theory has produced mixed results at best (see, e.g., Fravel 2010; Hendrickson 2002; Levy 1989; Meernik and Waterman 1996). In particular, recent studies have shown that countries with a basic level of state capacity—such as Russia today—tend to forego diversionary uses of force and instead use a mixture of coercion and cooptation to deal with domestic opposition (Oakes 2006). This finding casts doubt on the hypothesized relationship between regime-security concerns, on the one hand, and Russia’s near abroad assertion, on the other. Rather than pursuing belligerent foreign policies (or initiating an external war), which entails great risks, the Kremlin could try to buy off political opposition or simply resort to internal repression. Fourth, and finally, the focus on diversionary motives cannot explain the trajectory of Russia’s near abroad policy. As every close observer of Russian foreign policy knows, Moscow began to adopt a more proactive and combative approach in the region in around 2004. At that time, the Kremlin’s popularity greatly increased on the back of a booming economy, mainly brought about by a rise in world energy and commodity prices. In other words, just as the economy recovered, which in turn boosted the Russian leadership’s popularity, Moscow assumed a more assertive stance abroad. This pattern does not fit well with the argument that Russia’s combative approach in the post-Soviet space is an attempt to deflect attention from internal failures.

# AFF Answers

## Uniqueness Answers

### Russia Arms Sales Now

#### Russian exports high now and resilient

Episkopos ‘19 – PhD Student in history @ American U (Mark, See How Russia Is Selling Lots of Military Hardware Around the Globe, *National Interest*, 6-11-2019 [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097)//BB](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/see-how-russia-selling-lots-military-hardware-around-globe-62097%29//BB)

Spurred by a revised business strategy and favorable international climate, Russia’s chief arms exporter-- Rosoboronexport-- is seeing record profits. Rosoboronexport has sold 5.7 billion dollars worth of weapons since the beginning of 2019, setting the Russian defense industry up for its strongest-grossing year decades. Though 2019 is shaping up to be a particularly profitable earnings period on the heels of Moscow’s multi-billion dollar S-400 deal with Ankara, this cannot be dismissed as a one-off occurrence. Currently sitting at a whopping 55 billion dollars, Rosoboronexport’s portfolio has steadily grown over the past decade. Agency chief Alexander Mikheyev assured Russian state news that Rosoboronexport is not resting on its laurels: "As a world arms export leader, we are not only watching and following global trends today but are also developing unique areas of work for the market, including financial mechanisms for foreign trade activity." But can Russia's arms trade sustain its impressive pace of growth over the coming decades? Since the 2014 Crimean annexation, Rosoboronexport executives have wasted no time in arguing that the the Russian defense industry would be in even better financial shape were it not for the effects of the western sanctions regime: "For five years, Russia and Rosoboronexport have been confronted with serious restrictions from some international financial institutions that have become strongly dependent on the political will of some world arms market players. We can only perceive them as unfair competition and the attempts of pressure on us and our partners," said Mikheyev. Mikheyev’s claim is inarguably true as far as the secondary effects of sanctions are concerned; the Kremlin is currently being denied western capital inflows that, among other things, could otherwise have contributed to the growth of the Russian defense sector. However, sanctions have had no discernable effect on Moscow’s ability to secure a series of lucrative arms deals over the past several years. The reason is hardly surprising: the nations most likely to abide by the sanctions regime are western NATO members who are already militarily and politically invested in NATO’s defense infrastructure, and thus were never prospective Russian clients to begin with. Meanwhile, sanctions have done little to stop some of the world’s biggest arms importers from doing business with Russia. It was only last year that India signed a gargantuan 5.43 billion dollar weapons deal with Russia. There was talk of punishing India under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but Washington is dragging its heels over concerns of alienating New Delhi. Washington successfully sanctioned China under CAATSA, but this had no discernible effect on the burgeoning Sino-Russian defense relationship. Most recently, Moscow exploited the growing political rift between NATO-aligned Turkey and the west to not only sell the S-400 to Ankara, but to secure a joint Russian-Turkish manufacturing deal for its upcoming S-500 anti air system. In keeping with their ongoing export strategy of targeting prospective clients who are beyond the reach of western sanctions, Rosoboronexport plans to make further inroads in Africa, Latin America, the Middle-East, and Central Asia. Furthermore, the Russian arms trade is aggressively competing for second and third world import markets with a glut of cheaper, Soviet-inherited hardware that may lack the technical bells and whistles of their latest offerings, but nonetheless offers cost-effective performance for low and medium intensity warfare. Rosoboronexport’s ongoing success presents the Washington security establishment with a stark political reality that shows no signs of changing over the coming years: Russia’s remarkably resilient arms export business has not only survived, but is thriving, under the post-Crimea sanctions regime.

#### Russia arms sales high and continuing now – defense procurement, full spectrum, Syria, and US abandonment.

Connolly, PhD, and Sendtad, MA, 17(Richard, Russian + East European Studies @ Birmingham, Cecilie, Econ @ Bergen, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia”, Chatham House Royal Institute For International Affairs, March, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)

4. Conclusion: Prospects for Arms Exports and Foreign Policy Russia continues to occupy a global position of strength in an industry of immense strategic importance. It can be considered a superpower in the global arms trade, exporting a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems to a growing number of countries around the world. Only the US is able to offer the same full spectrum of armaments to its customers. Russia is the dominant supplier of weapons systems to at least one country in each of the regions examined here. This has the potential to strengthen its political, economic and military influence in those countries. Russia is also seeking to strengthen its position in new markets, and its large portfolio of orders suggests that it will continue to occupy an important global position in the years to come. Armaments exports play an important role in the Russian economy. They account for a small but significant share of total exports, and for a substantial share of manufactured exports. This makes the industry one of the leading sectors through which Russia is integrated with the global economy. Arms exports continue to play an important role in providing demand for goods and services produced by the defence-industrial complex in Russia. Exports are not as important to the defence-industrial complex as they were in the 1990s, but they continue to help keep production lines in service, and thus help preserve the full spectrum of defence-industrial production capabilities.86 This might become even more important in the future if, as planned, defence expenditure is further reduced from its current elevated level.87 If the scheduled reduction in spending is indeed sustained, international arms sales would help offset reduced domestic demand. There are several reasons to expect that Russia’s leading position in the production and export of armaments will persist well into the future. First, in addition to the healthy export revenues generated by arms-producing firms, Russia’s industry has benefited from the rapid growth in defence procurement since 2011. Along with a programme to upgrade the capital stock in use across the industry, this injection of funds has helped boost productive capabilities and laid the foundations for the development of new weapons systems.88 Second, Russia’s willingness and ability to offer a full spectrum of defence-industrial goods facilitate the conclusion of large export deals, thus supporting the development of long-term relationships to equip the armed forces of key customers. Third, the country’s arms manufacturers may well benefit from the success enjoyed by Russia’s armed forces in Syria. The fact that its weapon systems – such as the Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft and the Kalibr missile systems – have been proven to be operationally effective could boost the attractiveness of Russian weapons in other countries. This point should not be pushed too far, however; after all, airstrikes by Russian forces have taken place in a largely uncontested airspace. Whether these systems would perform as well against better-equipped forces is an open question. Fourth, Russia is likely to continue to be seen as a reliable source of weapons for countries that do not enjoy warm relations with the US. This means that a wider range of countries are potential markets for Russian exporters, in contrast with the situation facing some of their Western competitors. Russian armaments producers have the opportunity to exploit the tensions that exist between the US and countries such as Iran, China or Syria, and also those that may emerge in countries that traditionally source their weapons from the US, such as Turkey, Egypt or the Philippines.

#### Shift to Russian weaponry inevitable – cheaper, more robust, faster, good enough, comfort, few strings and diversifying.

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When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the US in terms of quality and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons learned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. 14 In addition, the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to deliver after a contract is signed. Moscow is weak when it comes to follow-up support of sales, and Russian weaponry is not always as technically advanced as America’s, but it is good enough for the needs of many markets, and is often far better than what the purchasing countries can build themselves. Russian weaponry is also a good choice for states on a budget. Moscow advertises this fact. For example, in early October 2015, days after Russia’s Syria intervention, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from primarily small corvettes in the Caspian Sea to hit targets in Syria.15 Moscow made a public display of the event, not only to demonstrate Russia’s own might but also to show other countries they need not purchase a large expensive warship to achieve strong naval capabilities, and that Moscow would be happy to help them achieve this goal. Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?”16 For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt’s anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack 4 helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-22 17 (which the US is currently not even exporting). Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from Washington. Moscow, unlike the US, does not prohibit secondary arms sales. This means, for example, that when the US sells weapons to Egypt, the weapon must stay in Egypt.18 But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily resell to someone else for profit may be a preferable option. Moscow also does not burden arms sales with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus, countries turn to Moscow when they wish to signal to Washington that they have other options if they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions. At the same time, some Arab states are genuinely interested in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several GCC states bought Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the America, invests effort across the MENA region to sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option: Moscow does not have to replace the US. Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages including quicker delivery and better negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made major inroads during the Putin era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.

### Russia Econ High

#### Russian econ strong and growing now – oil, stock marker, sanctions.

Phillips 6/28 (Matt, MarketsReporter@NYT, 19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/business/russia-markets.html)

Bragging rights for the world’s hottest major stock market this year belong to an unlikely leader: President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. The combination of surging Russian share prices and a buoyant ruble has generated some of the best investment returns on earth in 2019. In dollar terms, Russian stocks are up more than 28 percent (and more if you factor in dividends). The S&P 500, by contrast, is up more than 16 percent. There are fundamental economic reasons for the Russian rally, most notably the rebounding price of crude oil, a cornerstone of the country’s economy. But the strong performance also reflects investors’ growing confidence that the United States government isn’t going to take further actions that would imperil Russia’s economy. “This has been heavily driven by perceptions of political risk,” said Jason Bush, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, a consulting firm. “Last year, anxiety about new U.S. sanctions on Russia was very intense.” Last year, after the United States imposed sanctions on prominent Russian businessmen, officials and companies — a response to Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, among other things — investors fled. The country’s stock market dropped by more than 15 percent in dollar terms. Prices also fell in the bond market, making it more expensive for people and companies to borrow money. As capital exited, the ruble tumbled about 20 percent. For months last year, as relations between Russia and the West deteriorated, investors braced for more bad news. “It’s an uninvestable country, that’s how investors were looking at it last year,” said Lale Akoner, a global market strategist at BNY Mellon Investment Management. But things thawed. In January, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on a number of Russian companies. The State Department didn’t impose an expected second round of sanctions related to the March 2018 poisoning in Britain of a former Russian intelligence agent. And congressional legislation aimed at punishing Russia stalled. “These big financial-sector sanctions that people were worried about — that never materialized,” said Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. That has left investors to dwell on the fundamentals: a Russian market where stocks appeared dirt cheap after last year’s sell-off, especially in light of the more than 45 percent rise in global oil prices earlier this year. That rally helped shore up the value of the ruble and stopped the slide in Russia’s stock market, most of whose value is in energy companies. “If oil is performing well, Russia is performing well,” said David Hauner, a markets strategist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Across the board, analysts are lifting their expectations for Russian companies’ profits this year, and some of those companies churn out rich dividends to shareholders. (The dividend yield of the MSCI Russia index is three times as high as the S&P 500 index.) Russia’s relative isolation from the trade war between the United States and China is another selling point.

#### Russia econ growing – lending, world cup, oil.

Stognei, MS Finance, 19(Anastasia, Producer @ TheBell, @SOAS London, 2-8, “Why the Russian economy is growing despite western sanctions,” The Bell, https://thebell.io/en/why-is-the-russian-economy-growing-despite-western-sanctions/)

What happened This week it was announced that Russia’s economy [grew](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d04/21.htm) (Rus) 2.3 percent last year, compared to 1.6 percent growth in 2017. This shockingly positive data was published by Rosstat (the statistics agency under the Economy Ministry) and, if the figures are to be believed (and some economists think they have been manipulated), GDP is now growing at its fastest rate since 2012 (when GDP grew 3.7 percent). In nominal terms, GDP in 2018 reached 104 trillion roubles ($1.6 trillion). And all of this amid sanctions and geopolitical tension. Drivers of economic growth While some think the figures are unreliable, there is no doubt Russia’s economy is growing (the question is how much). The positive result for 2018 was driven by: Explosive growth of retail lending. The largest sectoral growth (6.3 percent) was reported by financial and insurance companies: 2018 was the year of a retail lending boom. Mortgage lending expanded 25%. One reason for this is the Central Bank’s monetary policy, which has meant interest rates on loans have been at their lowest levels in Russia’s recent history. The second is more worrying: Russians’ real incomes fell for the fifth year in a row in 2018, but they are not reducing their spending and are turning to banks for money to bridge the gap. While the risks are minimal at the moment, this could, in the future, lead to a dangerous bubble. In response, at the end of last year, the Central Bank began tightening the terms for retail lending. World Cup. The soccer World Cup, the major international event to be held in Russia last year, made a not insignificant contribution to growth (0.4 percent of GDP). The championship helped the hotel and restaurant sector grow by 6.1 percent, making it the second best performing sector of the entire economy. Expensive oil and ruble devaluation. It’s important not to forget that Russia was lucky in 2018: prices for its main export, oil, rose on average by a third, from $54 per barrel in 2017 to $70 per barrel in 2018. The ruble, on the other hand, lost 20% of its value, which allowed Russia’s exporters to post record ruble profits. Meanwhile, sanctions against Iran led to increased sales as Russia took Iran’s share of the global oil market.

### Thumpers

#### Russia sold weapons to India – that deal thumps the link.

MoneyControl ’19 News 6/28 [“India likely to pay for Russian arms in euros to bypass US sanctions: Report,” <https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world/india-likely-to-pay-for-russian-arms-in-euros-to-bypass-us-sanctions-report-4148661.html>, 6/98/19] -x

To avoid the threat of US sanctions for the purchase of Russian military hardware, India is likely to make its payments for Russian arms in euros to a Russia-nominated bank, reports The Economic Times. The move comes as an alternative payment system for the defence equipment as the threat of US action under the controversial Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) has scared away financial institutions from processing these transactions. Sources told the paper that a solution was firmed up this month with Russia’s VTB Bank agreeing to receive payments,worth $4 billion are remaining for this financial year, in euros. These include payments for the S-400 air defence missile system, a lease on the Chakra III submarine and four frigates to be procured for the Indian Navy. Two additional Russian contracts- one for the supply of AK 203 rifles to the armed forces that will be manufactured in Amethi, and the other, an Army contract to procure Ka-226 helicopters, which will be produced by a HAL-Russian Helicopters JV. The Russian bank is open to using a European account for the transaction and Indian Bank, selected for the transaction, will have the least exposure to US currency. In the past few years, VTB Bank has processed large deals in India like the over $12 billion investment into the Essar Group, bailing it from bankruptcy. India on June 26 told the US that it will go by its national interest on S-400 missile deal with sanctions-hit Russia, its strong stance conveyed by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to his American counterpart Mike Pompeo during their wide-ranging meeting. In April last year, after Russia’s flagship arms trading company, Rosoboronexport, came under sanctions from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the State Bank of India put a stop to all payments, blocking over $2 billion that had to be transferred. India found an alternative payment route, using banks with little exposure to the US. However, the issue persisted for over a year as Russian financial institutions also refused to be a part of transactions that could jeopardise their global business.

#### Russia flipped Turkey with arms sales – that should’ve triggered the link.

Global Times, 6/4 [Turkey sticks to Russia arms deal, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153134.shtml>, 6/4/19]

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Tuesday Turkey would not withdraw from a deal made with Russia to buy an S-400 missile defense system despite US threats of "devastating" consequences. Ankara's desire to buy the S-400 has been a major source of contention between NATO allies Turkey and the US, which has threatened sanctions after months of warnings. "We have made an agreement [with Russia]. We are determined," Erdogan was quoted as saying by the official Anadolu news agency. "There is nothing like backtracking from that," he told journalists after prayers at an Istanbul mosque. Last week, a top Pentagon official said the consequences would be "devastating" for Turkey's joint F-35 fighter program and its cooperation with NATO if the country went ahead with plans to buy the Russian anti-aircraft weapon system. Kathryn Wheelbarger, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, said the planned purchase would damage Turkey's ability to work with the Western alliance, and force Washington to hit the country with sanctions against arms deals with Russia. She said the US administration, even if it does not want to punish Turkey for the purchase, could be forced to do so by a Congress unsympathetic to Ankara. US officials said they expect Turkey to opt for the American Patriot missiles instead, arguing that would then allow the F-35 program to continue. Turkey plans to buy 100 US F-35s, and some Turkish pilots have already started training with counterparts in the US. Erdogan said Tuesday he told the US that Ankara would take steps to buy the Patriots only if its conditions of delivery were as positive as Russia's. "But unfortunately we haven't received a positive proposal from the American side on the subject of Patriots like the S400s from Russia," he added. Turkey has defied mounting pressure from its NATO allies and said the purchase from Moscow was a "done deal." Erdogan on Wednesday spoke with US President Donald Trump by phone and, according to the Turkish leader's office, they discussed Ankara's previous offer to form a "joint working group" on the missile system. The two leaders are due to meet on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, at the end of June.

## Link Answers

### No Fill-In – Interoperability

#### Fill in arguments misunderstand the global arms trade ­– interoperability checks.

French, JD, 18(David, Senior Fellow @ National Review Institute, @ Harvard, US Army Reserve Major, 10-18, “Arms Deals Give Leverage to America, Not the Saudis,” National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/arms-deals-give-america-leverage-not-the-saudis/)

The Saudi military is highly dependent on advanced American weaponry. American F-15s comprise close to half the Saudi fighter force, and the Saudi variant of the F-15E Strike Eagle represents a substantial portion of the air force’s striking power. On land, the Saudi army is dependent almost exclusively on American M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. They can’t just waltz over to a different country and transform their armed forces — not without suffering enormous setbacks in readiness and effectiveness during a years-long transition. A fundamental reality of arms deals is that a major arms purchase essentially locks the purchasing nation in a dependent posture for training, spare parts, and technical upgrades. Indeed, one of the reasons for engaging in an arms transaction — aside from the economic benefit — is that the transaction gives America enormous power over the national defense of the purchasing nation. You buy our weapons, and we gain power over you. Well, we gain potential power. The question is whether we have the will to exercise that power. Moreover, Trump’s claim that the Saudis could simply go to China or Russia betrays an odd ignorance about Chinese and Russian arms. Many of their most advanced weapons aren’t quite ready for prime time. If the Saudis are terrified of Iran, purchasing worse weapons that would require new training cycles, new spare parts, and new technical relationships is a terrible option. It’s a recipe for a serious military setback. For example — as Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin observes — the State Department just approved the sale of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense missile-defense system to the Saudis. The Saudis are rightfully concerned about Iranian missile attack. Is it the position of the Trump administration that the Saudis have leverage over us if they cancel that deal and seek an inferiormissile-defense system from a competing country? As Rogin says, Trump’s thinking is “totally and completely backwards.” Buying a weapons platform is not like choosing between a Honda Accord and a Toyota Camry — where if one dealer ticks you off, you can just walk across the street and immediately get a substantially similar product. Trump is displaying his ignorance here, and his surrogates on television (many of whom know better) are exploiting understandable civic ignorance to push the administration’s line. We can’t expect Americans to know exactly how arms deals work or how F-15s are serviced and upgraded. But we should expect the president to understand these realities. For all the president’s bluster, he’s demonstrating a surprising timidity in the face of an undeniable provocation from one of our more mendacious “allies.” We hold the cards in this alliance, and it’s time — for once — to stand up to a repressive and brutal regime, even if we do have a common Iranian foe. The world’s strongest nation, with the world’s largest economy, needs Saudi Arabia far less than they need us. End support for the brutal Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen. Impose conditions on continued American military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. It’s time for the junior partner in this alliance to finally learn its place.

#### Allies are locked into US tech - shift impossible.

Guay ’18 (Terrence, Poli Sci @ Syracuse, Prof International Business @ Penn State, 10-19, “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair,” The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998)

While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

### No Fill-In – Russia Fails

#### Russia can’t fill in for the US – it’s hit a ceiling and further sales don’t translate into regional influence

Bershidsky 19 (Leonid Bershidsky is Bloomberg Opinion's Europe columnist. He was the founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the opinion website Slon.ru. “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales”, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-market-share

Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter. SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.

#### Russian and American arms deployed together fails.

Helou 17 (Agnes Al Helou; a Military Expenditure and Naval Warfare Reporter, Master’s degree, specializing academically in media economics and media coverage of defense and military news, Barbara Opall-Rome contributed to this report; 11-15-2017; "Saudi use of US, Russian air-defense systems will create ‘serious challenges’"; https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/15/saudi-use-of-us-russian-air-defense-systems-will-create-serious-challenges/; Defense News; accessed 6-29-2019; LR)

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — The simultaneous operational deployment of a U.S. and a Russian air-defense system in Saudi Arabia will be “difficult and will pose a problem,” according to Lockheed Martin’s vice president of air and missile defense systems. Saudi Arabia has reached agreements to reinforce its missile defense capabilities with the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and the Russian S-400 Triumf. “The U.S government would clearly have to make a serious decision regarding this matter,” Lockheed’s Timothy Cahill said in a press briefing at the Dubai Airshow. Obstacles identified in the joint deployment include interoperability, data sharing and communication between the two systems.“We will be faced with some serious challenges, especially that two different companies are producing air-defense systems,” said Dan Norton, the vice president of strategic business development at Lockheed. “Crossing of classified data will be the biggest issue. Segregation of data during joint fire missions will be of critical significance. “The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense is in its delivery process to the UAE, while Saudi Arabia is considered to be the second international customer to acquire the system.” The THAAD system is currently deployed in South Korea by the U.S Army. When asked about human rights concerns surrounding Saudi-led action in Yemen and the transfer of missile technologies to the kingdom, Cahill said: “THAAD is considered a defensive system, so it does not have an offensive capability nor carry a warhead. It’s lethal to incoming missiles, but nothing else. So generally speaking, THAAD is not typically caught up in terms of delivering offensive capability.” Washington has approved some 600 PAC-3 missiles and associated support equipment to Saudi Arabia in July 2015. And last October, Washington cleared a potential sale of 360 Lockheed Martin-produced THAAD hit-to-kill missiles, 44 launchers, and associated fire-control stations and radars in a package assessed at $15 billion. In parallel to that potential U.S. deal, during an early October visit to Moscow by Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud Salman to Moscow, the kingdom announced an agreement with Russia to procure the S-400. According to U.S. and Russian executives interviewed in Dubai, neither deal has been formally concluded. “We are just delivering PAC-3 to Saudi Arabia. Particularly for the region, the Patriot provides an excellent point of defense while THAAD will provide more powerful radar capabilities and a larger missile that has greater range,” Cahill said.

### No Fill-In – Saudi Vision 2030

#### Saudi Vision 2030 means they won’t need to buy from Russia.

Stratfor 18 (Stratfor; an American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher; 11-9-2018; "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own"; https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030; Stratfor; accessed 6-29-2019; LR)

Saudi Arabia, flush with money, nestled in a hostile environment and saddled with demographic shortcomings, has long spent freely to bring in weapons from abroad. And over the past five years, driven by its intensifying competition with archrival Iran and a heavy military commitment in the Yemen conflict, this trend has accelerated. During the period of 2013-17, the number of arms systems the Saudi government purchased grew by 255 percent compared with its acquisitions from 2008-12, ranking it behind only India among global arms importers, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. As Saudi Arabia pursues its regional interests, it has increasingly sought to insulate itself from outside influence. To guard against dependence on arms imports, which could subject it to political pressure, it has worked to build up the capabilities of its own defense industry. This shift in philosophy comes as the kingdom's usual arms suppliers increasingly reconsider the extent of their weapons trade with Riyadh because of mounting casualties from Yemen's civil war and outrage over the apparent murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Besides lessening dependence on foreign weapons sources, a mature local defense industry could also play a key role in diversifying the Saudi economy while Riyadh is working to ease its overreliance on energy exports. If the Saudi defense sector can be successfully built out, it could provide jobs for a large number of citizens and help address concerns about growing unemployment. Building the Base for a Defense Industry Saudi aspirations for an indigenous defense industry are certainly ambitious. In its overarching Saudi Vision 2030 economic strategy, Riyadh wants to produce locally at least half of the equipment it will need for security and military use by 2030. To move toward that goal, when Saudi Arabia negotiates major arms contracts with trade partners, it increasingly insists that component manufacturing and final assembly be done in the kingdom. Riyadh has also overhauled some parts of the government structure to oversee the growth of its defense industry. For instance, the General Authority for Military Industries was created in 2017 to coordinate weapons procurement and research and development with an emphasis on local sourcing. In the same year, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), a state-owned defense company with a focus on aeronautics, land weapons systems, missiles and defense electronics, all areas of heavy Saudi need, was founded. SAMI's lofty goals include the creation of more than 40,000 direct and 100,000 indirect jobs in the country by 2030, which, by then, it hopes would add more than $3.7 billion to the kingdom's annual gross domestic product, which stood at about $684 billion in 2017.

[Chart omitted]

Saudi spending on arms imports Saudi Arabia already has made concrete progress in building its defense industrial base. Large Western defense companies employ thousands of Saudis at their plants in the kingdom. Two-thirds of the workers employed by BAE Systems to assemble the Hawk trainer jets it sold to Riyadh, for instance, are Saudi citizens. In March 2018, Boeing and SAMI formed a joint venture partnership with the goal of localizing 55 percent of the service and maintenance work done on Boeing aircraft sold to the kingdom by 2030. According to Boeing, this would create 6,000 jobs or training opportunities for Saudi youths. Wrinkles in the System While Saudi Arabia has certainly laid the groundwork for its defense industry and has made some early progress in developing it, guiding the sector to maturity will be no simple matter. It is one thing to agree on paper to significant technology transfers and local job creation, but it is another to effectively implement such deals. Struggles by defense companies to satisfy stipulations within pending agreements that mandate local sourcing of services and raw materials have led to contract delays. It has also proved particularly difficult for defense companies with well-established and staffed manufacturing plants in the United States and Europe to set up assembly lines in Saudi Arabia, despite the relative simplicity of assembly compared with full manufacturing.

### No IL – Arms Sales Not Key

#### Arms sales not key to Russian expansionism

Reaves 18 – MA in Security Studies (Andrew, “RUSSIAN ARMS SALES IN THE AGE OF PUTIN: FOR POLITICS OR PROFIT?,” Na*val Postgraduate School Thesis Archives*, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/59571/18Jun_Reaves_Andrew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//BB>, ability edited

It is unlikely that Russian arms sales will disappear in the near future, but their strategic pull is weakening. Influence and leverage, as arms export analyst Andrew Pierre notes, are indeed transitory phenomena.687 While Putin has successfully integrated arms sales into his strategy of fostering polycentrism, challenging American hegemony, and reestablishing Russia’s presence globally, his strategic end state of returning Russia to its former world power status lacks international attractiveness. Furthermore, his focus on short-term political gains in lieu of a more farsighted plan to achieve his strategic end state has ~~handicapped~~ [limited] his use of arms exports.688 In fact, arms sales have merely supported multiple pragmatic relationships, not an anti-Western coalition, as states seek to maximize their benefits at the expense of Russia. As Lo observes, Putin’s policy “is frequently held hostage to short-term political and economic expediency...and the over-personalization of decision-making.”689 Thus, while Russia’s recent dispersal of arms might strengthen the ability of other states to either reduce the power of the West or promote regional balancing, it does not mean that Russia’s overall strength and influence rise reciprocally. For as long as Putin’s strategy remains myopic as he seeks partners in a quixotic quest to renew Russia’s grandeur and global influence, states will continue to gain reverse leverage on Russia. Recently imprisoned anti-Putin activist Aleksey Navalny phrased it best in his ominous foreshowing of Putin’s future: This regime is doomed, I’ve said it and I will repeat it, but of course, I will not mention specific dates: in the eleventh year I said that they had a year and a half left, and I will not say anything more. Doom is obvious, because [Putin’s regime] is [a] feudal power, in the post-industrial world unthinkable [sic]; because it prevents us from developing, inventing, building, growing, teaching and healing.690 While Navalny’s words might err on the dramatic, there is truth within them. Although Putin might still view arms sales as an important item inside his political toolbox, military exports are quickly becoming a dull and impractical instrument unable to yield the outcomes that Putin desires regardless of the previous benefits they once provided.

### China Fill-In

#### IF fill-in happens, it’s with China, not Russia.

Halder ’19 (Ben, “CHINA, THE NEXT BIG SUPPLIER OF HIGH-TECH ARMS TO EMERGING NATIONS,” 2-25-2019, Ozy, [https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/china-the-next-big-supplier-of-high-tech-arms-to-emerging-nations/92647)](https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/china-the-next-big-supplier-of-high-tech-arms-to-emerging-nations/92647%29//BB)

China is emerging as a fast-growing supplier of affordable, high-tech weapons systems to countries facing sanctions or restrictions from the West. Models donning metallic outfits and ill-fitting red baseball caps posed at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, in November 2018. But the star attractions were the newest arsenal of Chinese weapons systems on display: from mine-clearing robots and high-speed unmanned helicopters to stealth drones and radar protection technology for tanks. In all, deals worth $21 billion were struck. And the show was just one sign of China’s growing clout in a field traditionally dominated by the West, Russia and Israel: high-tech military equipment. China’s rapid expansion over the past two decades into Africa, Latin America and across Asia has relied on its growing economic resources and has taken the form of heavy investments, funding and infrastructure projects. Its military exports were largely bare-bones equipment. Now, the world’s second-largest economy is fast positioning itself as an attractive supplier of relatively affordable high-tech military hardware to an increasing number of emerging economies facing sanctions or restrictions from the West. The country’s arms sales to Africa grew by 55 percent between 2012 and 2017 compared to the previous five-year period, totaling $273 million in 2017. Of those sales, 42 percent of exports landed in North Africa — a region long plagued by U.S. and European arms embargoes and a more general reluctance from these suppliers to do business. Today, 80 percent of trainer jets across Africa are the Chinese-made K-8 planes, and with advancements in China’s aviation industry, particularly the development of an indigenous jet engine, Chinese aircraft are becoming more attractive to African customers. China is now marketing its indigenous, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to potential buyers in Egypt and Nigeria. Closer to home, China in March 2018 announced a deal to sell Pakistan a large-scale optical tracking system used to accelerate the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads. It was the first example of China exporting sensitive technology. Pakistan is facing restrictions from the U.S. on weapons sales because of differences on terrorism and Afghanistan. State-owned China South Industries Group is aggressively pitching its mine-clearing laser gun to international customers such as Myanmar, which already relies on China for 68 percent of its weapons because of E.U. and U.S. sanctions. And Venezuela, which imports 23 percent of its weapons from China, showed off a cache of new Chinese-built military vehicles at a parade in July 2018. China is also pitching a new generation of laser weapons to Venezuela. These include the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp.’s LW-30 laser defense system and China Shipbuilding Industry Corp.’s vehicle-mounted laser weapon, both launched at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2018. “The one advantage that African countries, and for that matter any other country that considers China as an acceptable arms supplier, will have is that the number of suppliers of more advanced equipment is increasing, which improves the bargaining position,” says Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme. Some of China’s earliest successes in selling high-tech military equipment came earlier this decade, in the Middle East, with drones. The U.S. has strict rules on who it can sell UAVs to, and several Middle Eastern nations have had requests to America turned down. So, “China stepped in and offered its alternatives,” says Wezeman. Since 2014, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan and Iraq have all bought military drones from China. These UAVs have been deployed in wars against ISIS and in Yemen. But the country’s willingness to sell weapons systems to virtually anyone gives China a distinct edge in carving out a niche for itself in the global arms market, and its ability to deliver high-tech machines at cheaper rates than competitors also attracts potential buyers. China’s most advanced UAV, the CH-5 Rainbow, costs half as much as the $16.9 million U.S.-made Reaper. China’s base model can be acquired for just $1 million. Four of China’s Type 054A frigates were recently ordered by Pakistan at a unit cost of $250 million, compared to a price tag of $466 million for the similarly sized French-built La Fayette model. Speaking to the Global Times newspaper, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpieces, Beijing-based military analyst Wei Dongxu claimed in November that the country’s new HD-1 supersonic missile, known as an aircraft carrier killer, would hit the market at a significantly lower price than existing products. This includes undercutting the $2.75 million BrahMos missile, developed by Russia and India.

## Impact Answers

### Russia Defensive

#### Russia is not a revisionist threat --- their impact is wildly exaggerated

Götz and Merlen 19 – \*Ph.D. in Political Science from Aarhus University, Post-doc @ Johns Hopkins, \*\*PhD Candidate in IR @ Kent in UK (Elias and Camille, “Russia and the question of world order,” *European Politics and Society*, 20.2)//BB

To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016). Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda. Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As Carpenter (2017, January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration? For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings.

#### Russia is status quo oriented and deterrence checks.

Darden, PhD, 18(Keith, Assoc Prof International Service @ American University, PoliSci @ Berkeley, May, “Keeping the “New Cold War” Cold: Nuclear Deterrence With U.S. and Russian Nuclear Force Modernization”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 530, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/keeping-new-cold-war-cold-nuclear-deterrence-us-and-russian-force-modernization)

After two decades of dramatic reduction and deliberate neglect, the nuclear arsenals that were at the center of security relations between the Cold War superpowers are reaching the ends of their operational lives. Rather than allow age and obsolescence to erode their nuclear capabilities and carry us into a post-nuclear era, both Russia and the United States chose to modernize and redevelop their nuclear arsenals with new weapons systems, platforms, and strategy. For those raised during the Cold War, this can be a terrifying prospect. Yet, both the fears and the advantages of the new weapons are overstated. The U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines reflect a newly adversarial relationship, but the development of new weapons and doctrines for their use need not be destabilizing. Both doctrines are status quo oriented and primarily defensive. They are designed to deter potential aggressors—not to “roll back” rivals, overturn governments through military conquest, or to expand influence. Both are consistent with achieving a certain “strategic stability” or a stable mutual deterrence. At the same time, there is no technical military solution to the conflicts of interest and the ambiguity of resolve that characterized key U.S.-Russian interactions after the Ukraine crisis. Enhancing nuclear capability does not necessarily enhance deterrence, let alone security. If security is to be achieved it will have to address specific conflicts in relations between the two states. A Changing Relationship Requires a Changed Force Posture The past decades have made clear that force postures and our sense of security, follows—in part, at least—from underlying international political relationships. In the first decade following the end of the Cold War, there was a clear recognition that the U.S.-Russian relationship had changed fundamentally from its Cold War nadir even if the weapons platforms of the Cold War persisted. The two countries were no longer fundamental adversaries. The threat of surprise nuclear attack diminished to the point of implausibility. Whatever your preferred Cold War metaphor—the two gunfighters standing off against one another, two scorpions locked in a bottle, or two cars playing chicken—it no longer reflected the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States. The two countries signed arms control treaties, re-targeted their nuclear weapons, and reduced, mothballed, or eliminated their cold war nuclear arsenals. Through the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, START, New START, and unilateral decisions to retire nuclear weapons systems (such as the U.S. arsenal of submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles), the number and variety of nuclear weapons was reduced dramatically. By the mid-2000s, the existing nuclear weapons systems inherited from the Cold War began to reach the end of their shelf life. Even if the plutonium “pits” to trigger nuclear devices proved to be fairly robust (with a potential lifespan of close to a century), the nuclear warheads and delivery systems were aging. The electronic systems used to command, control, and guide strategic nuclear forces were decades old and approaching the point where they were no longer reliable and secure. As a result, over the past decade, the governments of both Russia and the United States faced the question of whether and/or how to craft a security strategy and build a nuclear arsenal for the contemporary international environment. Following the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea, the post-Cold War relationship between the United States and Russia—a relationship that led both sides to walk back from a nuclear threat—has definitively come to an end. The most recent Russian and U.S. strategy documents make clear that they perceive one another as adversaries (perhaps even the primary adversary), and characterize the current international environment as threatening with a relatively high level of geopolitical competition among established and emerging powers. Their proposed nuclear force postures and strategies reflect this change. Many have sounded the alarm over these choices made by Moscow and Washington. In particular, some have raised concerns that by developing new low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons and doctrines for their use, both Russia and the United States are lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in conflict and increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. Others argue that the new capabilities will signal a greater resolve on the part of the two countries, thereby deterring aggressive actions and preventing the escalation of limited regional wars to a nuclear conflict. What Is Strategic Stability and How Do We Achieve It? An adversarial relationship need not be an unstable one. Both sides refer to a desire to achieve “strategic stability.” This is potentially encouraging, but what does it mean? In a Cold War context, “strategic stability” meant having a devastating “second strike” capability. The essential pillar of stability was the notion that nothing could be gained from initiating a nuclear strike because the response would be devastating and certain—a form of deterrence through threat of punishment. Any weapons that diminished the certainty of the second strike—either by undermining the survivability of nuclear forces or by diminishing their effectiveness (e.g., missile defenses)—were seen as undermining strategic stability. When current Russian officials claim that the development of missile defenses or long-range precision strike capability undermines strategic stability, it is this Cold War notion of a secure second-strike capability that they have in mind. They understandably do not wish the United States to have the ability to eliminate their strategic arsenal in a surprise counterforce strike, or to pick off the remaining missiles from a potential retaliatory strike in a way that would render the losses from a war between the two countries to be tolerable to the United States. The United States similarly seeks to maintain a robust second-strike capability through the traditional triad. But a secure second-strike capability is not the only, or even necessarily, the most effective, form of deterrence, particularly for the regional conflicts that seem most likely to escalate to great power wars. For both the United States and Russia, the operative scenario for great power conflict is the escalation of a smaller-scale conventional conflict on the boundary between Russia and NATO. This is the scenario that was the basis for the most recent (2017) Zapad military exercises. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggests the need to deter lower-level regional conflicts and prevent Russia from perceiving that it can obtain positive results by threatening (or engaging in) limited nuclear escalation. Both sides are developing strategies and nuclear capabilities to facilitate (or dominate) escalation following an attack on an ally. This is, in principle, a good thing. To the extent that a NATO intervention in Belarus or a Russian intervention in Estonia are both credibly assumed to escalate to a nuclear exchange, those outcomes are more likely to be avoided. So long as neither side feels that the initiation of an attack will achieve strategic objectives at an acceptable cost, deterrence is likely to be stable. Neither side will perceive an opportunity for aggression based on the limited capabilities or resolve of the other. Strategic stability will be obtained. The NPR [makes](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF) this intent quite explicit. Its most controversial recommendation—to develop new low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons—is explicitly designed to eliminate what the U.S. perceives to be an adversary’s advantages in limited (regional) war: “Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression. It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely.” Stable deterrence is maintained by the United States (and Russia) having the capability and resolve to engage in “nuclear war-fighting” in a way that would impose sufficient costs on the aggressor to prevent it from initiating such a conflict in the first place. Arms “Management” or Arms Control, but Not Necessarily Arms Limitation To some extent, this version of “strategic stability”—defined as the avoidance of great power conflict through effective, credible mutual deterrence—can be attained without international arms treaties or agreements. Indeed, it may even be enhanced by allowing some provisions of existing treaties to lapse or be revised. Limiting capabilities or the sizes of nuclear forces is not nearly as important as making sure that the costs of aggression are unacceptably high. We should not cling to existing agreements like a security blanket, nor see violations as a precursor to international aggression, but as a response to a potentially changed security environment. But even in this adversarial environment, there is some scope for cooperation. There is no question that deterrence is more stable when the capabilities, intentions, and resolve of the adversaries are clear and transparent. One of the positive side-effects of the arms limitation treaties has been the degree of transparency they have afforded through interaction and regular monitoring. No one wants a launch misperceived, and neither side has an incentive for their capabilities or resolve to be underestimated.

### No Russia War

#### Ignore the hype – no US-Russia war – false rhetoric, defensive Russia, deterrence, alliances, and culture

Tsygankov, PhD, 16(Andrei, PoliSci @ USC, 2-19, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Russia Direct, https://russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated)

Why today's world is less dangerous than the Cold War Today’s world, while threatening and uncertain, is hardly more dangerous than the Cold War, for the following reasons. First, whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work. So far, NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side during the military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World War III. Second, Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control. Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and indeed are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate. Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis. Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for. Despite the dangers of the world we live in, it contains a number of important, even underappreciated, checks on great powers’ militarism. The threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides. Then a dialogue begins. Perhaps, the increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.

#### No Russian lashout now --- deterrence, empirics, expert opinion

Bandow 3-6 --- JD from Stanford (Doug Bandow, 3-6-2017, "What Russian Threat? Americans Shouldn't Be Running Scared of Moscow," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-russian-threat-americans-shouldnt-be-running-scared-moscow)

Yet the **fear-mongering is nonsense**. Russia’s presumed attempt to influence America’s election was more smoke than fire. Moscow is accused of a private hack which released emails detailing the sleaze afflicting one of the presidential candidates. Although illegal like other cyber-attacks, that’s pretty mild, especially compared to Washington’s routine interference in other nations’ political affairs, including their elections. Although American officials proclaim their commitment to democracy, their activities almost always promote parties, leaders, and movements friendly to the U.S. **More serious are claims that Moscow poses a security threat**. Military capabilities are more than formal military budgets, but **the spending disparity between the U.S. and Russia is vast**: **Washington’s outlays are almost ten times as much as Moscow’s.** President Donald Trump just proposed an annual jump in outlays, $54 billion, which is nearly as much as Russia will spend all year. **Russia lacks the global reach to challenge America. As Putin noted** in an interview with an Italian journalist: **“Publish a world map and mark all the U.S. military bases on it. You will see the difference between Russia and the U.S.” Moscow also lacks the economic foundation to match the U.S.** **According to the I**nternational **I**nstitute for **S**trategic **S**tudies, **“One effect of the country’s deteriorating economic situation has been** **the delay in** concluding **the** next **State** **Armament Program**; originally intended to have been started in 2016, this has now been pushed back to 2018.” **Russia possesses** the world’s second most **powerful nuclear arsenal**, capable of destroying America many times over. **But even Moscow’s sharpest critics don’t believe** Vladimir **Putin plans to commit suicide**. That nuclear threat acts more as Russia’s guarantee against U.S. coercion. **Neither side can allow** the **stakes of any conflict to race out of control**. Beyond inaugurating nuclear Armageddon, how does Moscow threaten America? **An invasion seems unlikely**, **since the two countries don’t share a land boundary**. An attack across the Bering Strait to retake Alaska is more than a little unlikely. Which means there is no direct threat to the U.S. How about isolating America by controlling sea and air and interdicting commerce? That’s almost as implausible. The vaunted Red Navy is gone. Moscow deploys one decrepit aircraft carrier, no match for Washington’s multiple carrier groups. And the U.S. is allied with European nations which also possess capable if smaller fleets. Russia is upgrading its forces, but it lacks the resources to equal America. Moscow is no more likely to dominate the air above or around the U.S. Russia’s air force is capable and has gained valuable combat experience over Syria, but remains no match for America’s globe-spanning force. More dangerous may be Russian air defenses, which would ensure that hostile U.S. air operations were not the cakewalk like in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Nor is there any obvious reason why Moscow would inaugurate war with the U.S. Russia’s critics notwithstanding, the Cold War is over. There is only one aggressive ideological power, and that is America. Putinism is a simpler, practical authoritarian nationalism. The concerted campaign by Republican hawks like Lindsey Graham and Democratic partisans of all stripes to turn Moscow into an enemy is not just counterproductive. It is dangerous. That’s obviously not a congenial home for anyone who believes in America’s classical liberal heritage. The vision of a limited government dedicated to protecting individual rights has few takers in the Russian Federation. The real problem posed by Vladimir Putin is not that he’s an unpleasant thug, but that he seems to represent a substantial number—a strong majority if polls are to be believed—of Russians. Still, Moscow’s policy reflects much more a defensive than aggressive stance. Its role in the world looks a lot like that of pre-1914 imperial Russia. The Putin government wants its interests to be respected and its borders to be secure. It especially doesn’t like seeing its friends, such as Serbia, dismembered without so much as a nod in Moscow’s direction. Russia also opposes a potentially hostile alliance pushing ever eastward, absorbing lands such as Ukraine that once were integral to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. (and Moscow’s neighbors) might wish that Russia would accept America’s not always so benevolent hegemony. However, Boris Yeltsen’s rule proved to be but a brief interregnum until age-old Russian nationalism reasserted itself. That Moscow now stands up for what it considers to be its interests is no cause for alarm in Washington unless the latter has aggressive designs on Russia itself. The belief that such a nation and people would voluntarily, even enthusiastically, submit to American “leadership” always was a fantasy. Of course, Moscow’s policies sometimes run contrary to Washington’s desires, but that doesn’t mean Russia poses a threat. Moscow generally has been helpful in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, all significant concerns of the U.S. Russia has moved closer to China, despite major differences between the two, but largely in response to Washington’s hostile policies toward both great powers. In this way the Obama administration inadvertently reversed Richard Nixon’s geopolitical masterstroke of 45 years ago. Washington is similarly displeased with Russia’s intervention in Syria, but Damascus long has been a Russian ally. America has no monopoly on the “right” to wage war in the Mideast. And the U.S. nevertheless remains the region’s dominant outside power, allying with Israel and the Gulf States, maintaining multiple bases in multiple countries throughout the region, and fighting endless wars for years. If there is a “Russian threat” to America it must come in Europe, generously defined to include Georgia and Ukraine. Yet the Cold War truly is over. **There is no Red Army poised to plunge into the Fulda Gap and race to the Atlantic Ocean**. The very idea of Russian domination of Eurasia is fantastic. Europe has recovered economically from World War II and consolidated politically into the European Union. The continent enjoys about three and a half times Russia’s population and almost 15 times its GDP. Indeed, Germany alone almost has three times Russia’s economic strength. The economies of the United Kingdom, France, and even Italy are larger than Russia’s economy. Despite their shameless defense lassitude, **Europeans** still **collectively spend nearly four times as much as Moscow on the military**. **The UK alone comes close to Russia’s levels**. For all of the sound and fury at recent NATO meetings, **no one seriously contemplates a Russian attack on** “Old **Europe**,” or even most of “New Europe.” **What would Moscow gain by triggering a potential nuclear war** while trying to overrun large populations of non-Russians who would resist Moscow’s rule? Theoretical **capability does not equal intent**. Last year the faculty of **the Naval War College** assessed the Russian “threat.” The NWC subsequently issued a “Sense of the **Faculty**” report which revealed that a majority believed “Russia’s fear of potentially ‘hostile’ forces on its doorstep and within its historical sphere of influence” was “the most fundamental cause of the Ukraine Crisis.” Moreover**, 71 percent considered the likelihood of an attack on the Baltics to be** low or **very low.** The latter are seen as most vulnerable to Russian pressure. Yet **Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are** irrelevant to America’s security. Washington is **treaty-bound** to defend them, an unfortunate result of the foolish go-go years of NATO expansion. **However, Russian aggression is very unlikely**.