# Arms Control K

## 1NC Generic Shell

#### Opposition to specific arms sales sanitizes overall militarism because it relies on the same framing/discourse

Cooper,PhD, 12

(Neil, IR@Bradford, *Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization: Moving Weapons Along the Security Continuum* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Fourth, the success of campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions demonstrates how ‘moments of intervention’ undertaken on behalf of the voiceless by supposedly weak securitizing actors such as NGOs can, nevertheless, produce quite effective securitizations - in this case, the hyper-securitization of particular weapons technologies. Both campaigns also highlighted the ways in which actors can utilize media images and, through survivor activism that extended to the conference room, provide a context for the body to speak security. Moreover, the success of these campaigns highlights the ways in which the language of threat, survival, and security can be deployed to achieve positive security outcomes. At the same time however, the success of the humanitarian arms control agenda around landmines and cluster munitions in particular was only achieved because NGOs adopted exactly the same discourse around humanitarianism, human security and weapons precision that has been deployed to legitimize post-Cold War liberal peace interventionism and in the marketing of new weapons developments. On one reading, this might point to the potential for actors to deploy dominant forms of security speech in order to achieve progressive ends. On a more pessimistic reading however, it also highlights the profound limits involved in such approaches. To the extent that the extra-securitization of pariah technologies such as landmines has facilitated the relative desecuritization of major conventional weapons transfers it has also made the current framework of control look like an example of ethical advance at the same time as creating space for the deproblematization of arms transfers in general. Ultimately then, the moments of intervention represented by the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions were successful because they did not threaten, and in many ways were quite consistent with, the dominant security paradigm and security narratives of the post-Cold War era. Equally, whilst the regularized routines and working practices of the security professionals of the export licensing process are certainly important in understanding the treatment of defence transfers, this body of professionals were themselves, brought into being as a result of historical changes in the fundamental assumptions about security and economy. Moreover, their veiy working practices and modes of behaviour are currently being altered as a result of similar fundamental shifts in the paradigms of security and economy which, in turn, are a function of particular combinations of power and interest. Although these shifts certainly predated the post-Cold War era, they have become particularly concretized in this era. One consequence of all this is that a loud ethical discourse around the restriction of landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms has gone hand in hand with recent rises in both global military expenditure and arms transfers. For example, overall, world defence expenditure in 2008 was estimated to be $1,464 billion (of which NATO countries accounted for 60 per cent and OECD countries 72 per cent) representing a 45 per cent increase in real terms since 1999,93 whilst global arms sales were 22 per cent higher in real terms for the period 2005-2009 than for the preceding period 2000-2004.94 Moreover, largely because of the dominance of American and European defence spending, the defence trade is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the United States and to a lesser extent, European companies. For example, in 2006 American and European companies accounted for an estimated 92.7 per cent of the arms sales of the world’s 100 largest defence companies.95 Most arms trade NGOs have largely neglected issues such as the rises in defence expenditure in major weapons states such as the United States, intra-northern trade in arms, and the dominant role played by Western companies in the arms trade, in favour of an agenda that conceives the South - and in particular pariah actors in sub-Saharan Africa - as the primary object of conventional arms trade regulation.96 With regard to transfers of small arms and major conventional weapons it might be argued that this, at least, also requires impressive self-abnegation from arms trade profits on the part of powerful states in the international system. In practice however, international initiatives such as the EU Code or the Wassennaar Arrangement, national export regulations of the major weapons states and the local initiatives of client states mostly combine to produce a cartography of prohibition that corresponds more closely with the disciplinary geographies advocated by the powerful rather than any global map of militarism and injustice. One illustration of this is the way in which a recent review of British defence export legislation downgraded long-range missiles and the ‘heroic’ Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV - the Maxim gun of modern imperial wars) from a categoiy A classification (goods such as cluster munitions whose supply is prohibited) to the less restrictive categoiy B,97 whilst in 2010, the Afghan government proscribed the import, use, and sale of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer because it is one of the elements used in the making of IEDs.98 More generally, as one recent econometric analysis of major weapons transfers from the Britain, France, Germany, and the United States concluded, despite much rhetoric about the need for a more ethical approach to arms sales from governments in all these countries: Neither human rights abuses nor autocratic polity would appear to reduce the likelihood of countries receiving Western arms, or reduce the relative share of a particular exporter’s weapons they receive. In fact, human rights abusing countries are actually more likely to receive weapons from the US, while autocratic regimes emerge as more likely recipients of weaponry from France and the UK.99 Of course, arms trade NGOs have often been the first to highlight such hypocrisies and the work of most organizations include, to a greater or lesser extent, elements of critique or advocacy that might be considered transformational. However, one of the principle features of arms trade activism in the post-Cold War era is the extent to which many NGOs have downgraded radical critique in exchange for insider influence and government funding.100 Instead, activism has largely been aimed at promoting tactical reform within an overarching economic and security' paradigm that justifies intervention, regulation, and transformation of the South whilst (with the exception of token action on landmines, etc.) leaving the vast accumulation of Western armaments largely unproblematized. The logic of this analysis then, is that there needs to be a far greater problematization of military expenditure by the major powers, of the so-called ‘legitimate’ trade in defence goods, including intra-Northern trade, and a problematization of the predominance of Western defence companies in global arms markets. In short, campaigners needs to return to a strategic contestation of global militarism rather than searching for tactical campaign victories dependent on accommodation with the language and economic and security paradigms of contemporary military humanism.

#### This militarism justifies exterminating people around the globe. Their invocation of human extinction is an ideological move to absolve us of responsibility for the consequences of intervention.

Saurin, PhD, 06

(Julian, IR@Sussex, *International Relations as the Imperial Illusion; or, the Need to Decolonize IR* in Decolonizing International Relations ed. Jones )

Whatever the paucity of references to or uses of the history of the colonized (subaltern and otherwise dispossessed), IR scholarship is able to present the colonized as much through omission and unspoken assumption as by direct reference. There are four principal (and no doubt complementary) paths one can take in exposing the nature and effects of these omissions and assumptions. First, there is the general critique of Eurocentrism in which the now global dominance, indeed intellectual hegemony, of the European "enlightenment" social scientific traditions has effected the silencing or permanent subordination of subaltern knowledge, including historical knowledge. Here, "subaltern" and "colonized" are synonymous. Second, there is the profoundly important critique of "oriental ism" in which the Western imagination tells us little or nothing about "the rest" but everything about the West. Here, " nothing" and "the rest" are synonymous. Third, there is the recording, tracing, and critique of the profound political economic inequalities that were generated by colonial (or imperial) international order and that have resulted in the **perennial extermination** of the colonized. Here, "colonial order" and "inequality" are synonymous. Finally, one could demonstrate the contradiction, partiality, differentiation, and inconsistency of ostensibly universalist doctrines, most obviously of human rights and human equality, in the constitution of the colonial (or imperial) order. Here, "partiality" and "universality" are synonymous. The removal or discounting of the subordinated from their own history is secured often through the simplest of techniques, such as in the repetition of simple phrases. Thus, in his critical assessment of Said's work, Bruce Robbins takes Disraeli's imperial dictum that "the East is a career" and comments that his phrase is briefly and brilliantly offensive. Activating the convention by which an empty, immobile point on the compass is held capable of condensing millions of undescribed personal destinies, the sentence equates these missing millions with a single individual 's rising curve of professional accomplishment. The individual who is to enjoy the career is elided, as if in pretense of equal exchange for the elision of the colossal human diversity that is to be its raw material; in the space of symmetrical impersonality thus cleared , the static East can be spurred into movement, metamorphosed into the kinesis of a (Western) '·pursuit.,,25 So, in a phrase, is captured the essence of imperial administration and the attitude to subject peoples. And it is the task of overturning a deep and long established attitude that any call for decolonizing lR must face . This attitude in fact tells the story of Western supremacy-its historical and historiographical evolution- by presupposing Western supremacism. Guha identifies the problem clearly when he counterposes Hegel's characterization of world history with what is historically entailed in the production of that world history. Thus, quoting Hegel, world history moves on a higher plane than that to which morality properly belongs .... The deeds of great men who are individuals of world history . .. appear justified not only in their inner significance ... but also in a secular sense.26 In this way, the historical function and purpose of the imperial nation or state is presented as already peculiar and elevated and not prone to the limiting conditions and considerations that characterize the subordinate. What does this abstraction mean concretely? Imperialism is author of history, author of law, author of historical subject, author of indictment, author of judgment. For example, "By **inventing a universal humanity** and endowing this juridical abstraction with inalienable rights, it absolved Europe of crimes both past and future ," Bess is opines before asking whether "Enlightenment thought, like storm-bearing Clouds, already carries future horrors within it, formulating the limits of universality in such a way as to make Europe its sole guardian?"27 Correspondingly, Guha argues that from the point of view of those left out of World-history this advice amounts to **condoning** precisely such " world-hi storical deeds"-the **rape of continents, the destruction of cultures, the poisoning of the environment**-as helped " the great men who [were] the individuals of world history" to build empires and trap their subject populations in what in the pseudo-historical language of imperialism could describe as Prehistory.28 Imperial rule makes itself known as imperial rule through the power of universalizing its own story and **self-validating its own story**. The twin of this is to deprive the subordinated of the capacity to tell their own story and to determine an alternative legitimation and self-validation. (33-4)

#### Voting negative challenges the terms of political discourse surrounding arms control. Critical praxis outweighs policy proposals and we must reject militarism- the only way to win the game is not to play

Dalby, PhD, 12

(Simon, Geography@Ottawa, *Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms in the 21st Century* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Much obviously needs to be done in terms of the arms trade and the possibilities of tackling proliferation in terms of the consequences for human rights specifically and human security more generally.48 In borrowing the slogan from the World Social Forum for this concluding section of this essay, the argument returns to the possibility of alternatives, not just where they are usually investigated in the contemporary scholarly engagements with activist movements and those getting arrested in protests against various ‘global’ projects, but also in the logics of critical geopolitics challenging the terms of political discourse where it is frequently most seductive, in the specification of contexts which, once so specified, then apparently require certain modes of conduct.49 As Spiegel and Le Billon suggest, the invocation of simple geopolitical verities, in their case a brutal regime (Mugabe’s Zimbabwe), and an evil arms supplier state (China), and heroic narratives of resistance to the arms trade by South African dock workers refusing to allow ‘the ship of shame’ to come into port to unload weapons and ammunition, run into much more complex geographies when resistance is mobilized to political violence.50 The international trade of weapons and the various financial organizations, shipping companies and other agents involved in this case alone make the reality of global interconnection much more complicated. Political campaigns calling for boycotts and international sanctions became caught up in confusion and counter claims, all of which suggest to Spiegel and Le Billon that larger questions about complicity in violence and support of regimes that use violence on their own populations need investigation. Which suggests once again the importance of larger political movements against war, and the arms trade in general rather than particular campaigns against particular ships or shipments. It is clear from this case that when focussed only on Chinese actions resistance was quickly drawn into geopolitical arguments and mutual recriminations, charges of hypocrisy and malfeasance that did not help prevent the continued violence in Zimbabwe. But what is clear in all this is the global interconnections of politics, violence and a global public concerned, albeit sporadically, about political violence are part of the current policy picture. It is also clear that such civil society initiatives are a fixture in the politics that President Obama discussed in Prague even though there is no reason to assume that the protestors will support American initiatives on weapons or disarmament. The growing interconnections and the potential for economic and political cooperation now suggest the possibilities of grappling with weapons issues and the technologies of destruction in matters that are much more nuanced than simple invocations of virtue and perfidy residing in particular states. With clear rules for assistance, trading, and aid in a crisis the possibilities of confrontation are reduced and the need for complicated technological weapons reduced. Double standards and self-serving attempts to use diplomacy as a means of strategic competition by other means will no doubt persist for a long time to come. If arms control is to be about more than this, then the geopolitical contexts within which these debates take place need much more attention. None of this suggests that pure ‘enlightenment’ where all the political leaders suddenly come to their senses and decide to come to common agreement over global problems is going to happen imminently.51 But it does suggest that the changing context of globalization presents opportunities to deal with numerous matters in a more productive atmosphere where pressing problems of mutual interest can be addressed. To do so requires, in the short run, tackling the legacy of the War on Terror, with its remilitarization of international politics. Continued American actions in Asia, while ostensibly consistent with the nuclear free world eventually policy of the Obama administration, nonetheless continue the military policies of his predecessor. While Colin Gray may be correct in arguing that America is the leading state on the planet for the foreseeable future, and can act as hegemon in some ways, his warnings about overreach are more especially germane to questions of how arms control and international cooperation play out in coming years.52 The rise of Asian powers makes it especially clear that there are limits to American capabilities, and that arms control will have to recognize the geopolitical circumstances of globalization and imminent problems of climate change, urbanization, energy shortages, and numerous related issues. As some recent commentators have suggested the shifting patterns of geopolitical change are beginning to produce alternative visions of arms control and disarmament, ones that are not about American technological dominance and surveillance, as in the Cold War model, but ones of larger cooperative international arrangements and regimes that do not rely on maintaining the existing geopolitical order as it has come to be known.53 The simple point that most of the existing nuclear-armed states have been reluctant to give up their nuclear weapons, while insisting that other states not acquire them and conveniently ignoring those that have done so outside international regimes, is not forgotten by many emerging states. It’s worth remembering that some of the peace activists in New Zealand in the 1980s, while advocating nuclear free zones, explicitly saw the spread of weapons from metropolitan states as the threat that needed to be contained. Geography matters greatly in how threats are understood. The initiative by Turkey and Brazil in May 2010 to defuse the standoff on the Iranian nuclear issues may only be the beginning of diplomatic initiatives from the growing group of second tier states, those Parag Khanna calls the second world.54 in light of President Obama’s speech in Prague where he insisted that people must demand an end to nuclear weapons, there is a rich irony in how quickly this particular initiative was dismissed in Washington and demands for negotiations between Tehran, Washington and European states were reiterated. American control of the agenda was apparently much more important than an innovative solution, and one that would have legitimized other states as actors on the arms control agenda worldwide. None of this is surprising if the authoritarian pedagogue model based on the American credo, to once again invoke Andrew' Bacevich’s formulation, remains as the dominant script of American policy. Nonetheless the assumption that arms control can remain a matter of control of arms by the major powers of the Cold War era is now' clearly in doubt. Numerous proposals for the reform of the United Nations Security' Council imply a refusal to allow the nuclear powers to dictate the terms of world order in perpetuity. The geographical loci of policy initiative may indeed shift in unpredictable w'ays. Paying attention to the geopolitical world orders that rising powers are seeking to shape, rather than operating within a simple geography of the existing metropolitan states policing a world of peripheral dangers, would be a most useful start in thinking about innovation in policy making, not to mention scholarly analysis.Facing challengers may be much less important in the coming decades than facing challenges, whether it’s from ecological disruption, diseases, or simply economic instability. But continuing to pose policy options in terms of competitive state actions is itself the major obstacle to progress on numerous pressing human security issues and arms control in particular.55 For the structural realists this is the only game in town; for the rest of us this game is precisely the problem that needs to be tackled, and while multilateral arms control is but one of the many methods whereby the logic of that game might continue to be effectively constrained, it has a role to play in dissipating the dangerous political prejudices that Peter Kropotkin warned about a long time ago.(50-2)

# Extensions

## Links

### L: Arms Control

#### Now is a key time to interrogate statist/colonialist assumptions of arms control

Mathur, PhD, 15

(Rita, PoliSci@UTSA, Sly civility and the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order: a post-colonial critique Critical Studies on Security, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1106428)

The contemporary efforts of scholars to describe the nuclear order as an ‘enlightened’ or a ‘quasi-religious order’ is a provocative exercise (Walker 2007; Jasper 2014). This complemented with projections of an impending ‘clash of civilizations’ due to failure of non-proliferation regimes generates a sense of curiosity and alarm in the subaltern (Huntington 1997). The resurrection of Cartesian binaries such as enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, West and the Rest cannot be easily dismissed as polarizing polemic. These narratives suggest the need to investigate the ‘and’ circulating as the colonial signifier of authority mapping the terrain of arms control and disarmament and staking its claim as the master (Bhabha 1994, 139). These narratives coupled with a sense of fatigue that, ‘there is absolutely no recognition that rather than the behaviour of outlaws, the acquisition of the trappings of modern state power is central to admission to the game in the first place, that states behave this way precisely because that is what it means to be a state’ suggests that there is much more at stake in interrogating the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order (Mutimer 2000, 141, 156–157). The invocation of enlightenment, civilization, religion at a time when the traditional ideological apparatus of arms control and disarmament appears to be a spent force is thought provoking. What prompts these invocations? What is their purpose? There is a churning in the field of arms control and disarmament that makes it difficult to conceal the practices of ‘sly civility’ embedded in the dominant epistemic understandings of arms control and disarmament (Bhabha 1994, 133–44). This then is an opportune moment in time to engage in an exploration of the political mastery of the nuclear order by the West. This paper is an undertaking to investigate the sly civility with which this order is staged and maintained. An exposition of the ‘dynamic of difference’ in the referential and institutional demands of arms control and disarmament with the help of the concept of sly civility will reveal a ‘process of signification’ through which those that control the narrative exercise their power to differentiate and discriminate against others (49–50). In undertaking this exercise this author willingly acknowledges her bias in exposing the sly civility of those especially entrusted with ‘special responsibility’ for maintaining international order. The deliberate focus on practices of sly civility will help cultivate an understanding of the paradox of equality/inequality in the field of arms control and disarmament. It is only to be hoped that such an exercise instead of being perpetually dismissed as the whining complainant with its tirade against ‘nuclear apartheid’ will receive some serious consideration from those interested in peace. (1-2)

#### Arms control is rooted in the logic of governmentality- key assumptions like balance/stability are tied to statistical control of risk through hyperinstrumentalized reason

Mutimer, PhD, 12

(David, PoliSci@York, *From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the abolitionist Desire* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

To the degree that my analysis of arms control is correct, any move towards Obama’s goal of denuclearization will require a fundamental rethinking of arms control practice. In the next section I turn to examine the recent attempts by the US to work toward this goal through negotiations with Russia, in order to see how the agreements reached to date relate to the Cold War practice discussed above. However, before I turn to those agreements, I want to reconsider the constitutive features of Cold War arms control that make it difficult to see how it can, as a practice, produce zero, and do so in an historical context rather broader than that provided by the Cold War. In some of his later work, particularly a series of lecture courses delivered at the College de France in the late 1970s, Michel Foucault began to develop an account of modern government.19 In particular, he was concerned with tracing the emergence of a particular mode of thought, governmental rationality, or, as it is now more commonly called, governmentality, as the primary logic of politics after the 16th and 17th centuries. In this section, I read stability, equality, and vulnerability through Foucault’s account of governmentality, to show that rather more than simply features of a late 20th century' diplomatic practice, these are deeply embedded in the governmentality of modernity. Put another way, I show that nuclear arms control is a modern, governmental technology. In 1978 Foucault delivered his annual lecture series. As he summarized it after the fact, The course focused on the genesis of a political knowledge that put the notion of population and the mechanisms of ensuring its regulation at the center of its concerns.’20 It is this political knowledge that he will come to call governmentality and Foucault begins his exploration of that knowledge with security. The notion of security that emerges from this discussion is complex, but I want to focus on one feature in particular: the way in which security involves the management of risk without any expectation of its elimination.21 To explain what he means by security, Foucault takes the example of the design of towns. In doing so, he distinguishes security from discipline: Discipline works in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely constructed. Security will rely on a number of material givens... [It] will not be reconstructed to arrive at a point of perfection, as in a disciplinary' town. It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while krwwmg that they will never be completely suppressed.22 From the perspective of the early 21st century', it is interesting to realize that security, in Foucault’s analysis, is very much a positive force. It is aimed at providing the best possible circulation, in the context of a lived space in which circulation is at the very heart of life. But clearly to ensure the best possible circulation, government must confront the question of risk: those things, like theft and disease (and now we might add terrorism and nuclear war), which will disrupt circulation. The relationship of government to risk, therefore, is through security, and it is explicitly, in Foucault’s analysis, a containment of vulnerability, rather than a practice seeking its elimination. The logic of modern government, then, centres on the management but not eradication of risk; it is a technology for minimizing but never overcoming vulnerability.23 ‘The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain....’24 The uncertainty cannot be eliminated; it cannot be made certain, but must rather be minimized and regulated. The connection to contemporary security practices, and in particular to arms control, seems quite clear. Security confronts the range of possible events with an eye to minimizing risk. The security practices of the War on Terror have tried to mask the impossibility of the elimination of risk,25 but the more common security practices throughout modernity have followed Foucault’s logic more openly in ‘knowing that they will never be completely suppressed’.26 Nuclear arms control fits this logic perfectly, serving as a regulatory tool to minimize the risk of nuclear war, while managing the necessity of vulnerability. Much of Foucault’s discussion of governmentality is in the realm of what we would call domestic politics. Indeed, he is concerned with the production of sovereignty through the marriage of territory and population in government. How'ever, tow'ard the end of the series of lectures,27 Foucault turns his attention explicitly to international relations. He suggests that with the emergence of the ‘governmental’ state, politics loses any claim to universality or eschatology, and in their place it puts raison d’etat. Raison d’etat breaks the hold of both the Church and the Empire on the state, so that the end of the state is nothing beyond itself. The effect of this break is to introduce what we know as international relations: competition among formally sovereign states. Thus along with a logic of (internal) government, an external rationality is also produced in the same period, and as part of the same process. The consolidation of the state as the government of a defined territory and population demands the removal of the sovereign from the sway of external powers, whether temporal or ecclesiastical. The logic, however, of the competition among formal sovereigns is not, at least not necessarily, the same as the logic of government within the state. Foucault traces this external rationality, this raison d’etat, in part to show the way in which governmentality produces the apparatuses of security: the military and the police. In doing so, however, he suggests that the idea of the balance of Europe is articulated at the heart of governmental logic. The balance of Europe is what is more commonly termed the European balance of power, and is, once it is generalized by the expansion of the European state globally, the basis of the balance of power and hence stability. The central metaphors of arms control, therefore, balance and stability are products of the very constitution of an interstate system in Europe, a system which was then globalized into the system in which we now' live; the system which, in turn, conditions the search for international security. It should, again, therefore, be no surprise to find that arms control as an international security practice is constituted by these twin notions of balance and stability. The maintenance of the European balance relied on the development of a particular technology: statistics. Foucault provides an account of this development, and its linking with international balancing, which begins with the production of police: From the seventeenth century it seems to me that the word ‘police’ begins to take on a profoundly different meaning. I think w'e can briefly summarize it in the following w'ay. From the seventeenth century police’ begins to refer to the set of means by which the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order. In other words, police will be the calculation and technique that will make it possible to establish a mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between the state’s internal order and the development of its forces.28 Police, at this early moment, is significantly more extensive than our present usage, referring to a wide range of governmental strategies which include, of course, what we will come to term policing. This later, narrower, use of the term (and practice) focuses on the question of internal order, rather than the development of forces. But in his account of the initial development of police, in which the two are closely connected, Foucault draws an explicit link between balance in Europe and the use of the technology of statistics: Finally,... there is a relationship of instrumentation between European equilibrium and police, in the sense that there is at least one common instrument. This instrument common to the European equilibrium and the organization of police is statistics. The effective preservation of European equilibrium requires that each state is in a position, first, to know its own forces, and second, to know and evaluate the forces of others, thus permitting a comparison that makes it possible to uphold and maintain the equilibrium. Thus a principle is needed for deciphering a state’s constitutive forces.29 The notion of forces is, of course, quite different from that of the arms control negotiations of the mid 20th century, but the point is that the notion of the maintenance of a balance, which comes to be institutionalized in European politics with the formation of interstate competition, is effected through the application of statistics, the rendering of forces into numerical categories for the purposes of comparison. Statistics is, if course, at the heart of modern government, indeed the term itself refers to the science of the state. It has become, however, the collection and analysis of numerical data, with the contemporary state increasingly collecting data on all aspects of the lives of its citizens. The close connection between government and statistics was demonstrated in an unusual way in Canada in the summer of 2010. The government decided to change the rules surrounding the scheduled 2011 census, for reasons most interpreted as an attempt to provide a sop to its anti-government, conservative base. The Canadian practice has been that 20 per cent of the census forms were the so-called long form, which ask a wide range of questions designed to generate the data from which Statistics Canada produces internationally renowned reports. The law required Canadians to answer and return the forms, including the long forms, with the threat of fine or even jail for non-compliance. The government announced in the spring of 2010 that in 2011 it would no longer be mandatory to complete the long forms, though more would be distributed in an attempt to maintain the quality of the data. For us, what is interesting is not the backlash, as a range of stakeholder groups fought to keep the integrity of StatsCan’s data, nor even whether or not the government backed down (uncertain at the time of writing), but rather why it was attempted in the first place. The anti-government conservatives in Canada (and the United States) see the data collection of the long form as overly intrusive - that is, the collection of statistical data is too much government.3° The practice of arms control has drawn on this early notion of police to develop a conception of balance which is similarly indebted to the science that statistics has become. The knowledge of one’s own (nuclear) forces and, particularly, the evaluation of others’, becomes through the practice of Cold War arms control an exercise in statistics. The first step is rendering the two different arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union as comparable for the purposes of counting, and then providing an accounting to produce the desired outcome: balance. What Foucault’s account of the 17th century practice of policing the European balance shows is that such a method of producing a nuclear balance is a product of that earlier practice. The conclusion of reading Cold War arms control through Foucault’s account of the emergence of modern government is that arms control is an expression of governmentality. The core constitutive features of arms control, stability, equality, and vulnerability, are a package with a long history in the rise of the European state. Arms Control is a technology of government whose key constitutive features are inextricably intertwined with the governmental rationality of the modern state. The question this conclusion then leaves is whether the recent developments in the US-Russian management of their nuclear arsenals fit within this Cold War practice, with its long roots in European history and its inability to countenance denuclearization.

### L: Heg/US Key

#### Aff portrayal of a just and equal rules based system is a nostalgia trap- the “liberal order” is a myth to hide US hegemony

Danforth, PhD, 18

(Nick, Senior Policy Analyst at the Bipartisan Policy Center, PhD in Turkish history at Georgetown University “What’s So Disordered About Your World Order?” *War on the Rocks*, June 20th, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/whats-so-disordered-about-your-world-order/)

It seems that the liberal international order, a system of rules and institutions that brought peace and prosperity to the world in the aftermath of World War II, is now “being challenged as never before in its 70-year history.” Examples of this unprecedented challenge can be seen around the globe: Trump is threatening to destroy NAFTA. Russia is resurgent, annexing Crimea and menacing the Baltic states. Democratic values are on the decline in Eastern Europe, with Poland and Hungary slipping toward autocracy. China flouts the rules of the World Trade Organization and Britain is on the verge of leaving the European Union. Worst of all, in the Middle East a brutal dictator uses chemical weapons with impunity. As these examples make clear, though, the international order at risk today isn’t quite as old as we think. As late as 1988, there was no NAFTA. Ukraine and the Baltic states were firmly under Russian control. Poland and Hungary were communist dictatorships. China hadn’t joined the World Trade Organization and what is now the European Union had yet to adopt such key features as a common currency and visa free travel. Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons not just with impunity but with tacit American support. And even in the last three decades, the liberal international order was not as robust as we’d like to imagine. For example, the ongoing humanitarian tragedy in Syria has generated poignant laments for a vanished era when such horrors wouldn’t have been permitted. By this standard, though, the golden age of the international order lasted just a few years, from Washington’s successful 1999 intervention in Kosovo to its unsuccessful 2003 intervention in Iraq. Or, measured differently, from the time Bill Clinton sincerely apologized for not stopping the genocide in Rwanda up until the moment it became clear George W. Bush wasn’t prepared to stop the genocide unfolding in Darfur. Of course, even its most ardent admirers would readily admit that the liberal international order was always more of an aspiration than a consolidated, 70-year-old achievement. And the optimism that accompanied the end of the Cold War has been widely derided for some time now. Yet there was still a surprisingly hardy assumption that up until recently the world was moving, however slowly or erratically, in the right direction. If nothing else, there appeared to be a trajectory toward greater order that has now become impossible to discern. This in itself is excellent cause for alarm. If the liberal order was always an arduous and incremental work in progress, it is all the more likely that progress could come apart. Similarly, if what order exists today only came about through the efforts of successive presidential administrations, the arrival of a president without the desire or competence to sustain this achievement is even more frightening. And gratuitously alienating allies is never a good idea. But it would be a mistake to react to this rising alarm with nostalgia for an era of global order that never was. Watching the president abandon the rhetoric and ambition that, however imperfectly, sustained American policy seems to have led observers to double down on historical myths. The temptation to invoke romanticized history in an effort to avert disaster is entirely understandable. But it comes at the expense of accurately diagnosing the contradictions of the previous policy consensus and having a candid discussion of how we got where we are today. Which then makes it harder to build something stronger in the aftermath of the crises we are experiencing. In fact, many of the questions up for debate today are the ones policymakers debated in the 1990s – when U.S. power and the optimism for a new international order were at their peak. In championing the liberal order, U.S. politicians were always loath to admit that there were ever trade-offs between America’s interests and the world’s, or that they had sometimes broken the very rules they promoted. Yet beneath this rhetoric there were still real arguments that now risk being lost in the nostalgia: Would the liberal order be American-led or American-dominated? Would America follow the rules or make them? How could countries like China and Russia be convinced to accept the terms of an American order? And out of what combination of idealism and self-interest would the American people be convinced to support this whole endeavor anyway? Well before Trump, U.S. foreign policy had to navigate between rival critiques, from Americans insisting that the international order was a hopelessly idealistic project with little in it for them and foreign critics who saw it as a euphemism for American hegemony. Partisan debates aside, past presidents never received an outpouring of popular support when contemplating intervention in the Balkans, or Syria, or anywhere else where they couldn’t articulate a clear threat to American security. Similarly, there was never a consensus, even in Washington, on how to respond to Russian aggression against non-allies situated on the periphery of Western institutions, whether Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014. It was, in other words, far from clear that voters were willing to shoulder the cost of compelling countries like Russia to accept the version of the international order that the United States was offering them. In pushing confidently ahead with a geopolitical project that saw its success peak in the year 2000, policymakers were bound to run into trouble eventually. Appeals to an idealized past serve to bolster the argument that if only the president – Obama, Trump, or both, depending on your politics – had not abandoned America’s commitment to global leadership the world’s current crises could have been avoided. The implicit premise is that were Washington to recommit to its previous foreign policy vision, the world would fall in line. Difficult disagreements about matching America’s geopolitical ambitions to its resources would resolve themselves without any insurmountable objections from voters or foreign leaders. Syria’s civil war could be resolved like Bosnia’s eventually was, rather than any one of the countless other civil wars Washington couldn’t, or didn’t ever attempt to, solve. One need not know the solutions to these challenges to see that they won’t be found in recreating a short-lived moment of post-Cold War confidence. Figuring out what comes next requires looking at the recent past as a cautionary tale as well as a template. And recognizing that, whatever solutions emerge, they will almost certainly prove more compelling – both at home and abroad – presented as a revised vision for a more stable and just world than as a return to an era whose virtues are more apparent to op-ed writers than anyone else.

#### Their advantage is a PR campaign for modernity management- interrogating unstated geographic assumptions is crucial to broaden our perspective on arms control

Dalby, PhD, 12

(Simon, Geography@Ottawa, *Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms in the 21st Century* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Which geographies are invoked as the appropriate contextualization is one way into this discussion. These are in part dependent on what are taken to be desirable future arrangements of global power; after all arms control is frequently rationalized in terms of its preventing conflict and facilitating the emergence of a world no longer endangered by large scale violence in a situation where the technological capabilities of industrial warfare threaten destruction on a planetary scale. Peter Kropotkin’s 19th century call for a geography that dissipates prejudices and promotes peaceful cooperation is now powerfully reinforced by the growing recognition in many places that our fates are now much more obviously interconnected in a globalized world. Arms control during the Cold War was to a very substantial extent about controlling arms that might destabilize matters in a crisis situation. Preventing situations where peripheral violence might escalate to a superpower nuclear war was key to the efforts; so too were the use of technological modes of verification. This was not the whole story, but it was a dominant dominant theme. After the Cold War this mode of thinking is much less obviously the necessary framework for arms control. Now the questions relate to larger questions of world order and the locus of authority in a rapidly changing situation. But old patterns of geopolitical thinking remain, and in Washington in particular reproduce the foreign policy credo in the technological assumptions about verification and the presuppositions that American military supremacy is a necessity in a world order understood in terms of modernity managing the planet. In part they do this by perpetuating the powerful geopolitical logics that specify matters in the cultural terms of them and us, peaceful virtuous modernity and barbaric threats beyond, in how security is written.5 The literature now known as critical geopolitics analyses such discourses of danger, the geographical representations of insecurity and the articulation of popular identities mobilized in security politics.6 How the world is represented in political language is frequently a matter of the most obvious geographical invocations of us and them – of this place in contrast to foreign locations – and the assumptions of a virtuous inside in danger of threats from dangerous external spaces.7 The most taken for granted designations of the arrangement of states, the assumptions of developed and not developed states, the presence of dangerous wild zones in various places beyond metropolitan civilization, and the simple shorthand involved in designating complex spaces as states with a single name are crucial to the modern geopolitical imagination.8 They provide the categories for policy making, but in doing so dramatically simplify the complex interconnected geographies of a globalized human world. A key point of the critical geopolitics literature is to suggest that the geographical imaginations that structure politics can be different, but it is never a foregone conclusion that some geographical designations are better than others; nor that the complexity of global politics is well served by particular invocations.9 This is the case in international attempts to prevent arms trades and efforts to impose sanctions on regimes seen to violate reasonable political behaviour. It is especially complicated where arguments about ‘the Responsibility to Protect’, and codes of conduct for states frequently seem to be invoked as universal principles when used by Northern states as a mode of disciplining Southern states.10 What much less frequently gets investigated is how Northern actions might threaten Southern states, nor what citizens, activists and policy makers in the South might deem to be desirable policies for disarmament, or the appropriate categories for scholarly analysis. But the question is implied in President Obama’s Prague speech. (40-1)

### L: Humanitarian Advantages

#### Humanitarian justifications for arms control solidify boundary between legitimate and illegitimate violence but do nothing to challenge it

Krause, PhD, 12

(Keith, IR@Geneva, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

The second element of continuity was that arms control measures often had a sort of humanitarian subtext, that echoed earlier restrictions on the civilized use of weapons, such as the banning at the Second Lateran council of the use of crossbows against Christians, or the general opprobrium that greeted the spread of firearms on the battlefield. From the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, on forward to the debate around dum-dum bullets and chemical weapons in the first half of the 20th century, to contemporary debates on land mines, cluster munitions and the treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), particular tropes concerning inhumane and unacceptable ways of killing and injuring people have been deployed.10 These include such things as the ban on chemical weapons, on blinding lasers, and on anti-personnel landmines. This humanitarian subtext to most of these measures was an important part of the civilizing discourse of warfare, but was therefore also part of the broader devil’s bargain of international humanitarian law. The principle of international humanitarian law, which protects some groups of people from some forms of weapons or violence, may also have made certain forms of interstate war-fighting more palatable or acceptable, rather than challenging in any fundamental way the relationship between states, citizens, and violence. It may also have channelled military innovation in certain directions, without necessarily having restricted overall the destructiveness of the weapons that were deployed.11(21)

#### Framing arms sales restrictions as a human security issue feeds into status quo militarist policy analysis – only the alt reclaims scholarship to see the malleable nature of militarism and open up new avenues of political action.

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The disagreements and silences of the ATT negotiations demonstrate the ways in which weapons circulation and regulation are marked by different forms of militarism. The human security agenda has made significant inroads to international public policy and social science scholarship, and was an explicit driver of the ATT. Whilst there is much in the treaty that optimists see as having the potential to better control the circulation of weapons, the argument put forward in this article is that it is a mistake to see the treaty as a victory for human security over militarism. Rather, human security has both chipped away at some of the most egregious manifestations of militarism, been silent on others, and proved to be an accommodation with global militarism in its various forms. Human security, political economy and sovereignty came into contestation during the negotiations as expressions of different modes of militarism.

Weapons circulation takes places within a system: there is a world arms market (including legal and illicit strands) marked by asymmetry, hierarchy and transnational practices, in which many major exporting states that claim to care about human security, in particular European states, already participate in regimes based on ATT-like principles. Those that don’t, or are ambivalent about such multilateralism – in particular Russia and China, and the USA, respectively – are sceptical about claims made on the basis of human rights and IHL. Claims to protect human security disconnect human rights and IHL violations from these patterns of military asymmetry and hierarchy, and generate resistance from non-liberal suppliers and recipients. So the human security agenda rests on the assumption that international politics can remain militarised in one way (the absence of efforts at disarmament or tackling military spending or military asymmetry) and yet be demilitarised in another (efforts to decrease the likelihood that weapons will be used in human rights or IHL violations), in ways that the examples discussed above suggest are untenable. Resistance to the ATT from a significant minority of Southern states may well be politically ugly, but needs to be understood in the context of asymmetry in the world military order, as does US dominance of the negotiations for a treaty to which it is a signatory but not a State Party.

In the desire to promote the spread of human security practices, there has been little attention to why an initiative such as the ATT might be resisted, beyond narrowly strategic or instrumental concerns or a failure to internalise human security norms. Thinking about modes of militarism, and the ways in which the human security agenda has transformed, but not necessarily diminished, militarism, can help us think more creatively, both analytically and politically, about what is at stake. We need to understand and explain patterns of militarism because of the paradoxical role of military power and systematic or organised violence in international relations. On the one hand, military power has historically been fundamental to the constitution of organised political power, be it in the form of the state or otherwise. On the other hand, demilitarisation from current levels and forms is a condition for improved human security. A contraction of the influence of the “social relations, institutions and values” of war and war preparation on social relations, institutions and values more generally 120 reduces the likelihood of violent responses to political problems, reduces the secrecy and corruption associated with military decisions or military involvement in the economy, and lowers the opportunity costs associated with high levels of military spending, to name a few reasons. But militarism has been pushed off the agenda, precisely because it strikes at the core issues around war preparation and the constitution of political community and political economy, and because the maintenance of coercive capacities in the South is central to aid donors’ and Southern elites’ interests, not to mention the entrenched coercive orientation of Northern states’ foreign policies.

For these reasons a human security agenda is limited in terms of its ability to generate more restrictive weapons transfer practices. However, it is also deeply interested, in the sense of having political effects. Human security has become a dominant policy orientation amongst aid donors and NGOs, is eminently fundable by donors who claim the mantle of benevolence without wanting to change their weapons transfer practices, and has been mobilised in scholarship in pursuit of a normative project. While the practical gains made by any treaty will always be partial, the more significant ramification is that the gains made in the ATT help set the parameters of politically feasible action, and obscure some of the core political projects that are sustained by the circulation of weapons.

### L: Proliferation

#### Fears of the collapsing proliferation regime obscure colonial violence- the demand for a concrete alternative is a disciplinary tactic that maintains the racialized status quo

Mathur, PhD, 15

(Rita, PoliSci@UTSA, Sly civility and the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order: a post-colonial critique Critical Studies on Security, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1106428)

A clear conceptualization of practices of sly civility above encourages us to now survey the system of recordation of the paradox of equality/inequality in the texts on arms control and disarmament. For the purpose of this paper we will limit this exercise to three representative samples of writing that traverse through time vacillating between ‘what is always “in place”, already known and something that must be anxiously repeated’ (Bhabha 1994, 95). These texts display a liberal willingness to entertain the problem of equality/inequality in arms control and disarmament in some measure. The willingness to question the assumptions informing ‘a desirable and feasible’ nuclear order is constrained by the desire to rationalize and make it appear natural that the inequalities should persist in the existing nuclear order (Bull 1987, 191). The treatment meted out to the equality/inequality paradox deserves careful consideration as they make visible the practices of sly civility that are responsible for the hierarchical international nuclear order. In the initial period of the Cold War, Hedley Bull, a representative figure of arms control and disarmament acknowledges the hegemonic control that exists in the nuclear order (1987, 191). He concedes that ‘the vision of the world order that is projected by our arms control arrangements is one against which the majority of states are in revolt’ and that ‘one finds different degrees of opposition to these arrangements, deep mutual divisions’ (191). However he insists on the need for maintaining this nuclear order because those that ‘wish’ to break down this hegemony ‘have nothing in mind with which to replace it’ (191, emphasis added). Bull specifically cites countries such as China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria and argues that ‘the objection of the third world countries is not to the quality of order in the present international arrangements; it is rather to the way in which these arrangements discriminate against them’ (191, emphasis added). Thus, Bull not only specifically identifies the countries that are opposed to the inequality in the nuclear order but is also insistent in making a division between those that have a mind and others that are mindless in their quest for change in the nuclear order. He further argues that states located on the third rung of the hierarchical nuclear order harbour grievances not to the quality of order but the arrangements within this order that are discriminatory against them. This split discourse on quality of nuclear order and responsibility for the arrangements within the nuclear order is further buttressed by the suggestion that ‘those who have special interests recognize the special responsibilities that go with them, and conduct themselves in such a way as to engage general support for the system whose custodians and guarantors they are’ (Bull 1968, 1987, 143–50, 214, emphasis added). The racial etiquette practiced by Hedley Bull becomes more pronounced in his statement that the ‘Third World’s lack of power, including military power – its sense of impotence and vulnerability in relation to the Western countries’ makes it rail against the existing international nuclear order (1987, 201–2, emphasis added). It is with an inquisitorial insistence that he demands they articulate an ‘alternative conception of world order’ to be taken seriously (191). A similar tone of authority persists in the text of Joseph S. Nye as he writes in the last decade of the Cold War. Nye undertakes a purposeful investigation of the ‘logic of inequality’ in the nuclear order (1985, 123). The sincerity of his undertaking is belied by attributing theatrics to those claiming to harbour grievances against the existing nuclear order prior to the investigation being completed. At the very outset of this investigation, he describes the allegations of discrimination, hypocrisy and failure to live up to commitments levied by the diplomats of non-nuclear weapons states against the superpowers as a ‘drama’ (123). Nye then suggests that there is a ‘basic intuitive compact underlying the NPT’ and describes the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) itself as an ‘imaginary compact’ (1985, 124, 129) He then stipulates that ‘under certain conditions’ and ‘other things remaining equal’ nuclear inequality is acceptable (124–126). This reluctance to engage with historical circumstances and insert ceteris paribus clauses to advance abstract conditions of arguments is a questionable exercise. According to Akeel Bigrami and Priya Chacko this reluctance exhibits a ‘technological mindset’ that ‘fosters an abstract view of the world and relies on an understanding of truth as cognitive rather than as lived moral experience’ (Bilgrami 2003, 4164; Chacko 2011, 191). Nye deliberately insists on investigating the logic of inequality only as a technical problem susceptible to failure and denounces any investigation of the problem as embedded in racial roots. He emphatically insists that, ‘nuclear inequality has nothing to do with racism on the part of weapons states or with the irrationality that some claim to see in Third World leaders’ (Nye 1985, 126). This impatience to denounce charges of racism is coupled with fearful portents that questioning the logic of inequality could lead to the possibility that ‘deterrence will fail’ (126). The failure of deterrence it is argued ‘is likely to be much higher in most regional situations because of the shaky political conditions found in most states seeking nuclear weapons as well as their limited experience with nuclear command and control systems’ (126). The existing inequality is further justified on grounds that with ‘new proliferators’ the threat of breaking ‘nuclear taboo becomes that much more likely’ (127). The reference to ‘shaky political conditions’ belies an element of suspicion and uncertainty of a stabilized and legitimate influence in these regions that fuels the need for assertion of hegemony in the nuclear order. There is little effort to balance these observations with acknowledgement of the risks that the possession of nuclear arms by Western powers has exposed to the world (Sagan 1995). The maintenance of inequality is further proposed in the following terms, ‘under many circumstances the introduction of a single bomb in some non-nuclear states may be more likely to lead to nuclear use than the addition of a thousand more warheads to the US and Soviet stockpiles’ (Nye 1985, 128, emphasis added). This particular statement reveals the entrenched psyche of fearful discrimination and reignites the racial trauma of colonization in the subaltern that is to be severely penalized should even a single, rusty weapon be discovered in its possession by the colonizer (Memmi 1967, 93–4). Nye is confident in his assertion that, ‘nonproliferation is not an inconsistent or hypocritical policy if it is based on impartial and realistic estimation of relative risks’ (Nye 1985, 127). But he is oblivious to the consideration that the power to make calculations pertaining to risk of failure of deterrence are all vested in the West and violation of taboo are all sourced to ‘new proliferators’ that need to be policed (Nye 1985, 131). Nye does not problematize the task of policing as a shared responsibility of all countries but reiterates that the task of policing is ‘traditionally the domain of great powers in international politics’ (131). Any resistance to this policing function perceived as ‘the domain of great powers’ is further circumscribed by polarized choices between ‘some ordered inequality in weaponry’ or ‘anarchic inequality’ an oxymoron that is described by Nye to be ‘more dangerous’ (Nye 1985, 130). Nye casually entertains the possibility that ‘third countries may hold the superpowers similarly accountable’ but fails to provide any account of how this might be undertaken as he only insists on ‘alliance guarantees’ to stem proliferation and readily concludes that the NPT’s ‘Article VI obligations cannot be interpreted as simple disarmament’ (128). The transfer of nuclear technology even for energy programmes is also to be grounded in an ‘evolutionary approach’ and susceptible to additional deliberation on a ‘region’s stability and of the susceptibility of the technology to safeguards’ (130). It is this entrenched mindset of political master and paranoia of displacement of power that is displayed by Nye four decades into the Cold War. Nye displays little desire to question the legacy of attitudes that he has inherited from those that have been revered and are woven into the traditional discourse on arms control and disarmament. (3-6)

#### Fear of weapons proliferation is an attempt to eliminate risk- warps decision calculus

Cooper and Mutimer, PhDs, 12

(Neil, IR@Bradford, David, PoliSci@York, *Arms control for the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Most significant of all, strategic and crisis stability are no longer considered achievable through mutual vulnerability and the search for parity but rather through overwhelming dominance, the maintenance of global military inequalities and the search for invulnerability. Thus, the key feature of contemporary arms control practice has been the proliferation of non-proliferation initiatives aimed at preventing WMD acquisition by rogues and terror groups, most notably al Qaeda. Examples include: a new focus on combating terrorist financing adopted by the Financial Action Task Force since 2001; the 2002 G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the 2002 Container Security Initiative now incorporating some 58 ports around the world; the Proliferation Security Initiative announced in 2003; the adoption in 2004 of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, requiring all states to establish effective controls over WMD-related assets and to impose criminal penalties against individuals or groups developing or assisting in the development of WMD; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched in 2006; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism that entered into force in 2007, and; the expenditure of $800 billion on the global war on terrorism by the United States between 2001 and 2008.18 This proliferation of non-proliferation initiatives, it should be noted, has taken place in a context in which NATO countries combined now account for some two thirds of global military expenditure, with the United States alone accounting for more than forty percent and the only notable terror attacks on American soil involving WMD would appear to have been perpetrated by a scientist at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases who sent anthrax though the postal system, killing five people shortly after 9/11.19 Despite this, it is not inconceivable that Iran will be subject to a strategy of forcible disarmament because of concerns that it might develop a nuclear weapons capability sometime in the future. We have thus moved from an era where arms control was principally about ensuring societies remained at risk of extermination to one where it is principally about exterminating risk all together – at least for the major powers. In many respects then, it is now the practitioners of the contemporary WMD non-proliferation agenda who have become the new unilateral disarmers (albeit of the forcible kind) and the new idealists in search of the kind of absolute security (albeit for themselves) that Bull dismissed in 1961.20 Ironically however, this search for absolute security appears to be giving rise to ever more arms control challenges as illustrated by the way in which prophylactic interventions to prevent the next 9/11 have given rise to threats of improvised explosive devices and the copycat use of unmanned aerial vehicles.21 It is also the search for the absolute security of the boiling frog, where low risk, high impact, events such as 9/11 prompt intense efforts to escape from repetition, but the gradual ratcheting up of normalized threats such as global warming are treated within a policy paradigm characterized by exceptionally high levels of tolerance for the associated risks, mutual vulnerabilities and insecurities they produce – including, in the case of global warming, the possibility of global ecocide. (7)

### L: War Advantages

#### The plan is a technocratic attempt to rationally manage war/escalation. This reinforces military industrial logic and pushes violence to the periphery- its incompatible with more transformative action

Krause, PhD, 12

(Keith, IR@Geneva, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements, mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation, maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I think the policy acceptability of SIPRI’s work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naïve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen as part of the broader spectrum of nuclear capabilities, such restrictions were tilted more towards the control side of the equation.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related, element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices. Its political acceptability came from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking, including of course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire military-industrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-industrial complex. High level proponents of arms control (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a techno-managerial project. The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions. The third core element of the arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state’s monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace but that it could also be projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence. Just as the domestic form of the Weberian monopoly renders the population vulnerable to the predatory state (so much so that scholars such as Rudolph Rummel could argue that democide – state-sanctioned killing of citizens – was a greater risk than war);27 the international form also involved rendering entire populations totally vulnerable to nuclear holocaust. In the name of national security the very survival of the entire population could be put at risk, through policies such as Mutual Assured Destruction or treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. It is difficult to find a better example of techno-managerial logic, instrumental rationality and the assertion of sovereign power at work. Although perhaps an extreme example, this faith in the ability of states to exercise restraint over the use of force, also underlay the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The final element was that the arms control paradigm, like the much older balance of power system, was not a mechanism for maintaining order that eliminated war or the use of force from the international system. It assumed that the main risk to be prevented was that of large-scale inter-state war between great powers or the superpowers, and that a trade-off between this risk, and the risk of (or fact of) small and large wars, especially in the postcolonial world, was an acceptable one. The use of violence was either to be part of the logic of so-called limited (nuclear) war or to be confined to the periphery, to such places as Indochina, Angola, and Afghanistan (although this was hardly peripheral to the Soviet Union). This was analogous to the operation of the 19th century balance of power system, which sanctioned the partitions of Poland, the Crimean War, and so forth in the name of maintaining systemic stability. Similarly, the logic of limited nuclear war, as presented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger, rested upon the assumption that the use of force could be carefully calibrated and controlled.28 The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear, and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. (23-6)

### AT: Aff ≠ Arms Control

#### Arms control is a mode of governmentality not a piece of paper

Krause, PhD, 12

(Keith, IR@Geneva, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

How, if at all, is this relevant to 21st century challenges of controlling the possession and use of the means of violence? Viewed narrowly as a policy-relevant and technocratic means of regulating military competition between states to minimize the risk of accidental violent conflict (or to reduce the overall risk of conflict), the arms control paradigm is intellectually, although not necessarily practically or politically, exhausted. There remains much practical negotiation and work to be done on such things as a fissile material cut off treaty, further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals (especially of tactical nuclear weapons), and efforts to maintain the somewhat shaky edifice of nuclear non-proliferation. Other initiatives, such as restrictions on the weaponization of space, or on ballistic missile defences, seem less relevant to 21st century geopolitical realities, in which the risk of inter-state war is relatively minor, while the risk of large-scale intra-state and non-state violence remains. What the complete paralysis of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the non-events of the past two decades (since the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993) have highlighted is the way in which arms control as narrowly conceived was a product of particular geopolitical conditions and presuppositions that gave rise to certain kinds of multilateral measures, based on shared understandings of the significance of stability and balance, transparency, equality, hierarchy, and the technological potential of nuclear weapons. All of these understandings have been challenged in different ways by states such as India, Pakistan, China, Egypt, North Korea, or Iran, often for reasons of national or strategic interests, but also because they reject the way in which traditional arms control practices reinforced and legitimated particular sovereign understandings of who could (and could not) possess, use, or threaten to use, particular weapons.30 But I argue that arms control practices can also be viewed more broadly through the lens of governmentality.31 To begin, the regulation of and control over the use of lethal violence was not, since the early 20th century, just about inter-state military competition. It was also about a set of social and institutional practices that imposed certain understandings about the rules for the use of force in international society, that reinforced the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of force both internally and externally, and that manifest themselves through particular forms of management of a given territory, population and resources. Thus, even though some of the new frontiers of contemporary arms control do not have the same practical manifestations or targets, nor even the same actors engaged in promoting arms control, they can be understood as sharing the same premises about state power and violence. On this broader account, one could redefine arms control as being about who can possess, use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for what ends? And the (critical) scholarly question is then: what are the consequences and effects of the legitimization of particular configurations and distributions of technologies of violence? In this light, a wide range of contemporary international practices, include such things as the bans on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, post-conflict weapons collection and destruction efforts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives all can be considered as new manifestations of arms control as governmentality. Some have argued that these types of measures reflect a shift towards humanitarian disarmament, or ‘disarmament as humanitarian action’, and aim to reclaim the disarmament side of the arms-control and disarmament divide.32 I would argue, however, that despite some significant differences in focus and targets, targets, there is a great deal of continuity with the logic of governmentality that emerged in the latter stages of Cold War arms control practices. The first way to highlight the shift from a sovereign to a governmentality perspective is to reformulate the original three goals of arms control articulated by Morton Halperin33 into a contemporary idiom that captures some of the newer arms control challenges: • reducing the risk of war: today involves extensive post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes designed to eliminate the potential for a resurgence of violent conflict; • reducing the destructiveness of war should it break out: today involves campaigns to promote and extend international humanitarian norms concerning what weapons are used and how they are used by both state and non-state armed actors; as well as the collection and destruction of surplus weapons and restrictions on the international transfer of arms; • reducing the costs of preparing for war: today involves the exercise by international and bilateral donors of intrusive oversight and pressure on client states – as a form of liberal governmentality – over the size, structure, training and armaments of their armed forces, as well as over military spending and the security sector as a whole. In the next brief sections, I will illustrate how these three goals have been pursued in practice through efforts at humanitarian disarmament, DDR and SSR. More importantly, I want to show how their pursuit reflects the contemporaneous deployment of the logics of sovereignty and governmentality, both drawing upon and moving beyond the underlying elements of the Cold War arms control paradigm.(26-8)

### AT: perm

#### Now is the key time to focus on decolonizing arms control-including aff representations guarantees failure

Mathur, PhD, 18

(Rita, PoliSci@UTSA, Postcolonial perspectives on weapons control, Asian Journal of Political Science, 26:3, 293-296, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2018.1526694)

Several months ago, I received an invitation from the editorial board of the Asian Journal of Political Science to serve as a guest editor for a special issue of this journal. This unexpected invitation came as a pleasant surprise when I was mulling over the possibilities of postcolonial interventions to decolonize practices of arms control and disarmament. The efforts to decolonize cannot be undertaken alone but need a forum and multiple voices that can collectively represent the efforts of postcolonial scholars to engage with the problem of weapons. The scholars contributing to this special issue have long struggled individually to represent the subalterns struggle for equality and justice within the field of arms control and disarmament. It is now that they come together collectively with their myriad perspectives to interrogate contemporary practices of weapons control. This undertaking is critical especially at a time when the field of International Relations is being critiqued for its Eurocentrism and there is a resurgence of populist civilizational discourses juxtaposing the West and the Rest. This appears as an opportune moment in history to accept the challenge of decolonizing practices of arms control and disarmament. It is not simply a cliché that the field of arms control and disarmament has long been defined and dominated by the West’s military superiority in arms. The struggle against this dominance has been launched by critical security studies scholars that question practices of Orientalism in warfare but refrain from probing more specifically into the problem of weapons. Postcolonial interventions are an exercise in responsibility as they engage with civilizational discourses of difference articulated in terms of race, technology, law and culture. A study of the performative power of these civilizational discourses of difference is critical to cultivate understandings of not only how differences reinforce hierarchies but also to generate reflexivity on the struggles for power, justice and emancipation waged continuously by the subaltern. This Special Issue of the Asian Journal of Political Science is an effort to make more visible the engagement of postcolonial scholars with the problem of arms control and disarmament. It is an effort to resist a resurgent tide of dominant discourses seeking to constitute and reconstitute the field of arms control and disarmament representing the interests of the West to address problems of nuclear proliferation, counterproliferation and nuclear terrorism. While these efforts have their own niche in the field of security studies they cannot be guided by assumptions representing the West as the vanguard of maintaining order and stability in the international system. These dominant representations of the West as the guardian and custodian of the field of arms control and disarmament have often blighted and marginalized contributions of the Global South to weapons control. These efforts have been further stymied and marginalized as some actors from the Global South have striven to join the nuclear club and their practices have been typologized as co-optation or imitation of the behaviour of great powers in the international system. (293)

#### Landmine ban proves partial resistance ends up sanitizing the broader system of arms transfer

Cooper,PhD, 12

(Neil, IR@Bradford, *Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization: Moving Weapons Along the Security Continuum* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

Second, the analysis highlights the relational elements that can be involved in processes of securitization and desecuritization. In the case of the landmines ban this manifested itself in the way campaigners engaged in simultaneous processes of securitization of APMs (with respect to the human as referent object) and (relative) desecuritization (with respect to the state as referent object) that worked to mutually reinforce the case for a ban. In the case of pariah weapons generally, whilst there are a number of factors that explain their stigmatization, one factor can be the way their particular qualities are depicted as the antithesis of those possessed by legitimized and particularly heroic weapons. Conversely, the stigmatization of pariah weapons works to delineate other weapons as normal and legitimate. There is therefore a process of mutual constitution that is at work in the way different sets of weapons technology are framed and understood. Third, the preceding analysis illustrates the relevance of Floyd’s argument that processes of securitization or desecuritization can be positive and negative, particularly when considered in terms of their emancipatory effects. As noted above, in the case of landmines a process of relative desecuritization vis-a-vis the state combined with a process of extrasecuritization vis-a-vis the human to bring about the production of a ban widely considered to have produced positive security outcomes for individuals, communities, and the human as a collective. In contrast, the relative desecuritization of major weapons transfers represents a much more ambiguous development. It could, of course, be argued that such a change in the security labels attached to the weapons holdings of neighbouring states would not only reflect but reinforce a move to more peaceable relations. In addition, the relative deproblematization of defence transfers might be conceived as a positive development, particularly for states that possess minimal domestic defence industrial capacity, and are threatened by hostile neighbours. At the same time however, such a shift along the spectrum of security arguably represents a quite regressive development when applied to the issue of arms transfers. This is particularly the case given that, irrespective of the powerful ways in which the security labels attached to major weapons are shaped by discourse and other forms of representation, they still possess a residual materiality, however thin, that is characterized by their capacity to facilitate the organized prosecution of violence. More generally, the transfer of such technologies can also be viewed as symptomatic of a world characterized by deeply problematic higher order paradigms of security and economy. At the very least then, the relative (if not complete) desecuritization of major arms transfers would appear to raise further questions about the Copenhagen School’s normative commitment to desecuritization. Although more accurately, it highlights the effects that come from ratcheting down the security labels attached to ‘normal’ arms transfers and subjecting them to the kind of standard bureaucratic routines highlighted by Bigo, albeit the routines of the export licencing process in this case. One consequence, is that the many thousands of export licences granted for the transfer of weapons other than landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms are far less likely to become the object of public scrutiny or become subject to intense public and political contestation about the security effects of such exports. In this sense at least, the switch from a Cold War arms transfer system where security motivations for exports often predominated to one where economic motivations are more to the fore, has also been accompanied by a corresponding depoliticization of contemporary transfers, a phenomenon that highlights the problematic nature of the neat division between politicized and securitized issues outlined in the CS conception of securitization and one that highlights the downside of even partial moves towards the desecuritization end of the security spectrum.

### AT: Realism

#### Purported objectivity and inevitability of realism sanctions mass violence- human history disproves this kind of determinism (also perm answer)

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Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

#### Imagined dominance of realism promotes violence and conflict- alternative images are not only possible but critical to examine in order to avoid cognitive biases

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The problem of the self-fulfilling prophesy is of course not unique to the realist paradigm of international relations. We have seen that similar criticisms have been raised against other scientific approaches, and that, in principle, any interpretive frame- work, if it is influential enough, can become self-confirming. However, an exposure of these tendencies as they are exhibited by political realism may be considered particularly important. It is important because of the effects realist policies can have on the **lives of human beings**. It is clear that realism is enormously influential as a political ideology. It is far from clear that, through lack of proper judgment, it does not serve to **inhibit peaceful coexistence and cooperation and increase the risk of violent conflict** among and within nation–states. As long as there is **only a slight risk** that it might, it is **necessary** that at least part of the discipline of international relations theory adopt a **critical as opposed to a defensive attitude** with respect to its major assumptions. It is equally necessary that the other part listen. Steven Forde observes that “drawing on analyses of human nature, on arguments about the necessary structure of international relations, and on laws of political behavior derived from both these sources, realists have quite frequently posed as the **clear-eyed apostles of objective reason**, confronting the deluded idealism or selfrighteous moralism of their fellow men.”63 Certainly, nobody, whether political scientist or policy maker, likes to be called “deluded” or “self-righteous.” However, it also seems a likely dictate of “objective reason” that we should not threaten the normative bases for communit y together with all hope for social improvement for the sake of any **convenient paradigm of scientific inquiry**. It is important to keep in mind that “‘scientized realism’ . . . presumes what actually needs explaining.”64 Paradigmatic realism was, after all, born from ideological realism and follows the Hobbesian strategy of self-justification. As David Johnston has emphasized, Hobbes’s works are not designed merely to be academic exercises in political theorizing, but to help persuade those who carry on conf licts between parties and factions to instead seek accommodation and domestic peace.65 As Robert Walker points out, to modern realists, “Hobbes is perhaps easier to read as a corroboration of the external necessities of realpolitik, but only if his explicitly normative aspirations are read naively, as the way things are.”66 In the service of **ideological self-legitimation**, Hobbesian realism constructs “a myth of origins in which individuals arise out of an **imaginary moment** of utilitarian calculation: a fabulous story which continues to mesmerize those economistic utilitarians seated obediently upon the patriarch’s knee.”67 The reason such a myth can actually become dangerous is that, when it is **used as a theoretical framework for the development of policy**, the constraints that are considered given for the purposes of analysis are also **taken on faith as being given in empirical settings**. We may not want to conclude with Robyn Dawes that the claims social science makes about understanding human nature are altogether unwarranted and it might be better to withhold all judgment about it.68 However, we should clearly allow for the possibilit y that human nature might not be entirely static nor fully determined by the dictates of rational egoism, but that, instead, human beings can and do develop “social” interests along with cooperative patterns of interaction. In addition, we should counter the realist bias in political decision making by fighting **both motivated and cognitive misperception**. To do so, in the words of Robert Jervis, is to “increase explicit and self-conscious judgment and decrease the extent to which decision-makers **perceive without being aware of the alternatives that are being rejected**.”69 It is commonsensical to expect the motivating power of fear to vary with actors’ perceptions of threat. It is equally commonsensical to expect the importance of relative power to vary with the degree of opposition an actor expects in the pursuit of its goals. As Richard Herrmann and his colleagues have put it, “[O]bviously, if cognitive perspectives develop only the enemy image, then they will need to assume that all relationships are perceived in threat-based terms. This may be consistent with the assumptions of neorealism, but fails to capture the variation in both motivation and behavior that characterizes foreign policies. . . . **Clearly other images and relationships should be explored.”**70 (152-4)

## Impact

### Structural Violence

#### Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

### Environment

#### Militarism makes environmental destruction inevitable

Bennis 18 (Phyllis Bennis -- fellow @ the Institute for Policy Studies, “A Green New Deal Needs to Fight US Militarism”, Jacobin Magazine, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/05/green-new-deal-fight-militarism-imperialism, 8 October 2018)

The war on terror unleashed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack has led to almost two decades of unchecked militarism. We are spending more money on our military than at any time in history. Endless wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere are still raging, more wars are threatened against Iran and beyond, costing the US trillions of dollars and creating humanitarian disasters. Treaties to control nuclear arms are unraveling at the same time that conflicts with the major powers of Russia and China are heating up.

The Green New Deal must have anti-militarism at its core. Wars and the military render impossible the aspirations contained in the Green New Deal. And slashing the out-of-control military budget is crucial to provide the billions of dollars we need to create a sustainable and egalitarian economy.

To fund the Green New Deal, with all of its component parts, we must transition away from the current war economy that pollutes the planet, distorts our society, enriches only the war profiteers. An end to US wars across the globe and massive cuts to the military budget will provide funds for green jobs, public education, health care for all, green infrastructure development. And we will transition our nation’s security away from failed and failing wars into a new foreign policy based on peace and diplomacy, not war.

The Military and the Environment

The United States’ militarized war economy plays a major role in the destruction of our planet’s vital life support systems. The military uses enormous amounts of fossil fuels and other chemicals that poison the air, water, and land human beings depend, both within US borders and across the globe where US forces, planes, drones and other war machines go to war. Where the US military establishes bases abroad, the local environment always suffers. As David Vine noted in his seminal book Base Nation, the carbon footprint of military bases is enormous. They house carbon-spewing tanks and aircrafts, and use tremendous energy for climate control and electricity. “The military’s thirst for petroleum,” Vine writes, “is so great that on a worldwide basis, the US armed services consume more oil every day than the entire country of Sweden.” To make matters worse, in many countries, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with the host government prohibit local authorities from investigating environmental destruction caused by US military bases.

As documented by the Institute for Policy Studies and the Poor People’s Campaign, US wars have left a toxic legacy in their global wake, poisoning soil and water and polluting air for decades after the formal end to hostilities. And the military sows environmental destruction within the US, as well. The IPS/PPC report notes that “the Pentagon is directly responsible for 141 Superfund sites” — ten percent of all such sites, far exceeding any other polluter — while “760 or so additional Superfund sites are abandoned military facilities or sites that otherwise support military needs.” The carbon footprint of the military industrial complex is also staggering: In 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) emitted 66.4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, representing over two-thirds of the entire emissions of the US government. Tellingly, however, the military’s overseas emissions are exempted from the U.S. government’s carbon accounting — despite representing a majority of the DoD’s emissions.

Slash the Military Budget, Fund Green Jobs

The US military is clearly an obstacle to a safe climate — so any comprehensive climate justice policy must confront US militarism head on. What would the Green New Deal’s peaceful foreign policy look like?

Since fifty-four cents of every discretionary federal dollar goes to the military, we must massively cut the military budget, starting with at least a 50 percent cut. We should close most of the 800-plus US military bases around the world, which are destructive to people’s rights, land, water, and international law. We should bring home most of the hundreds of thousands of troops deployed overseas, including the thousands of Special Forces operating in 149 countries. We should end the air and drone wars that are responsible for so much death and destruction, and move towards abolition of nuclear weapons. And the money saved from the de-militarization of our foreign policy should be immediately redirected to fund green jobs and infrastructure programs, health care and education for all, new diplomatic initiatives, and significant support for reparations, reconstruction and rebuilding in the countries our wars and economic and environmental policies have so profoundly damaged.

### Intervention

#### Turns case—the aff’s participation in an economy of sacrifice guarantees global death-dealing operating under the guise of ‘defensive’ action

Pahl 2015[Jon Paul and Elizabeth Hagan Professor of History and Director of MA Programs in The Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. “Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture.” In Can We Survive Our Origins?: Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture]

American self-understanding has been brutally efficient in producing “innocent domination” (Pahl 2012b). Throughout American history, deathdealing, pursued as a matter of public policy, has been cloaked repeatedly in a sacralizing aura of rhetorical innocence. According to this “exceptionalist” narrative, usually asserted in direct contrast to the evidence, killing is an unfortunate accident, “collateral damage” in the otherwise noble history of American progress. American domination, even and especially where violently pursued, is innocent. Usually, this killing is dressed up as “sacrifice,” i.e., as heroic and costly self-dedication to an ideal or value (Denton-Borhaug 2011). The trope is remarkably mobile—and exceptionally slippery in the semantic ambiguities it generates. The “sacrifice” of others (and of American “boys”)—implying their bloody immolation (i.e., sacrifi ce in its archaic and original sense)—has been invoked as necessary across the centuries (Ebel 2010). The removal of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of the Spanish in the South of North America, the revolution against the English across the 72 Jon Pahl and James Wellman Atlantic seacoast, and the pushback of the French to what became Canada were all justified, already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by rhetorics of “sacrifice” ( Jewett 2008). In the nineteenth century, the Civil War was described by both sides as a sacrifi cial struggle “upon the altar of the nation,” as Yale’s Harry Stout has aptly put it (Stout 2006). Most recently, the dawn of U.S. empire in the Philippines, the (belated) entry into World War I, the “good war” against the Axis Powers in World War II, the “Cold War” against the Soviet Union and Communist China (via proxies in Korea and Vietnam), and the military adventures in Iraq (twice) and in Afghanistan were all shrouded in sacralizing discourses of “sacrifi ce” (Stout 2006). American interventions have thus always been presented as exceptional necessities justifying exceptional measures. Such violence, no matter how sadistic, “preemptive,” and domination-driven, has been cloaked as “defensive” action, hence as innocent. Domination, so the exceptionalist narrative goes, is invariably “good” for the peoples Americans have invaded and fought. Religion itself has been pressed into service as a key component in an ongoing rationalization of violence-in-the-name-of-evolutionary-“progress” (progress being understood in racial, economic, nationalist, and gendered terms and marked by potent binaries of “us” versus “them”). Indeed, the production of sacralizing narratives out of violence tends to institute a civil religion parallel and rival to Christianity, operating essentially with transposed structures of thought and language (mis)appropriated from it. The thought of René Girard insightfully illuminates this trend in American history, since for Girard, such phenomena are to be understood most fundamentally as “regressions” characteristic of Christendom and its aftermath, to primitive archaic patterns programmed by our evolutionary history. In his most recent (and probably final) writings, especially I See Satan Fall Like Lightning; Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith; Evolution and Conversion; and especially Battling to the End, René Girard has emphasized insistently what he calls his “realist” approach to anthropology, while also taking a decidedly theological turn (Girard 2001, 2008, 2010; Girard and Vattimo 2010). For our purposes, Girard’s emphasis, in particular, on the historical actuality of a “founding murder” at the beginning of human civilization can point us toward a fully “realist” refusal to blink in the face of violence, or be deceived by its sacralizing disguises. Girard’s theological turn too can help us Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 73 to recognize in American history the dynamics of a paradoxical oscillation, of “apocalyptic” tenor, between a “crescendo towards extremes” of violence (producing domination) and what Pierpaolo Antonello has identifi ed as the “containments” of violence (presented as innocence)—a paradox operating via what Girard calls forms of “false transcendence” (Girard 2001, 46, 98–100, 119, 185). Th is “realist theology,” if we may so call it, embodies Girard’s most mature refl ections not only on human nature and Christianity, but also on an American culture that he called “home” for most of his adult life. It is true that the American empire (as Hardt and Negri observed [2008]) now operates as a global regime of transnational corporate power (one is tempted to say banking power). Yet the exchanges and flows (of weapons as well as cash) within this system are no less, for being global, part of a “sacrifi cial” economy than they were when tied to the nation-state and its policies (as is, in fact, still largely the case). Even more, the capacity of these sacrifi cial processes to produce victims has escalated, as Girard observes throughout Battling to the End—while also being at least temporarily contained in modern judicial rituals and systems of economic exchange. We have to understand here, however, that when violence is “contained,” for Girard, it is also redistributed and recycled around the body politic. What Girard helps us to realize, then, is that the system of false transcendence that marks American exceptionalism takes two primary forms. First, the ideological construct of innocent domination operates through overt, physical warfare rationalized and sanctifi ed as (noble) “sacrifi ce”—at which construction Americans have proven themselves to be exceptionally skilled, not least in recent decades. Secondly, the “false transcendence” of superordaining necessity and sacralized innocence is deployed in various forms of “cultural warfare.” Here, the battle is over symbols or “truth” more than actual physical territory. In these battles, what is “sacrifi ced” is not as evident (perhaps) as an actual human victim, but these ossifi cations of human reasoning that produce both the ideology of American exceptionalism and the false transcendence it secretes are, in the long run, no less destructive—are, indeed, perhaps more dangerous—than actual warfare. For ideological rigor mortis is the exact opposite of devotion to a living God (not to mention devotion to living human beings and commitment to alleviating their suff ering, insofar as possible). Such ideological certainty 74 Jon Pahl and James Wellman (which can have the function of masking a deeper want of assurance) marks a deep-lying strain in American history from its origins to the present. Of course, American history is not to be reduced to any single deconstructionist narrative of anti- or para-Christian American exceptionalism cloaking domination with innocence through the workings of a false transcendence. Th ere is also a deep stratum of trust (what Robert Putnam has identifi ed as “social capital”) manifest in spiritually grounded, pragmatically realistic, nonviolent movements for social change that give some empirical and cultural “heft ” to what Kant long since identifi ed as the conditions for perpetual peace, and that might collectively point (ironically enough) to the prospects for a Pax Americana.1 For the moment, however, we must explore and expand the fruitfulness of the present exercise in the application of Girardian theory. To which end, my colleague and I here present a series of four selected culture-readings, designed to illustrate the logic of sacred and “sacrifi cial” violence. In Guns We Trust: The Origins of American Exceptionalism Jon Pahl “American” identity, according to this reading of the culture-story, originated in murder. From the very beginning of European settlement, shifting alliances between indigenous tribal groupings and English settlers produced competing, and largely unresolved, charges of murder and injustice. For instance, in 1636 an English trader named John Oldham was murdered in Massachusetts Bay Colony. Th e English accused various Native Americans of the crimes. Th ese accusations were apparently driven less by the facts of the case than by the benefi ts that accrued to the English from playing on tribal rivalries that pitted the Mohegans and Narragansetts against the Pequots. English-speaking clergy preached repeated sermons demanding that the Pequots punish the murderers of Oldham, and when the Pequots refused and began carrying out raids on English villages, the English escalated the confl ict with an attack on the Pequot village in what is now Mystic, Connecticut, on May 26, 1637. Captain John Mason led a band of ninety English soldiers, accompanied by several hundred friendly Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 75 Narragansetts, and torched the entire village, killing hundreds of Pequots, most of whom were women, children, and the elderly. Commander of the attack John Mason explained the religious rationale for the mass murder aft erwards, claiming that God “laughed his Enemies and the Enemies of his People to scorn making them as a fi ery Oven. . . . Th us did the Lord judge among the Heathen, fi lling the Place with dead Bodies!” (Mason 1763, 10). A few decades later, Nathaniel Morton imagined the scene in vivid terms for readers, and explicitly justifi ed it as a “sacrifi ce”: it “was a fearful sight to see [the Pequots] thus frying in the Fire, and the streams of Blood quenching the Same; and horrible was the stink and scent thereof; but the Victory seemed a sweet Sacrifi ce, and they gave praise thereof to God, who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their Enemies” (Morton 1669, 101). In the coming years, New England’s Puritan settlers actually secured their dominance by promising free trade with various indigenous peoples in exchange for the severed heads and hands of murdered Pequots as tributes—thus establishing early connections between religion, violence, and commercial exchange in the “New World.” And lest the theological point be lost—namely, that encouraging the murder and dismembering of an enemy could be an act of love on the part of Christians committed to Enlightened moral values like not killing—William Bradford of Plymouth Plantation opined that “cutting off [Pequot] heads and hands, which the [Indians] sent to the English, [was] a testimony of their love and service” (Lipman 2008). In the decades to come, the English came to specialize in this method of dividing and conquering the fi rst peoples of North America. Th ey did so by using a murder as a pretext for more killing, although of course the killing was also legitimized by inquests, trials, and other legal procedures. Th e case of Sassamon—a “praying Indian” found dead near Plymouth in January of 1675—is the best-studied example. As a Christian, Sassamon was an ally of the English, although he also advised Wampanoag sachem Metacom (King Philip). Th ree Wampanoags were charged with Sassamon’s murder, tried in English courts, and found guilty and sentenced to death. Metacom protested, and eventually began organizing raids against English settlements. Th e confl ict escalated into total war—something Girard comments on with great insight in Battling to the End. Historian Francis Jennings has estimated 76 Jon Pahl and James Wellman that six of seven Native Americans and six of thirteen English in New England died during the war ( Jennings 1976). King Philip’s War, as it came to be called, ended with the death of Metacom in 1677. Aft er being captured by the English, he was fi rst tortured, then beheaded. His head was then displayed on a pole in Plymouth for decades. According to Jill Lepore, the war—triggered by the murder of Sassamon, and ending with the murder of Metacom—rigidifi ed cultural distinctions between “Indians” and “Americans,” and established a dualistic pattern for cultural confl ict that defi ned “American” identity (Lepore 1999). Murder, war, torture, destruction—the “sacrifice” of some to preserve others— these are the themes with which American history ought rightly to begin. Throughout the centuries, of course, Native Americans continued to bear much of the violence that fl owed from this us-them dualism and its sacrifi cial operations—from the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 (led by Colonel [and Methodist Reverend] J. M. Chivington), to the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, to the repression of the AIM uprising in 1973, to untold murders and crushing poverty down to the present.2 All of this was done, of course, in the name of “progress”; in the name of the “modern” (if not putatively “Christian”) renunciation of “primitive” religion and ritual. It would not be diffi cult to trace the way this initial incident spiraled into ideological trajectories that take us quite directly to Iraq and Abu Ghraib.3 Instead, however, let us, with Girard’s help, draw out the historical and evolutionary signifi cance of this “founding murder.” He writes: Th e modern shedding of ritual brings to light the psychosocial substratum of ritual phenomena. We cry “scapegoat” to stigmatize all the phenomena of discrimination—political, ethnic, religious, social, racial, etc.—that we observe about us. We are right. We easily see now that scapegoats multiply wherever human groups seek to lock themselves into a given identity— communal, local, national, ideological, racial, religious, and so on. (Girard 2001, 160) It is the mobility and pluriform diversity of the religious phenomenon—the construction, within the gap created by the “secularization” of inherited traditions, of hybrid civil religions and of self-sacralizing “cultural religions” or “identities”—that has marked the modern world. Girard again draws the Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 77 conclusion: “All discourses on exclusion, discrimination, racism, etc. will remain superfi cial as long as they don’t address the religious foundations of the problems that besiege our society” (Girard 2001, 210). I have said something of the religious foundations of American violence in this brief excursion on the founding murder(s) in American history. For other case studies in the history of innocent domination, readers are invited to explore my book Empire of Sacrifi ce (2010a), which discusses in turn: the execution of the Quaker Mary Dyer on Boston Common in 1660; the sacrifi ces associated with slavery in North America, as outlined by Frederick Douglass; the ruthlessly mimetic “war on drugs” that is, in eff ect, a war on youth and adolescents in American policy; and (fi nally) the exclusion of women, gays, and lesbians from full participation in American society, in what I call the “sacrifi ce of sex.” Each of these trajectories off ers an enduring thread, open to a Girardian reading, throughout American history; and each demonstrates quite real “sacrifi ces” of ritual immolation illustrating America’s ideology of innocent domination, albeit in forms that are not immediately and evidently identifi able as religious. Other “sacrifi cial” trajectories of reading in American history are explored in my previous book, Shopping Malls and Other Sacred Spaces: Putting God in Place (2003), which tracks the ways shopping malls, Walt Disney World, or the suburban home—and especially domestic sanitation and lawn care—originate in a “desire to acquire” in America, and produce “sacred places” that reinforce what I call the “violence of banality.” But too many examples are wearisome. Th e point is the same in any event. Mimetic rivalries operate contagiously in America, through market and social systems that bear religious signifi cance without appearing to be religious. In other words, innocent domination stems from a false transcendence, the falsity of which is evidenced by the existence underneath a religious rhetoric of innocence of a brutal, and escalating, system of interrogations, surveillance, torture, prisons, military expansion, and weaponry, the ballistic capacity of which is matched only by its destructive intent (Bacevich 2010). Unfortunately, the most troubling and insidious of the forms of innocent domination is the way in which truth itself suff ers under the fi xed ideology of American exceptionalism. Th is is the case in the “warfare” between science and religion in America, which has been concentrated, with special heat, on the topic of evolution, and which deserves special attention.

#### The impact is the elimination of other people to maintain a global economy of violence

Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar]

¶ The Necropolitics of Global Civil War¶ As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war.¶ In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death.¶ According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence.¶ Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and Negri, then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars.¶ In other words, if imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus, the native is included in the imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped of social life and transformed into bare life, ready to be commodified on slavery's auction blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of bare life derives from his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between "fact and law" (ibid., 171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes the place of politics and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing biopolitics and the normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and preemptive strikes, it also suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is to what extent the production of bare life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies, citizenship, and the concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its politics in ways slightly different from those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ??? then and today, as Rwanda's race-based genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed" (Agamben 1998, 114), that is as homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the value of human life on grounds of race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing process rooted within the necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes the remaking of the human into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them to what Orlando Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves the making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998, 161). In this sense, imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence characteristic of global civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the globe's population.¶ Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather, emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent "war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the "degradation" of the "postcolonial subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the human per se. We may therefore say that if global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred to as a process of zombification. Understood as sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ??? refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-objective violence ??? that is, the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid., 25) and detachment by those who manage and administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven value historically and presently assigned to human life and the politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global warfare.¶ The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's Ghost"¶ Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of exception and the failure of global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and violent excesses. While the novel presents an extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the operative modes of violence beyond their historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by treating it as a normative element of human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project of dramatizing the complicity between religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I argue, unwittingly coincides with normative narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global life as a permanent state of exception.¶ Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6¶ To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice.¶ If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars.¶ Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence.¶ Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity.¶ Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956).¶ Cont ¶ For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. ¶ In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war.¶ First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring.¶ Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances.¶ Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war?¶ Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.¶

### AT: Case Outweighs

#### The “case” doesn’t exist as something you can analyze outside the project of modernity-1AC harms/solvency claims are European invented factoids designed to make the plan *appear* to be a good idea- we don’t have to defend their “narrative” of the SQ because it doesn’t exist

Jabri, Phd, 17

(Vivienne, War@King’sCollege, *Colonial rationalities, post colonial subjectivities, and the international* in Against International Relations Norms ed Epstein)

The international is a location of politics the distinctiveness of which is historically defined in juridical-political terms, abstracted from the social-cultural terrain. Where the juridical-political evokes sovereignty and territorial limits, the social-cultural is a messier terrain, evoking identity, language, ideas, changing and unpredictable affi liations, movement and circulation. It is tempting to reify the former at the expense of the latter, or to retain a dualistic ontology where structure is separate from meaning. We might associate the former with ‘realist’ thinking in International Relations and the latter with ‘constructivism’ (see, for example, Ruggie, 1998 ). Historicizing the international reveals the complex imbrications of socio-cultural frames of reference with emergent juridical-political structures associated with Europe at the dawn of modernity, a time and place replete with conflict and contestation over political authority and locations. In the dominant discourses of International Relations, Europe scripts, indeed invents, the international. This particular narrative erases from view the non-European together with the histories and interactions constitutive of relations between geo-political entities beyond Europe (see Hobson, 2004 ). It is this erasure that is then repeated through European colonial expansion, reinforcing a narrative that confers the authorship or design of the international to the European subject as if this authorship had its origins in a tabula rasa, a point zero where no other subject of history could be construed or imagined. This same move can be said to be present in narratives that define the normative order of the international. To provide a critique is to reveal the workings of such erasure, not just historically but in the present, and to reintroduce the subject of history as the post colonial subject. This double move is the aim of the chapter. Discourses on norms are with us on a daily basis, mobilized in legitimizing strategies related to a multitude of issues, from climate change to human rights to interventions in conflict. Nowhere are norms more readily called upon, or more implicated, than in contexts of war and responses to confl ict. 2 That there is contestation around interventionist practices, especially when these are militarized responses, reveals much beyond the immediacy of the situation at hand and points us to the epistemological and ontological foundations of the normative structuring of the international. These are predominantly seen as having their genesis in Europe and spreading historically to encompass a world order where normative limits to decisions and actions derive from the realm of the international as a structured, rule-governed terrain of politics. Postcolonial states come to acquire voice on an international terrain built on the distinctly modern idea of sovereign equality. 3 The problem, however, is that the distribution of normative capital remains unequal, and the postcolonial world, as witnessed in the ongoing interventions against postcolonial targets, remains vulnerable to a colonial rationality, the continuity of which bears testimony to powerful and ongoing discursive formations where the postcolonial subject is not considered equal in agency or indeed worth. (38-9)

## Alt

### Ethics

#### The weighing mechanisms established by constructivism obscure genocidal colonial violence- a simple rejection of the plan is the only ethical response

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(Naeem, IR@Ithica, David L., PoliticalEconomy@Macalaster, *Constructivism and the Normative Dangerous liaisons?* in Against International Relations Norms ed Epstein)

Price wants to establish ethics as central to empirical inquiry. To do so, he turns to Mervyn Frost’s exploration of the constitutive role of moral ideas in the international system. This move is important for it seems to distance Price from the need to invoke a transcendental moral system that he could then bring to bear on the international system. Instead, following Frost, he finds ethical materials already present. This move aligns with contemporary constructivist thinking on ethics, like Onuf’s account of international social life as ‘a world of everyday ethics’ in which people live according to and with the ‘standards that make their worlds inescapably their own’ ( Onuf 1998 , 669–70) or Walker’s notion ( 1993 , 50–51) that international relations theory and practice is ‘already constituted through accounts of ethical possibility’. The point is potentially powerful: to give an account of the international system is to map its existing ethical contours. Price appears to begin humbly, recognizing that an emphasis on ethics as description or as integral to explanation requires that we get the ethical descriptions or explanations right. For example, he acknowledges that we cannot simply presume a unified international ethical community, as Frost seems to do (197). Despite this apparent doubt, Price’s engagement with Frost quickly raises the stakes, implying that constructivist empirical inquiry can adjudicate between various accounts of ethical possibilities within a universalizing modern history. Following Hegel, Frost (1996 , Chapter 5 ) suggests that the modern era, with its distinctive recognition of individual freedom and rights connected to citizenship, arrives along with the modern state in Europe, which is gradually spread across the globe. A communitarian global ethics thus turns on the recognition of sovereignty and the states system as the institutional underpinnings for the norms of the international system. However, Price argues that other accounts of the institutional underpinnings of modern ethical life are possible (198), though his account narrows our ethical vision. He points to cosmopolitan thought to suggest that a different set of institutional conditions (international interdependence; global governance, universal human rights) may be necessary to achieve the ethical fruits of modernity. Price inadvertently (and rightly in our view) exposes the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate as between competing claims about the institutional underpinnings of a modern vision of the world, not a wider exploration of ethical possibilities, such as those suggested by postcolonial scholars in IR, an issue to which we will return below. It is the more limited set of ethical alternatives – between modernist communitarian and cosmopolitan ethics – that Price aims to adjudicate as empirical questions. For example, we are asked to weigh the relative consequences of decisions to intervene or not for humanitarian purposes (199–200), but the standards for that weighing are presumed as part of the given backdrop of modernity . Norms constructivism works its empirical magic only against a broad historical story of (Western) international society, deciding whether and in what mixture cosmopolitan or communitarian institutional underpinnings best realize what is already given in the universal history of modernity’s advance. What Price delivers, then, is an empirical science that explores and makes possible the progressive unfolding of modern consciousness and ethics. What Price’s constructivism does not or cannot tell us is equally important. He gives no account of the ascendancy of modern norms, nor does he investigate the possibility of alternative ethical visions. Here we have the central ‘empirical’ exclusion of Price’s account: gone is the colonial imposition of modern institutional forms; erased is the violence, the blood, the resistance, the destroyed ways of life. 4 The answer might be that this is all in the past; now we can move forward with an empirical agenda of ‘progressive ethical advance’. But we can move forward readily only if the violence was complete, if the defeat of any alternative vision was so absolute that there really is no live alternative vision of international ethical life. If so, the claimed capacity to ‘unpack the dichotomy between relativism and universal objectivism’ (199) turns on the prior and complete destruction of alternatives. The ethical heroism of norms constructivism has cultural genocide as precondition. Acknowledging this seems too painful. Much constructivist work trades in images of ‘persuasion’ and ‘consent’, excluding or denying the power involved. For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998 , 895), norms have a ‘life cycle’ – a process of expansion and growth – involving norm acceptance, norm cascades, and peaceful and voluntary internalization. There is no hint of coercion in this language – no epistemic, structural, or physical violence. But norm entrepreneurs do seem to need the ‘leverage’ that comes with control of information, symbols, accountability processes, and practices of shaming ( Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 , 401). Yet, the reference to ‘leverage’ hints at the ambiguities in the idea of ‘internalization’ or ‘socialization’ documented by Epstein in Chapter 5, where the existing identity and values of the ‘socializee’ is ignored so that the process of internalization appears without loss or resistance, 5 or where norms emerge via a power-laden process that distinguishes normal identities and practices from de-valued others (see Epstein 2014 ). (27-8)

### Epistemology

#### Evaluate alternative solvency through an epistemological lens-

Jabri, Phd, 17

(Vivienne, War@King’sCollege, *Colonial rationalities, post colonial subjectivities, and the international* in Against International Relations Norms ed Epstein)

The chapter derives its analytics from previous engagements with postcolonial subjectivity and the constitution of the international ( Jabri, 2013 , 2014 ). The formulation, ‘postcolonial subjectivity’, suggests articulations of meaning and identity that recognize the formative legacy of colonial dispossession and the postcolonial condition. The latter is especially significant as it defines a break from the past through anti-colonial struggles that conferred meaning to postcolonial political community while being at the same time held firmly in the grip of the past. The ‘break’ as such is hence itself constitutive of postcolonial subjectivity, but it is a break that is constituted by a colonial legacy that does not disappear, but re-emerges in memory traces, narratives, and the hermeneutic positioning of the postcolonial self. The postcolonial international as structure is also constituted by the break from a colonial past that is constitutively part of the continuing present. The agency to transform the international derives from the interface between postcolonial subjectivity as defined here and the continuities, discursive and institutional, that come to structure the international as a distinct location of politics. It is in the context of these continuities that ‘norms’ come to matter, in their emergence and structuration as well as their constitutive potential. Understood thus, norms are not only regulative: constraining behavior, sanctioning transgression, and rewarding conformity, but also constitutive, determining identities and differences, conferring value and symbolic worth, drawing inside/outside boundaries (see Kratochwil, 1989 ; Ruggie, 1998 ; and cf Walker, 2010 ). How the postcolonial subject is located in relation to the regulative and constitutive potentiality of the normative ordering of the international raises questions relating to how this ordering is implicated in constructing the formerly colonized epistemologically and ontologically and what this looks like from the vantage point of the postcolonial subject. Drawing on this understanding of postcolonial subjectivity and the postcolonial international, the chapter places the lens on what I would refer to as the hermeneutics of erasure and its constitutive practices. Three arguments are made: the first suggests that the epistemological and ontological schema informing norms perspectives are based on a hierarchical rendering of the international and entities constitutive of this terrain; a hierarchy premised on the dichotomy between the universal and the particular. The second focuses on culture and its uses as a technology that differentiates populations and that services the hierarchical ordering of the international. We see here the racialization of cultural differentiation as the core practice defining the colonial rationality and its practices. The third argument reclaims the postcolonial subject of politics suggesting that the very presence of the postcolonial re-instantiates and reinforces the international in the face of a resurgent colonial rationality that, to this day, remains a powerful force in international politics. The chapter engages with Frantz Fanon’s understanding of the colonial condition and its legacy. As will become evident through the chapter, while Fanon was writing in the middle of the twentieth century, a time defined by the anticolonial struggles of the era, his analytics of the colonial condition hold resonance in understanding the colonial rationality that informs late modern, twenty-fi rst century practices. At the heart of Fanon’s ‘colonial schema’, as I will argue, is the dynamic of culture and, specifi cally, representations of the cultural life and institutions of the colonized. Importantly in the present context, Fanon reveals both the racial dynamics of such representations and the uses of culture as a technology of control. For Fanon, as will be shown, the point of resistance is not defined by rejecting the international and its normative constitution, but by the enactment of presence onto this terrain. It is precisely this presence that reveals and renders apparent the colonial rationality informing practices that seek to govern late modern postcolonial populations. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first outlines the universalizing claims of perspectives in International Relations that place primacy on ‘norms’ as the binding force that holds the international together. From Hedley Bull to contemporary ‘English School’ theorists and constructivists, the formative claim relates to the ‘expansion’ of international society to incorporate the postcolonial world. The second makes a turn towards ‘culture’ and its signifi cance in the epistemologies and ontologies of a discipline that has for long based its core assumptions on a limited historic terrain, both temporally and spatially. The section reveals the formative tensions that persist even as the discipline seeks greater ‘inclusion’ of non-western voices. The third and fi nal section turns to the question of postcolonial agency in the normative constitution of the international, suggesting that such agency emerges from the aporetic relationship between the postcolonial subject of politics and the international. (40-1)

## FW

### K Before Policy

#### Interrogating the framing of arms control is crucial to policy analysis

Dalby, PhD, 12

(Simon, Geography@Ottawa, *Critical Geopolitics and the Control of Arms in the 21st Century* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

The other point that is implicit in calls for arms control, in President Obama’s speeches, and in very many other places, is the crucial specification of the world as a dangerous place, and hence in need of arms control. But precisely who is threatening to whom where is frequently less clearly specified not least because it is frequently taken for granted in political rhetoric. But as the rest of this paper suggests, focussing on those taken for granted contextualizations, on the implicit, and sometimes explicit, geographical framing of the world as needing certain forms of arms control, is a useful analytical way of clarifying how the politics of arms control works. Many of the new innovations in Washington retain the geopolitical assumptions of American hegemony. In Andrew Bacevich’s terms they follow the longheld foreign policy credo in which American thinking has ‘an abiding conviction that the minimum essentials of international peace and order require the United States to maintain a global military presence, to configure its forces for global power projection, and to counter existing or anticipated threats by relying on a policy of global interventionism’.3 Nonetheless, and this is the key point in the rest of this paper, the geography of violence, and the technological means of its application have changed very substantially since the Cold War.4 Thinking through how these new circumstances, only loosely caught in the terms ‘globalization’ on the one hand and ‘human security’ on the other, are tied into campaigns both by civil society and states to control arms matters both as a matter of policy and a matter of scholarly analysis of the new geopolitical circumstances of the 21st century. What is clear is that a combination of the inter-related phenomena of urbanization, climate change, migration, financial crises, technological innovation and the rapidly shifting geography of global production is changing how geopolitics works. The rise of multilateral institutions emphasizes how inadequate nationalist political visions are in these circumstances, however tempting they are for politicians mustering domestic support for various policies. (39-40)

#### Academics should critically investigate arms control theory/framing not parrot policy assumptions- now key

Cooper and Mutimer, PhDs, 12

(Neil, IR@Bradford, David, PoliSci@York, *Arms control for the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

The period between 1960 and 1961 saw the emergence of some of the key texts upon which Cold War arms control practice and theory was built. This included the Daedalus special issue on arms control of 1960, Schelling and Halperin’s Strategy and Arms Control, and Hedley Bull’s The Control of the Arms Race both of which appeared in 1961.1 The same year also witnessed the publication of Donald Brennan’s edited book, Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, based on the articles in the earlier special issue of Daedalus.2 The influence of the Daedalus publication in particular is reflected in the journal’s production of further special issues on arms control in 1975 and 1991 each of which reviewed progress on the agenda of the 1960 publication and assessed the new arms control challenges emerging on its fifteenth and thirtieth anniversary respectively.3 Given the fiftieth anniversary of the Daedalus special issue has only just passed and that the same landmark has now been reached for the other publications, it is an apposite time to once again review the arms control agenda of the 1960s, to consider new practices that have emerged since then and to ask whether either are fit for purpose in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 era, apparently replete with new arms control challenges. Over and above the question of timeliness however, the production of this special issue was animated by our concern that the academic community has largely been reduced, on the one hand, to recording the new practices or challenges of arms control (although often using language other than that of arms control), rather than shaping the former or anticipating the latter. On the other hand, it has engaged in an extensive reconceptualization of security and its associated practices that has, nevertheless, managed to pay scant attention to questions of arms and their control. Instead, it has tended to be the policy or NGO community that has driven new agendas in arms control rather than the academy. Moreover, given the predominantly problem-solving orientation of academic arms control, there has not even been much that can be described as an attempt to critically reflect on the relationship between current practice and traditional arms control theory, on the security framings underlying current policies or on the functions served by the current global architecture of arms control. In part, this may reflect one of the downsides of the widening and deepening of security studies that has occurred since the 1980s, which has arguably resulted in relatively less attention being paid by more critical analysts to some of those areas normally associated with the thinner and shallower notion of security held in traditional security or strategic studies. (1)

#### Exclusive concern with policy making is unethical- assumptions must be deconstructed epistemologically

Epstein, PhD , 17

(Charlotte, Gov/IR@Sydney, *The postcolonial perspective Why we need to decolonize norms* in Against International Relations Norms ed Epstein)

Our critical task is to understand how norms constitute powerful ordering mechanisms of international politics that are enabled and sustained by particular forms of knowledge. In this duty of critique, the ethical commitment differs from that at work in norms constructivism in ways that Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney further expound in Chapter 2. The role of the normative consists not in determining the ‘ought’ that political actors or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ should orientate themselves upon in order to make the world a better place (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In that scenario, the normative is a guide to political practice or praxis . Here, instead, the duty of critique is necessarily epistemological, insofar as practices are always sustained by specific forms of knowledge (see also Shilliam 2014). To engage with the normative at the level of practices, as norms constructivism does, is therefore to leave untouched the orders of knowledge that sustain them. Returning power relations to the analysis makes this no longer viable, or at least suffi cient, as an ethical commitment. Or to put it differently, apprehending the normative merely at the level of praxis is not enough, once one recognises that orders of practice are regulated by epistemological orders, which in turn are always suffused with power. ‘Knowledge-power’ ( savoir-pouvoir ) is the term Michel Foucault coined to capture this constitutive and mutually reinforcing relation between forms of knowledge and powerful normative orders. Re-examining the epistemological categories that both sustain practices, on the one hand, and scholarly analysis, on the other, then, becomes the duty of critique. The contributors to this volume seek to explore the specifi c forms of knowledge-power that have become institutionalised as a result of conventional constructivism’s success in adding norms to IR’s established tool-kit. What is it about the concept itself, its underlying logic, that can account for the erasure of the workings of power in the international system? (3-4)

### AT: Reps Don’t Shape Reality/Cause War

#### The very belief that “reps don’t shape reality” is steeped in colonial logic

Jabri, Phd, 17

(Vivienne, War@King’sCollege, *Colonial rationalities, post colonial subjectivities, and the international* in Against International Relations Norms ed Epstein)

Fanon provides a picture of the continuities of colonial rationality and its constitutive power over postcolonial subjectivity. What I refer to as colonial rationality, with a focus on how such a rationality is implicated in the government of the postcolonial world through contemporary forms of intervention, is refl ected in Fanon’s understanding of the ‘colonial system’. Liberation for Fanon ‘is the total destruction of the colonial system, from the preeminence of the language of the oppressor and “departmentalization”, to the customs union that in reality maintains the formerly colonized in the meshes of the culture, of the fashion, and of the images of the colonialist’ (1988: 105). Such ‘liberation’ is not possible when the ‘colonized’ sees him or herself ‘through the filter of colonialist culture’ (1988: 103). Refl ecting on the anti-colonial struggles that defi ne Fanon’s core political position, he suggests ‘The Western “model” is being attacked in its essence and in its fi nality. The Orientals, the Arabs, and the Negroes, today, want to present their plans, want to affi rm their values, want to affi rm their relations with the world . . . it is no longer true that we must constantly trail behind, follow, depend on someone or other’ ( Fanon, 1988 : 125). It would be a mistake to read Fanon here in terms of cultural enunciation as the input that guarantees a voice in the constitution of the international. In the statements quoted above, Fanon provides a radical interpretation of the subjectivity of the colonized and the postcolonial, not one based in or determined by cultural specifi city, but one that is constituted in terms of resistance to colonial rule. The interjection of the formerly colonized onto the terrain of the international is hence only possible through liberation from colonial rule and a colonial system that continues to dispossess the colonized of their place in history. Fanon is all too aware of the corporeal imprint of colonial power and colonial violence, both of which are enabled through deep rooted and institutionalized discourses based not so much on cultural difference but on race. Fanon does not reject the international as such, nor its defi nition, in distinctly modern, secular terms based on national liberation and national sovereignty. What he reveals are the contingent matrices of power and violence that continue to be informed by racialised hierarchies that continue to reinforce the colonial system even in the postcolonial era. It is through Fanon that we see the implications of the epistemological and ontological hierarchies that enable the forms of intervention, such as the invasion and occupation of Iraq, I highlight at the outset of this chapter. Resistance for Fanon is suggestive of the interjection of the embodied self in opposition to the colonizer. At the same time, operations of power come to be articulated racially against the corporeality of the postcolonial subject of politics. Fanon’s understanding of the subjectivity of the colonized does not derive its basis from uniformity of experience or identity based on culture or ethno-national identity. Formative of colonial and postcolonial subjectivity is the colonial encounter, but also the capacity of the colonized to resist, to articulate forms of subjectivity that have the capacity to create something new – to found political community constituted not by the colonial system, but the desire for political liberation understood in distinctly modern terms, exceeding, in other words, the specifi cities of culture. How does Fanon relate to the lexicon of the modern international and its normative constitution? The fi nal chapter of The Wretched of the Earth provides us with some clues as to whether we might see Fanon in conforming or subversive terms; conforming to an order already scripted in Europe, or subversive of its core foundations. Fanon identifi es the following international political aspirations: Come, then, comrades, the European game has fi nally ended; we must fi nd something different. We today can do everything, as long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. ( Fanon, 1967 : 251–52) This creation of something new is repeated several times here, so that the responsibility of the formerly colonized is no less than ‘starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but will also not forget Europe’s crimes’ (Fanon, 1967: 254). However, in rejecting the European model, Fanon is keenly aware of Europe’s imprint and the desire to replicate and imitate. However, the condition of possibility for the creation of a seemingly cosmopolitan order for Fanon, one that is responsive to universal Man, in his view, is ‘independence’. This is, however, ‘not a word which can be used as an exorcism, but an indispensible condition for the existence of men and women who are truly liberated, in other words, who are truly masters of all the material means which make possible the radical transformation of society’ ( Fanon, 1967 : 250). Fanon’s search for something ‘new’, a new vocabulary and a new ontology, is not without controversy and it would be misplaced to argue that Fanon somehow transcends the limits of the postcolonial international. Rather, Fanon is fully aware of how ‘culture’ is used variously to exclude, control, and contain: The unilaterally decreed normative value of certain cultures deserves our careful attention. One of the paradoxes immediately encountered is the rebound of egocentric, sociocentric defi nitions. There is fi rst affi rmed the existence of human groups having no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and fi nally the concept of cultural relativity. We have here the whole range from overall negation to singular and specifi c recognition. It is precisely this fragmented and bloody history that we must sketch on the level of cultural anthropology. ( Fanon, 1988 : 31) For Fanon, the colonial system and its legacy do not emerge from a cultural vacuum, but are products of frameworks of knowledge and hermeneutic meaning that confer legitimacy to these practices of domination. The consequences are well spelt out here: There are, as we may say, certain constellations of institutions, established by particular men, in the framework of precise geographic areas, which at a given moment have undergone a direct and sudden assault of different cultural patterns. The technical, generally advanced development of the social group that has thus appeared enables it to set up an organized domination. The enterprise of deculturation turns out to be the negative of a more gigantic work of economic, and even biological, enslavement. The doctrine of cultural hierarchy is thus but one aspect of a systematized hierarchization implacably pursued. It is the ‘special character of the colonial situation’ that is at the heart of the racialised underpinning of this cultural hierarchical ordering of the world. Fanon writes of what every colonized population knows full well, from Algeria to Kenya, to Syria and Lebanon, Iraq of the past and present, Malaysia and China, that culture and its institutions can be mobilized in the service of colonial rule to exploit, kill, and govern, and to combat resistance. A machinery or bureaucracy of imperial domination was underpinned at once by racial domination, of the settler over the native, and by the division of the native into what Edward Said refers to as the ‘convenient categories’ of tribe and ethnicity. For Hannah Arendt (1968 ), the twin institutions of imperial domination, race and bureaucracy, were tried and tested fi rst in the colonies and then came to underpin the Holocaust. The racialization of cultural difference remains at the heart of twenty-fi rst century articulations of the colonial rationality that informs the interventions of the recent past and present. Such practices are built on a colonial edifice that obliterated entire populations (the Hottentots, for example) through genocidal wars against the colonized accompanied by institutionalized practices that subjected them to forms of rule designed to reinforce European supremacy in all aspects of life. Importantly, what I am referring to as the colonial rationality is manifest through a variety of technologies mobilized for control, exploitation, and dispossession, including the discourses and practices of culture, the political economy, and the juridical system, all defined in terms of racialised difference where the non-western is always constituted as the inferior entity. Mamdani explains the dynamics of rule involved in terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rule: Politically, indirect rule was an attempt to stabilize colonial rule by moving away from direct rule that created a volatile context in which the identity of both rulers and ruled was racialised, but the former as a minority and the latter as a majority. Indirect rule did this through a legal project that fractured the singular, racialised and majority identity, native, into several, plural, ethnicized, minority identities – called tribes. ( Mamdani, 2009 : 137) Seen in light of contemporary interventions, we see a replication of such practices, where so-called tribal and religious leaders are re-shaped to represent the fragments of population deemed more amenable to control. The imperialists of the present, on full view primarily in Iraq, could thereby look to past colonial rule and destroy with impunity postcolonial national infrastructures necessary for any modern state. Having so destroyed, they could appoint British or American ‘governors’ for local regions to negotiate with the assumed tribal elders, governors literally fl own in to ‘govern’ a population now disposed of its history, territory, resources, and, above all else, its right to self-determination. 10 All this and more could only be possible with the continued assumption that the population so targeted remained racially and culturally inferior to the invaders and occupiers. Signifi cantly for our present purposes, the racialised and bureaucratized forms that colonial rule took and continues to take are based on two inter-related forms of ontological assumption. The fi rst continues to see the ‘white man’ or the westerner as the authorial architect of civilization, order, and rational judgment – the voice of theory as opposed to the particularities of the empirical domain. The second, constitutively related, ontology is that the non-western subject is a fragmented entity, incapable of creating and sustaining the juridical-political order that is the linchpin of modern political statehood. Both ontologies are at play in contemporary international inequalities, as refl ected in multiple locations such as Iraq, Palestine, Syria, to name but a few. Structural continuities reinforce these inequalities, as do the discourses and institutional practices that continue to render entire populations vulnerable to late modern articulations of the colonial rationality. (48-51)

# Aff Answers

## At: Link Args

### At: Human Rights Links

#### Human rights framing is the most pragmatic challenge to the violence of war

Smith, PhD, 10

(Thomas W., Gov&IntlAffairs@SouthFlorida, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, Journal of Human Rights, 9:1, 24-44)

“Humanity’s law,” Ruti Teitel’s felicitous term for the marriage of human rights law and the laws ofwar, is notable for its ambivalence. “The most pronounced change in the international legal system,” wrote Teitel, is “the dramatic expansion of humanitarian law’s reach through its merger with international human rights law” (Teitel 2002: 359). This confluence of norms is widely seen as a tribute to the power of human rights. Thus even war, the most sovereign of prerogatives, is not immune to the attractions of what Zbigniew Brzezinski called “the single most magnetic political idea of the contemporary time” (Forsythe 2006: 34). Human rights and war law speak in one voice with respect to genocide and crimes against humanity, torture, and terrorism. Landmines and chemical weapons have been banned, human rights courts masquerade as war crimes courts, and humanitarian rhetoric infuses the conduct of modern warfare. State reciprocity has begun to cede to global norms, legal rules are increasingly recognizable to human rights, and accountability has been strengthened. While humanity’s law is a model of humanitarian norms, they are norms of a certain kind, dealing with gross rather than “ordinary” abuses, tending to criminalize low-tech violence rather than hi-tech violence, and legalizing military necessity on the battlefield. The strategic utility of violence, a principle that is carefully tended in the laws of war but that rests uneasily with human rights, comes through unscathed; indeed it may be legitimized by its association with rights. Critics say the human rights movement has gotten too comfortable with the exercise of military power in its calls for forcible humanitarian intervention and “robust peacekeeping.” Under the tutelage of humanitarian law, human rights may grow accustomed to military norms governing the use of force as well, narrowing the ideals of human rights to fit the pragmatics and apologetics of war law. Although human rights courts and commissions render “human rights” readings of humanitarian law, the comparative advantage of human rights is not necessarily to do a better job of applying the laws of war, or to hold belligerents to ever more rigorous readings of the Geneva Conventions. What human rights does uniquely well is to address the broad-based effects of conflict and to develop alternatives to war itself. As modern militaries increasingly adopt the language of humanitarianism, the challenge for human rights may be to preserve its normative and political independence in the face of “humane war.” (24-5)

#### Critics trade policy relevance for principle-human rights framing is powerful enough to challenge the logic of war

Smith, PhD, 10

(Thomas W., Gov&IntlAffairs@SouthFlorida, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, Journal of Human Rights, 9:1, 24-44)

First, if “strategy” and “victory” come to inhabit human rights, the merger of the regimes takes on a darker cast. Rather than complement the laws of war, human rights may bow to them. It is sometimes said that human rights and humanitarian law speak different languages (see, e.g., Lubell 2005). But human rights activists increasingly engage the military on military terms. This garners them “relevance” in the eyes of policymakers and real, if limited, influence over the conduct of war, but the strategy can muffle the message of human rights. The antiwar wing of the human rightsmovement has been especially skeptical of this turn. Karima Bennoune, a former legal advisor for Amnesty International, says that among human rights organizations IHL has become “the primary, sometimes sole, mode of analysis of armed conflicts” (Bennoune 2004: 173). David Kennedy suggests, conversely, that it is the language of human rights that has been militarized. “Humanitarians increasingly provide the terms in which global power is exercised.We speak the same language as those who plan and fight wars, the language of humanitarian objectives and proportional, even humane means” (Kennedy 2006: 132). At best, this results in confusion, as the constituents of human rights and IHL use the same vocabulary to talk about different things. At worst, the utility of violence is smuggled into human rights, undercutting the philosophical as well as the political cause of the movement. This “displacement of the established human rights vocabulary by that of the law of war,” notes Tietel (2002: 375), “goes to the very heart of the meaning of ‘human rights.’”(26)

(continued)

If these are the pitfalls of humanity’s law, the power of human rights to protect civilians caught in war lies in its absoluteness and autonomy. While human rights bodies may lack expertise in humanitarian law, “their very idealism and na¨ıvet´e, however, are their greatest strength” (Meron 2000: 247). One can envision a human rights reading of many of the principles of IHL. Such an approach begins with an appreciation that there is room for human rights. As Louise Doswald-Beck (2006: 882) notes, IHL is not “crystal clear as to when and how force can be used in all areas of armed conflict.” Facts as well as the application and interpretation of law often are in dispute. The idea “that the nature of the threat and the resulting circumstances within which force is applied will ultimately govern the choice of that framework” is less straightforward than it sounds (Watkin 2004: 22). Threats are notoriously indeterminate. Naturally skeptical of the exercise of state power, unfettered by military mores, and singularly humanitarian in aim, human rights can defend the continuity of rights in extreme times, set frankly higher standards required to infringe the right to life (“absolute necessity” in the case of the European Court of Human Rights) and show greater skepticism toward the recourse to war and distrust, perhaps even incredulity, toward military claims regarding the conduct of operations.As Bennoune (2004: 174) notes, “clearly, the human impact of an armed conflict is much larger than a sum of violations of the Geneva Conventions.” Human rights brings the long-term and cumulative impacts of war into focus in a way that IHL cannot, highlighting the terrorization of populations even by lawful attacks, pressing for accountability for war policies, and raising basic questions about the militarization of societies and economies. (28-9)

\*Note- the first part is the start of the lit review summarizing the other sides args the 2nd part is the end of that section

#### HR framing shifts debate from intentions to consequences- crucial to challenge “collateral damage”

Smith, PhD, 10

(Thomas W., Gov&IntlAffairs@SouthFlorida, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, Journal of Human Rights, 9:1, 24-44)

The law of war tends to focus on individual intentions, while human rights addresses the actual impact of wartime acts. As Koller (2005: 245) notes, “human rights theory does not provide a list of principles guiding action, but rather a list of ends to be attained.” Indeed, human rights is silent on the means and methods of warfare; what matters is the upshot, not the tactics, of state power (Rowe 2007: 118). The laws of war bar direct, intended attacks on civilians, but they do not outlaw killing, even widespread killing under other circumstances. The modern theory of collateral damage rests on the philosophical concept known as “double effect,” which distinguishes between those consequences that are intended and those that are, as it is usually put, “merely” foreseen. What matters from a moral and legal standpoint is that only the good effects are intended. As Paul Ramsey argued (1968: 145), the principle of discrimination “never supposed that [noncombatants] were to be roped off like ladies at a medieval tournament.” Even fully anticipated death is permitted “on however colossal a scale.” “There is a significant moral difference between the destruction in obliteration warfare which is deliberately wanton and murderous, and the destruction and death that is among the tragic consequences of counter-forces warfare. This distinction is not determined by the amount of the devastation or the number of deaths, but by the direction of the action itself” (Ramsey 1968: 153–154). This is, to say the least, a slippery view of intentions. Just think of the history of aerial bombing. If the killing of noncombatants is foreseen—even “foreknown” or carried out with “certain knowledge” of its consequences, to use Ramsey’s language—by going forward with the act do we not intend the consequence? From the standpoint of human rights, it is violence against civilians whether or not they are the intended targets. (31-2)

### AT: Imperialism Link

#### Reject abstract critiques of intervention, local circumstances often necessitate external involvement. Prefer aff specificity to vague anecdotes

Njeri, PhD Candidate, 15

(Sarah, A Minefield of Possibilities: The viability of Liberal Peace in Somaliland, with particular reference to Mine Action. Sarah NJERI Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Social Science Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford)

Another underlying and oft highlighted critique of ownership fails to acknowledge that there are several factors that may limit local ownership. Mateos (2011), for example, identifies three main “practical problems” (influenced by perceptions of reality) that explain why local ownership is more a rhetorical concept than a real one: a problem of lack of “local capacity” (especially where most of those educated have previously fled), a problem of the locals’ dependence on externals for resources, and a problem of mutual mistrust. Although locals are supposed to lead the different reforms, they strongly depend on external funding (Mateos, 2011). Though this may not be explicitly outlined in policy documents; in practise some donor funding practises make funding available through personal connections with programme heads where mutual trust is inferred so long as the organisation is headed by specific individuals. Likewise the critics miss out on the fact that different societies, especially those which are highly segmented, may not necessarily have any one institution holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of power to rule, or for physical violence. Nevertheless, they exhibit tendencies that are very far from a Hobbesian situation of a bellum omnium contra omnes (i.e. a war of everybody against everybody else). These societies are not all chaotic, but include examples which are ‘orderly’ in a completely different way from the state order that is commonly perceived by the powerful countries of the world as the only valid order. Such societies, as has been evidenced for example within the Somalia communities, have their own institutions of violence control, conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Thus, those like Paris (2004) who locate the main weakness of contemporary peacebuilding in its neglect for strong institutions such the judiciary, executive and rule of law, base their evidence on their own perception as to what these institutions ought to be, rather than what the reality on the ground dictates. They advocate that state building must precede peacebuilding and even democratisation. Peacebuilding must first address human needs, produce physical safety and foster socio-economic stability before elections and democratic government can be instituted (ibid). The peacebuilding critics fail to show what a practical alternative would look like. The empirical evidence is that these external transnational networks of governmental and non-governmental actors do make a crucial contribution at very delicate times of the post conflict environment. In situations where most of the populations have fled, there may be a lack of available capacity in the provision of vital services e.g. health care provision; mine clearance specialists; provision of basic education, amongst others. In such contexts these external actors and transnational networks are vital. On the same note, sometimes local capacity may have the resilience needed to address their immediate needs but may lack the proper resources and tools to undertake such tasks, as this thesis will illustrate with the case of Somaliland’s efforts on mine clearance. The critics and the critiques only provide a partial view of international interventions, neglecting what Autesserre (2011) has noted as ‘the concrete, daily practices of international action, the social and epistemological tensions among international actors, and the impact of public opinion and domestic considerations’ which means that they overlook how interventions operate on the ground where most peacebuilding operations occur (2011 p. 5). Peacebuilding interventions have to contend with the reality and the practical challenges on the ground and these challenges are unique for every context. Similarly Opongo (2011) has argued that these liberal peace critiques tend to rely on anecdotal evidence without talking to the people on the ground to find out their own perceptions of the critiques being made (p. 369). He has argued that the critique has often been undertaken at a macro level while ignoring the interactive peacebuilding processes at the micro level and how these shape the discourse and practice of peacebuilding at the middle and top level structures of the society. My analysis will draw attention to the importance of context, both historical and political, in challenging the implementation of programmes. The critics also overlook how the context both at the global level (be it in funding etc. and therefore policy formulation) and local level for implementation may contribute to the failures or successes of interventions. Thus by focusing on actors alone in their critiques, the critics perpetuate the very problem of failure of acknowledging local context and other factors that exert control over peacebuilding processes. This will be illustrated by the role of mine action that has intrinsic value for peacebuilding but of which the context presents a particular challenge for implementation. Therefore just as peacebuilding is conceptualised by both the external actors and the recipients themselves; the responses, the sequencing, and the activities ought to be uniquely shaped in order to make the right impact. Similarly the wide arrays of actors have divergent and sometimes conflicting interests, values, purposes, organisational forms and modalities of action that they bring into the context that they are working in. It is important to acknowledge that peacebuilding does not take place in a vacuum, and even when in reference to the local, it is important to engage in understanding how the ‘local’ conceptualises their idea of peacebuilding without necessarily assuming that ‘local’ is not liberal. Thus any critiques should be context specific; and they should consider peacebuilding as a discourse of a multiple peace, appreciating the fact that peacebuilding is not a homogenous entity and that to understand, one must explore the multiple discourses by shifting the analytical focus to multiple ‘peacebuildings’ (Heathershaw, 2008 p. 603). (54-6)

### At: “Masking” Link

#### Arms control doesn’t parrot national security language, it reformulates it away from zero sum logic

Quester, PhD, 89

(George H., ChairGov&Politics@Maryland, International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504,Peace Studies: Past and Future (Jul., 1989), pp. 98-105)

Not all of the dialogue between these two intellectual camps is quite so contradictory, of course. There are indeed many cases on which we would agree and where we would be contending together against other camps and other attitudes. The international-security phraseology was in fact devised as a deliberate paraphrase of the traditional national-security formulation, a formula that had the major defect of hinting that international conflict was always, at least where wars and weapons were concerned, going to be a matter of "one man's meat being another man's poison." The reformulation thus has had the advantage of reminding one and all that security for our side now depends on security for the other side as well, as it becomes necessary for Washington to assure Moscow that it need never rush into the use of its nuclear weapons of mass destruction, just as it has become necessary for Moscow to assure the United States. It is required that neither side be placed in a position of "use them or lose them" with regard to such missiles. This concern for the other side's intentions and interests is a crucial aspect also of all of what we outlined previously as arms control. If the most pressing goal of arms control is to reduce the likelihood of war, this sometimes means that we will not want to have some effective weapon our-selves and that we will indeed want our adversary to have certain kinds of weapons. At the end of the 1950s, experts on the arms-control issue were thus already advocating submarine-based ballistic missiles for the United States and also for the Soviet Union.' The important point about the research approach that speaks of arms control and international security is that it recognizes how complicated the maintenance of peace may be, as some weapons are good for us to let our enemies have, and some are bad for us to possess, but others are good for us to possess, and so on. Avoiding a nuclear war is terribly important, but so is avoiding conventional wars. Avoiding conventional wars is never trivial, but winning such a war, if it breaks out, may still be of tremendous value to many people. Keeping down the costs of military preparations is always important, but sometimes this can be achieved more easily by retaining nuclear weapons than by eliminating them. Arms control is not identical to strategy, even though it addresses many of the same difficulties and paradoxes, and international- security reasoning is, similarly, not identical to national-security reasoning. Peace-research advocates sometimes throw away the baby with the bathwater in arguing that any discussion of weapons details amounts to a moral compromise or to an endorsement of the arms race and armed conflict. The crucial accomplishment in the advancement of arms-control reasoning comes with the open and clear acknowledgment that now we must always care about the self-interest and motivations of our adversary. If war ever resembled a zero-sum game, whereby whatever is good for the adversary is bad for us and vice versa, the looming possibility of nuclear war amounts to a definitive refutation of this, refutation that every military officer is now required to understand just as any civilian analyst cannot evade it. The worst for the other side is now also the worst for us as well, and one cannot become a general or admiral today without showing a well-developed awareness of this. The final criticism that might be directed against the majority, but not all, of peace-research or peace studies programs, from the perspective of international security or arms control, might thus be phrased as follows: the opposite intellectual camp does not realize how much we are on the same side and how much has been accomplished. (104-5)

#### Reducing violence and combatting structures of militarism aren’t exclusive- controlling the means of violence (CMV) does both

Cooper and Mutimer, PhDs, 12

(Neil, IR@Bradford, David, PoliSci@York, *Arms control for the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence* in Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence, ed. Cooper & Mutimer)

It should be noted that even this more expansive control agenda did not go far enough for some of our conference participants who argued that the limitation of armed violence also necessitated a focus on changing mindsets and cultures of violence. We would not disagree with the idea that cultures of militarism and violence need to be rejected if meaningful peace is to be secured (although we do have reservations regarding the way in which contemporary CMV practice has tended to become more about problematizing the cultures of violence possessed by others, rather than critiquing our own militarism). However, we would also argue that for CMV as a field to have coherence it also needs to maintain a concern with the means by which armed violence is perpetrated, including both the instruments (for example, armed forces, suicide bombers) and technologies (such as fighter planes, bio-weapons, communications systems, improvised explosive devices [IEDs]) of armed violence against individuals, communities, and even states. This includes, for example, limits on small arms to prevent inter-communal violence; even restrictions on knives to prevent knife crime against individuals; while also including sustained attention to the most potent means of the most extreme violence, controlling the military capacity of states, whether this be via multilateral disarmament initiatives such as the CWC; arms limitation agreements such as the New START agreement between the United States and Russia; confidence-building measures designed to reassure actors that particular force structures are not threatening; or the harnessing of nano or biotechnology in as yet undreamed of ways to serve the goals of arms control (verification, for example) rather than to undermine them. We would therefore make a distinction between the immediate and direct aims of CMV initiatives on the one hand and the longer term, indirect effects of the strategies of control employed. With regards to the former, we would argue for the following reformulation of the classic aims of arms control as outlined by Schelling and Halperin in 1961:24 To reduce the likelihood that the instruments of armed violence are used against individuals, communities, or states; 2. To reduce the effects of armed violence should it be employed; and 3. To reduce the resources employed in the development, acquisition and deployment of the instruments of armed violence (a deliberately more ambitious formula than that of classical arms control). In all efforts to advance a ‘controlling the means of violence’ agenda, and particularly those directed to the third goal, the longer term, indirect effect should be to reduce militarism and to promote cultures of peace. In other words, whilst control initiatives should only be directed at the instruments and technologies of violence, the strategies of control employed should, at the very least, avoid further embedding cultures of militarism and, ideally, have the indirect effect of promoting global and local cultures of peace in the longer term. Such a standard would mark a significant shift from the traditional practices of arms control, which were expressly designed to seek security in and through an armed, militarized world. Thus, whilst our formulation of CMV is quite expansive in one sense, this constraint regarding the indirect effects of its practices delimits the range of strategies that might be deployed to promote such control. Most obviously perhaps, it would rule out strategies of forcible disarmament employed in contravention of international law, and those now common practices of proliferation control which have the effect of enshrining extravagant military dominance. Conversely, it would place a premium on the adoption of strategies that are underpinned by processes of dialogue and mutual understanding, processes that are based on, and develop, what Booth and Wheeler have termed a ‘security dilemma sensibility’ – an appreciation of the fears that can be aroused in others by one’s own search for security.25 This is not to suggest that we necessarily envisage controlling the means of violence as a vehicle to completely eliminate the security risks associated with weapons and the military potentials societies invent for supposedly civil technologies – at least not in the short-term. Wherever such risks are deemed to exist, CMV will, like Cold War arms control, be geared to managing and reducing risk rather than eliminating it, as we indicate in the first two of our revised CMV goals. In contrast to Hedley Bull however, we would suggest that this more hard-headed approach to the weapons-security nexus is, ironically, more the preserve of radicals and idealists than contemporary policy makers who, operating in their own maze of unrealism, endlessly pursue the chimera of absolute security via militarism and authoritarianism and the unilateral disarmament of others. At the same time, given that identities and sensibilities are not fixed we can envisage a politics of controlling the means of violence that contributes to the development of more peaceful global cultures, in which armed violence, both among and within political communities, becomes ever-less acceptable. This is not simply because we think the reduction or even elimination of arms and other technologies of violence will eradicate military security dilemmas surrounding technological potentials – on its own it will not. Rather, it is because the forms and methods of CMV can contribute to a politics that is transformatory. In other words, rather than CMV only being possible when it is least needed, as critics have suggested of arms control, we would argue that what makes CMV most relevant will not be the substance of agreements per se, but the extent to which its practices contribute to a transformatory politics that produces demilitarized communities where such control is no longer needed. 26(9-10)

#### HR framing is pragmatic but principled- doesn’t legitimize warfare

Smith, PhD, 10

(Thomas W., Gov&IntlAffairs@SouthFlorida, Can Human Rights Build a Better War?, Journal of Human Rights, 9:1, 24-44)

In the real world of humanitarian work, human rights groups routinely cooperate and compromise with perpetrators of violence, leveraging compliance by appealing to selfinterest and welcoming even half-measures if they ease the suffering of innocents. But this pragmatism is tempered by a peremptory commitment to the humanity of all those involved.3 This commitment I call, for lack of a better word, the purity of human rights. While human rights revolve around this absolute, war law is designed as a relative process of weighing and judging. Violence against civilians must, of course, be proportionate to the military goals anticipated. Humanitarian law does define excessive force, and Additional Protocol I crisply delineates military objectives as those “that make an effective contribution tomilitary action,” but the science of proportionality is inexact (Protocol I 1977: Art. 52). “Excessive harm” and “purposeless or wanton violence” are prohibited, but “there is no ready way to establish an independent or stable view of the values against which the destruction of war is to be measured” (Walzer 1977: 129). Even the notion of due care, held out as a more rigorous standard then IHL, rests on good faith judgments of military planners. The ambiguities of the law almost certainly favor the pursuit of military ends over the protection of civilians, especially when belligerents see a mission as imperative or certain tactics as necessary. Benvenisti argues that armies construe their obligations narrowly in any case: Armies interpret the law as granting them wide discretion. They wish to limit the commanders’ responsibilities rather than increase protection to civilians. They highlight the obligations imposed on the defending army. In applying the test of proportionality, they stipulate that the means used should be measured against the overall aim of winning the military conflict rather than against the particular aim of winning a specific battle. And this overall aim is defined subjectively. (Benvenisti 2006: 95–96) This is a dubious calculus from the perspective of human rights. The idea that means be matched to ends relies on a kind of “Clausewitzian instrumentalism” that assumes that “war is a rational and controllable means to political ends.” “Once we begin to question these assumptions,” says Anthony Burke (2004: 339), “morally neat arguments about the justice of strategic violence begin to unravel.”(32)

### At: Security Focus Link

#### The aff challenges traditional realist security discourse-humanitarian framing broadens the concept of security

Sears, PhD candidate, 12

(Nathan A., Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation: The Potential of the Arms Trade Treaty Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 35–59.)

The contemporary security discourse identifies the control of SALW proliferation as a global security initiative.2 Historically, however, SALW were irrelevant to the international security discourse. The original Cold War “arms control” agenda of the 1960s looked to reduce the risks, severity, and costs of war between states through legally binding, verifiable treaties of agreed military constraints in the “numbers, types, deployment or use” of nuclear weapons and related military technologies (Krause 2011, 26). SALW were neglected since they were perceived to be inconsequential to the balance of military power between the two blocs of states led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively.3 The Cold War was dominated by a realist, or state-centric, security paradigm, which conceived of “the state as the subject of security and anarchy the eternal condition of international relations” (Krause and Williams 1996, 232). According to this view, states seek to increase their security vis-à-vis other states by strengthening their relative military power. The end of the Cold War led to a broadening and deepening of the security discourse. Types of security threats were broadened to include non-state actors; and the subject of security was deepened, most notably to define security in terms of the protection of civilians, or “human security” (ibid., 230).4 Thus it became popular in the post–Cold War arms control discourse to talk of “humanitarian arms control and disarmament” to reduce the risks to civilians of certain “inhumane” and “indiscriminate” weapons (Cooper and Mutimer 2011, 10; Krause 2011, 35). The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (MBT), signed in 1997, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), signed in 2008, are examples of this new arms control agenda. Recently, arms control has been reconceptualized as “controlling the means of violence,” implying a broader scope to address questions of “who can possess, use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for what ends” (ibid., 29). The objectives of this reconceptualization are as follows: “1. To reduce the likelihood that the instruments of armed violence are used against individuals, communities, or states; 2. To reduce the effects of armed violence should it be employed; and 3. To reduce the resources employed in the development, acquisition and deployment of the instruments of armed violence” (Cooper and Mutimer 2011, 11). As the threats to global security have changed, the arms control agenda has followed suit in an effort to contain the primary tools of destruction. SALW control has thus become an issue of prominence in the contemporary security discourse (Garcia 2006, 29). In 1993, then Malian president Alpha Oumar Konaré requested that then UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali send a UN mission to observe the effects of uncontrolled SALW proliferation in his country. At the time, scholars such as Edward Laurence (1992) were also beginning to focus on the security implications of the international arms trade, particularly the SALW trade. In 1995, Boutros-Ghali called for international attention to the need to control SALW proliferation and for the disarmament of these weapons, which “are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands,” at the ground level (UNGA 1995). By the late 1990s, SALW control became one of the most important security priorities of a large number of states (Garcia 2006, 18–19). (37-8)

### Link Turn- Generic

#### Cutting FMS (Foreign Military Sales) is crucial to broader de-imperialism---it closes access to foreign markets and unravels Western regional interests. The alt emboldens private military fill-in.

Marshall 13. [Andrew Gavin Marshall, Independent researcher and writer based in Montreal, Canada. He is Project Manager of The People’s Book Project, head of the Geopolitics Division of the Hampton Institute, In the Arms of Dictators: America the Great... Global Arms Dealer, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/inthearmsofdictators.html#.XPllY9NKhYg>]

The American imperial system incorporates much more than supporting the occasional coup or undertaking the occasional war. Coups, wars, assassinations and other forms of overt and covert violence and destabilization, while relatively common and consistent for the United States - compared to other major powers - are secondary to the general maintenance of a system of imperial patronage. **A "stable" system is what is desired most by strategic planners** and policy-makers, but this has a technical definition. **Stability means that the populations of subject nations and regions are under "control"** - whether crushed by force or made passive by consent, **while Western corporate and financial interests have and maintain unhindered access to the "markets" and resources** of those nations and regions. Since the 19th century development of America's overseas empire, this has been referred to as the "Open Door" policy: as in, the door opens for American and other Western economic interests to have access to and undertake exploitation of resources and labour.

As the only global imperial power, and by far the world's largest military power, America does not merely rely upon the "goodwill" of smaller nations or the threat of force against them in order to maintain its dominance, it has established, over time, a large and complex network of imperial patronage: supplying economic aid, military aid (to allow its favoured regimes to control their own populations or engage in proxy-warfare), military and police training, among many other programs. These programs are largely coordinated by and between the Defense Department, State Department, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

**Arms sales are a major method** **through which the United States** - and other powerful nations - **are able to exert their hegemony, by arming and strengthening their key allies,** **directly or indirectly fueling civil wars and conflicts**, and **funneling money into the world's major weapons manufacturers**. The global economic crisis had "significantly pushed down purchases of weapons" over 2009 to the lowest level since 2005. In 2009, worldwide arms deals amounted to $57.5 billion, dropping 8.5% from the previous year. The United States maintained its esteemed role as the main arms dealer in the world, accounting for $22.6 billion - or 39% of the global market. In 2008, the U.S. contribution to global arms sales was significantly higher, at $38.1 billion, up from $25.7 billion in 2007. In 2009, the second-largest arms dealer in the world was Russia at $10.4 billion, then France at $7.4 billion, followed by Germany, Italy, China and Britain.[1]

There are two official ways in which arms are sold to foreign nations: either through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in which the Pentagon negotiates an agreement between the U.S. government and a foreign government for the sale and purchase of arms, and through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), in which arms manufacturers (multinational corporations) negotiate directly with foreign governments for the sale and purchase of arms, having to apply for a license from the State Department.

Between 2005 and 2009, U.S. arms sales totaled roughly $101 billion, with direct commercial sales (DCS) accounting for more than half of the total value, at $59.86 billion, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) accounting for $40.85 billion. The top seven recipients of U.S. arms sales between 2005 and 2009 were: Japan at $13.14 billion, the United Kingdom at $8.32 billion, Israel at $8 billion, South Korea at $6.53 billion, Australia at $4.17 billion, Egypt at $4.07 billion, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at $3.98 billion.[2]

The United States experienced a slight decline in global arms sales over 2009, though it maintained its position as the world's number one arms dealer, holding 30% of the global market. However, the Obama administration in 2010 decided to change certain "export control regulations" in order to make arms deals easier and **increase the U.S. share of the global market**. The stated reason for the legal change was "**to simplify the sale of weapons to U.S. allies**," though it had the added benefit of "generating business for the U.S. defense industry." The U.S. National Security Advisor at the time, General James Jones, claimed that without the changes, the existing system of arms sales "poses a potential national security risk based on the fact that its structure is overly complicated."[3]

In early 2010, the Obama administration began pressuring Saudi Arabia and other Gulf dictatorships (aka: "allies") to increase their purchases of U.S. arms, upgrade their defense of oil installations and threaten Iran with overwhelming military superiority. In the lead were Saudi Arabia and the UAE in undertaking a regional "military buildup" - or arms race - resulting in more than $25 billion in U.S. arms sales to the region over the previous two years. A senior U.S. official in the Obama administration commented: "We're developing a truly regional defensive capability, with missile systems, air defense and a hardening up of critical infrastructure… All of these have progressed significantly over the past year." Another senior official stated, "It's a tough neighborhood, and we have to make sure we are protected," adding that Iran was the "number one threat in the region."[4]

Of course, Iran is actually a nation that exists within the region, and thus has the right to defend itself, whereas the United States cannot "defend" itself in a region in which it does not exist. But then, geographical trivialities have never been a concern to imperialists who believe that the world belongs to them and it was a mere accident of history that all the resources exist outside of the empire's home country. Therefore, with such a rationalization, the United States - and **the West more broadly - have a "right" to "defend" themselves** (and their economic and political interests) **everywhere in the world**, and **against everyone in the world**. Any other nation which poses a challenge to Western domination of the world and its resources is thus a "threat" to whichever region it belongs, as well as to U.S. "national security."

Iran is of course not the only competition for the United States and the West in its unhindered access to and control of the world, but China is another and arguably much more significant threat (though not an officially sanctioned U.S. enemy, as of yet). Around the same time the U.S. was pushing for increased arms sales to the Persian Gulf dictatorships (no doubt, to advance the causes of "democracy" and "peace"), the Obama administration secured an arms deal with Taiwan worth over $6 billion, incurring the frustration of China. The deal included the sale of 114 Patriot missiles, 60 Black Hawk helicopters, and communications equipment for Taiwan's fleet of F-16s, with the possibility of future sales of F-16 fighter jets.[5]

The Chinese vice foreign minister expressed "indignation" to the U.S. State Department in response to the arms deal, adding: "We believe this move endangers China's national security and harms China's peaceful reunification efforts [with Taiwan]… It will harm China-U.S. relations and bring about a serious and active impact on bilateral communication and cooperation." In response, the U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones stated that the announcement shouldn't "come as a surprise to our Chinese friends."[6]

In September of 2010, the Obama administration announced the intention to undertake the largest arms deal in U.S. history, the sale of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia worth up to $60 billion for fighter jets and helicopters (84 F-15s, 70 Apaches, 72 Black Hawks, and 36 Little Birds), as well as engaging "in talks with the [Saudi] kingdom about potential naval and missile-defense upgrades that could be worth tens of billions of dollars more," according to the Wall Street Journal, with "a potential $30 billion package to upgrade Saudi Arabia's naval forces." **The stated objective was to counter the role of Iran in the region**, though no agreement had been initially reached. **The U.S. was selling the idea to Congress as a means of creating "jobs," a political euphemism for corporate profits**. **One official involved in the talks noted, "It's a big economic sale for the U.S. and the argument is that it is better to create jobs here than in Europe."[**7]

**The arms deal would purchase** equipment and **tech**nology **from Lockheed** Martin, **Raytheon**, **Boeing**, and United Technologies. In recent years, Saudi Arabia had been purchasing more European and Russian-made arms from companies like BAE Systems. **U.S. officials were also attempting to ease the fears of Israel** while massively building up the arsenal of a close neighbor, ensuring that the planes sold to the Kingdom wouldn't have long-range weapons systems and further, that the Israelis would purchase the more advanced F-35 jet fighters. The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, commented, "We appreciate the administration's efforts to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge." The potential $60 billion arms deal with the Saudis would be stretched out over several years, though there was talk that the Saudis might only guarantee a purchase of at least $30 billion, at least, initially.[8]

The Financial Times reported that **the Arab dictatorships in the Gulf "have embarked on one of the largest re-armament exercises in peacetime history, ordering US weapons worth some $123 billion as they seek to counter Iran's military power**." Saudi Arabia's $60 billion was the largest, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signing arms deals worth between $35 and $40 billion in purchases of a "high altitude missile defence system" known as THAAD, developed by Lockheed Martin, as well as purchasing upgrades of its Patriot missile defense systems, produced by Raytheon. Oman was expected to purchase $12 billion and Kuwait $7 billion in arms and military technology. The CEO of Blenheim Capital Partners, a consultancy firm which helps arrange arms deals, noted that Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries were replacing Western European nations as the largest arms purchasers, adding: "They are the big buyers."[9]

Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said that **the United States was seeking to create a "new post-Iraq war security structure that can secure the flow of energy exports to the global economy**." These massive arms sales would then "reinforce the level of regional deterrence" - or in other words, expand American hegemony over the region through local proxy powers and dictatorships - and thus, "help reduce the size of forces the US must deploy in the region." As a Saudi defense analyst noted, "[t]he Saudi aim is to send a message especially to the Iranians - that we have complete aerial superiority over them."[10]

### Link Turn- Saudi Arabia

#### Allowing for increasing arms sales to Saudi Arabia props up the military industrial complex and U.S. imperialism and risks further wars

Afrasiabi 17 (Kaveh L. Afrasiabi -- Ph.D. / political scientist & author, “Trump And The New Militarization Of Middle East – OpEd”, https://www.eurasiareview.com/19052017-trump-new-militarization-middle-east-oped/, 19 May 2017)

On the eve of US President Donald Trump’s much-anticipated trip to the Middle East, anonymous White House officials have already leaked publicly the news of impending mega US arms sales to Saudi Arabia totaling 100 billion dollars and up to 300 billion over the coming decade.

These astronomical figures are certainly good news for the US military-industrial complex, but quite the opposite for regional and global peace and stability. Saudi Arabia is already world’s largest importer of weapons and the 4th largest military spender, and one out of every 7 dollars spent on defense imports in the world is spent by Saudi Arabia.

Adding to the 60 billion dollars arms sold to Riyadh by the previous Obama administration, Trump’s planned arms sales to the Kingdom will spur dangerous arms race by introducing massive new disparity, e.g., between Iran and the Saudi-led bloc of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that routinely outspend Iran by a ratio of more than 10 to 1.

Apparently, Trump’s other intention of his Saudi visit, to cement relations with an important client state, is to clinch the Saudis’ commitment to spend tens of billions of dollars on US infrastructure projects, thus making the Saudi royal family into solid partners for Trump’s “America First” vision. To achieve all these objectives, US is accommodating Riyadh in its Iranophobic strategy and framing the arms sales in terms of a new “Arab NATO” that integrates forces from a number of other Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus, we must expect to hear more of Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric in his Middle East trip.

At a time when the European Parliament has voted to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia over its on-going atrocities in Yemen, and some leading European politicians such as Jermy Corbyn, head of British Labor Party, vowing to end UK’s lucrative arms sale to the Saudis if victorious at the upcoming elections in June, the Americans are singing a completely different tune, oblivious to the need to couch their arms sales policy in a coherent Middle East policy. There is, in fact, a vacuum of a sound US Middle East policy, and Washington’s one-dimensional and short-sighted Persian Gulf policy runs the risk of undermining its Syria policy, as well as putting it on a collision course with Iran.

With respect to the planned arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the list of high-tech weaponry includes THAAD missile interceptor system, combat ships, latest jet fighters, attack helicopters, laser-guided bombs, long-range artillery, etc. Various US experts, such as Anthony Cordesman, are falling over backward trying to rationalize these destabilizing arms sales that pose a new level of threat to Iran’s national security and even implicate Russia’s national security since an “Arab NATO” would inevitably integrate the Persian Gulf-based defense system with the NATO system in Europe and elsewhere. In other words, the creation of an “Arab NATO” is in line with the post-Cold War NATO’s “eastern expansion” that poses risks to both Russia and China.

Not only that, US’s carte blanche for the Saudi military wish list is closely linked to (a) their known arms shipments to Syria, and (b) their current atrocities in Yemen, condemned by world’s rights organizations. The Saudis have been operating their US-made F-15 in the Yemen conflict, as well as the UK-made cluster bombs, and are now planning an amphibious assault on the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah Port, with the help of their partners-in-crime UAE, which will certainly add to the present humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and, also, further increase US’s direct military involvement, which is presently limited to providing logistical support for the Saudi air campaign.

In addition to Saudi Arabia, the oppressive sheiks running Bahrain have also received fresh military imports from the US, decried by their jailed human rights activist, Nabeel Rajab, in his recent column in the New York Times. At long last, the US had dropped even the pretension of human rights concern, with Trump chummying with various Middle East dictators in the Oval Office, thus putting on display the US’s “imperialist hubris at its worst,” to paraphrase a poem from Kipling.

An important question is if, indeed, such a militaristic US approach in the Middle East actually benefits the security of its own network of client states such as Saudi Arabia? Lest we forget, the internal economic woes of Saudi Arabia, grappling with the plummeting oil prices, corruption, and mismanagement, are multiplying. The Kingdom has a 30 percent youth unemployment and it has been tapping into its strategic reserve to buy political loyalty through handouts that are untenable in the long run.

Instead of devoting its precious resources to the priorities at home, the Saudi puppets are now appeasing Uncle Sam by pouring money into US economy and bringing broad smiles on the CEO’s Lockheed Martin, General Dynamic, Northrop Grumman and other major US defense contractors. Of course, the latter are more than thrilled about the depletion of Saudi arms stockpile after two years of assault on poor Yemen, which provides the necessary justification for more arms to the Saudis.

### Pragmatism Perm

#### Critics of arms control rely on unrealistic, historically inaccurate assumptions -prefer pragmatic gains when put to tough choices

Quester, PhD, 89

(George H., ChairGov&Politics@Maryland, International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504,Peace Studies: Past and Future (Jul., 1989), pp. 98-105)

The first very basic complaint to be made about peace research is that it accepts the same overarching premise about international relations, and about life, that most traditional American liberals-this is a category that includes Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater and Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan and it is not what George Bush was trying to impute to Michael Dukakis-have accepted and that most Marxists also accept, namely, that good things go together. Most Americans have, ever since 1776, assumed intuitively that good and proper domestic institutions will lead to international peace. As Louis Hartz noted several decades ago, this has not been the normal assumption in the continental European tradition, but Americans were able to escape that tradition almost from the Mayflower Compact.' Hartz noted that such assumptions go unquestioned for the great majority of people in the United States, because alternative world outlooks have always had very little following inside our borders. If there is an orthodox approach to issues of war and peace in America, this assumption is it, and peace research could thus be accused of reflecting a very deep and pernicious orthodoxy here. The assumption that domestic reform will lead to international peace or that one kind of international improvement will always support another kind of international improvement has emphatically not been endorsed by traditional European analysts of power politics. It has been endorsed, however, as part of another intellectual tradition, by Marxists in their own approach to the analysis of the causes of war. To cure a domestic evil, by such a set of assumptions, is to eliminate an international evil as well. Liberals and Marxists indeed very much agree that wars and arms races are international evils, while dramatically disagreeing about what is better or more evil at home.2 By contrast, a third perspective, that of the realist, or power-politics, school of international relations analysis, most persuasively put forward after World War II in the writings of Hans Morgenthau,3 argued that there is no such benign pattern to the universe, no pattern by which one would not have to choose between goals. While there is much of the power-politics perspective that today's researchers on arms control and international security would have rejected or dropped, they would nonetheless retain at least some of the pessimism or realism of acknowledging that there is often some need to choose, and this is lacking in the peace-studies peace. When asked how they would choose between preventing nuclear war and preventing conventional war, many people who style themselves peace researchers will thus simply refuse to comment, regarding it as a moral betrayal even to acknowledge that such a choice might ever have to be made, arguing that there must somehow be a solution that never would require giving up on either gain. Similarly, if asked to choose between eliminating poverty and eliminating war, the same researchers will again run away from the question, as if it were some kind of trap. Yet there are tough choices to be made in this world. The same nuclear weapons that, by being deployed in Western Europe, might produce an escalation to an all-out thermonuclear World War III may also have contributed to keeping Europe from engaging in another conventional war for more than four decades, an unusually long time for that continent. The arms-control perspective recognizes such tough choices, in effect, by stressing a yardstick of at least three outputs, phrased most aptly by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin some three decades ago:4 reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the destruction in war if it actually occu'rs, and reducing the economic and other burdens of peacetime readiness for the possibility of war. These outputs are each important, but in case after case, they get in each other's way, may conflict with each other, and may force us to make difficult and unpleasant choices. Compared to these outputs, the variable of disarmament is only an input, something that is valuable if, and only if, it conduces to these desirable end outputs. Peace researchers would, of course, hardly question that the three categories of output listed by Schelling and Halperinwhich can again be broken into many, possibly conflicting, subcategories-are a good thing. Yet they tend, nonetheless, to focus on disarmament very directly, often advocating total disarmament, as if this were a good thing in and of itself, or as if something as good as disarmament could not possibly conflict with anything else in life that was morally desirable. The peace researchers are thus somehow convinced that there are no good weapons, and they regard any talk of arms control as merely a trick, intended to persuade them to relax their opposition to every form of preparation for war. When the case is made that submarine-based nuclear missiles have actually been desirable for the world, since 1960 markedly reducing the tensions of each side's fearing an attack by the other, perhaps even thereby reducing the total of resources that would otherwise have been wasted on military programs, the peace researcher makes himself or herself intellectually blind to such arguments. If someone from the international- security research community were to suggest, perhaps facetiously, perhaps more seriously, that the Nobel Peace Prize is overdue for the developers of the Polaris missile program, the peace researcher would react with anger and dismay, rather than having his or her curiosity aroused by the suggestion.' There are indeed many bad weapons, weapons that make war more likely and more destructive, and weapons that waste a great deal of money. But not every choice in this field of life is thus what the economists would call Pareto optimal, whereby an improvement can be made by all measures and no difficult choices have to be made. Rather, we quickly enough run out of the simpler choices and then reach the hard decisions, where disarmament might make wars more likely, or where making war less likely in one theater would make it more likely in another, and so forth. More broadly, the peace researcher is convinced that the elimination of social ills will almost always tend to reduce the risks of war as well. No one in the more realistic international-securities community is opposed to the spread of literacy or to the eradication of disease and starvation and poverty. Yet what are we to make of the fact that the Mediterranean country with the highest per capita income has been Cy- prus? There is, unhappily, no real evidence that the conflicts that cause a nation to be ready to go to violent warfare disappear when other problems disappear; the linkage often seems to be the reverse. Peace researchers often style themselves as protesting heretics, at odds with the orthodox establishment. Yet, on this first basic point, they are, as noted, much less rebellious than they realize and much more ready to accept what most Americans accept as an orthodox intuition, namely, the premise that God did not play dice with the universe on moral entities, that good things go together, that eliminating one evil will eliminate others as well. Morgenthau and his colleagues, when they began offering alternative-more traditionally Europeantheories of realpolitik to Americans, indeed also felt like heretics, protesting against an orthodoxy of ideas, and probably had more justification for this feeling. Most American students, and most Americans in general, approach the study of war and peace with this most orthodox of assumptions, an assumption that the peace-research community panders to, that war would become unlikely if economic injustices and human rights violations were eliminated, and that war would become unlikely if arms were reduced.6 It may simply be factually wrong to accept this kind of assumption uncritically, or to refuse to consider the possibility that an improvement on one front might come only at the price of a setback on another. Given that our subject is the avoidance of some very disastrous possibilities of war, it might indeed be dangerous to stick to these underlying premises of peace research. (99-101)

#### Prefer short term reductions in proximate violence to pie in the sky utopian alternatives- there is no trade off disad given the differing time scales

Quester, PhD, 89

(George H., ChairGov&Politics@Maryland, International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504,Peace Studies: Past and Future (Jul., 1989), pp. 98-105)

Advocates of peace research sometimes justify their approach by asserting that they alone are addressing the ultimate or root causes of conflict. Unless one eliminates injustice or racism or prejudice or tyranny, they contend, there can never be a real peace or positive peace. This argument runs the risk, however, of becoming a play on words. Real peace can mean that we approve of every step of the causal chain, going back as far as it can be traced, which might indeed be ideal; but this might hardly be so essential for someone caught in the crossfire of Beirut, someone who is merely pleading and praying that the shooting might stop. To imply that a termination of conventional war and an avoidance of nuclear war and an abatement of terrorism are not somehow real would be to blur our understanding of a great deal of what most men and women indeed care about. Similarly, to refer to such an absence of warfare as "negative peace"-as compared with something more positive in "positive peace"-is to use these words of our English language in a manner that substantially underrates the human priority of eliminating warfare, whatever its causes and whatever the remedy. Critics of peace studies would thus come back to argue that these ultimate and genuine reforms of human arrangements for which peace researchers claim such priority are all well and good, but that these may not be capable of being attained in anything less than several centuries. Rather than eliminating all ideological suspicions between Marxists and non-Marxists or eliminating all ethnic dislikes between Greeks and Turks, would it not be a major accomplishment in the meantime to eliminate those kinds of weapons that tend to make wars between such contending factions more likely, and to stress instead the defensive types that discourage military forces from launching attacks? Peace researchers then often reply that any such resignation to intermediate and proximate improvements implies a welcoming of permanent conflict or even a relishing of it or at least an assumption that conflict and hostility are in the natural order of things. But the real issue is surely much more one of whether certain kinds of improvements can be made over certain ranges of time. (103-4)

## At: Framing/Alt Args

### At: Structural Violence O/W

#### The impact of war-torn displacement and resource shortage outweighs. Even if the US is an imperial force, the aff solves a particular instance of that violence.

Krieger 19. [Sonja Krieger, Editor and writer for Left Voice, Made in the USA: How the U.S. Manufactures Death and Destruction in Yemen, https://www.leftvoice.org/made-in-the-usa-how-the-u-s-manufactures-death-and-destruction-in-yemen]

The pictures of Yemeni children with their sad eyes are gut wrenching to look at. Shocking are the images of babies that are but skin and bones, held in the arms of desperate parents. **It’s hard to stomach the sight of** the human face of what is referred to everywhere as the “**the worst humanitarian crisis on earth**.” Faced with a devastating famine, 22 million people in Yemen (out of a population of 29 million) urgently need food and other aid. Seventeen million people are suffering from hunger, and according to the UN, 14 million are on the brink of starvation (“seriously food deficient”). According to some estimates, 85,000 people may have already starved to death, most of them children. Only half of the population has access to clean water. Communicable diseases have resurged, including 1.2 million cases of confirmed or suspected cholera since April 2017. Diphtheria, which was all but eradicated in Yemen by the 1980s, has reappeared. One hundred and thirty Yemeni children die each day due to hunger or disease.

Human-made, **this famine is the product of war**—a war that has been dragging on for well over three years. **The Saudi-led coalition has erected a sea, air and land blockade that is preventing import goods and humanitarian aid from getting into the country**. Prices have soared, effectively making basic necessities unaffordable for most people. Inflation is, however, only one aspect of the country’s near total economic devastation. Factories, farms and companies have slowed production or shut down; millions of people have no work. This war has caused mass suffering in many ways, but the most direct, most immediate source of misery remains the world’s advanced military technology. No amount of “precision” targeting changes the fact that this imperialist war is a giant annihilation campaign; it kills and maims, obliterates homes, workplaces and cities. There have been 18,000 air raids since the spring of 2015, or roughly 14 air raids each day. The New York Times reported that over 4,600 civilians have been killed as a result of the air strikes (and 6,500 including other war-related violence). The Guardian wrote that **more than 57,000 civilians and combatants have died since the beginning of 2016**, **and 2 to 3 million have been displaced**. The country’s infrastructure is utterly demolished, including half the hospitals. Many people cannot pay for transportation to the nearest medical facility because of the rising fuel prices. Eight civilians die each day as a result of the fighting and the bombardment.

### At: “Prior Questions”

#### There are no prior questions to problem oriented IR- empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action

David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Changing representational practices hinders understanding of policy by overlooking questions of agency and material structures

Tuathail, 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

### Policy Focus Good

#### Problem-oriented policy analysis is critical to develop portable skills, maximize knowledge of the literature, raise public awareness of social issues, and create better political solutions – only our framework allows for effective consideration of alternatives.

Hird 17 [John Hird, Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) *Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice*. University of California Press. 44-76.]

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop.

In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009).

In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research.

Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.

### Realism Good

#### The 1AC endorses a defensive grand strategy – this is the only way to reduce intervention overall

Walt, PhD, June 19

(Stephen, Prof@Harvaaaaard, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris)

Today’s world presents a seemingly endless array of challenges: a more powerful and assertive China, novel threats from cyberspace, a rising tide of refugees, resurgent xenophobia, persistent strands of violent extremism, climate change, and many more. But the more complex the global environment, the more Washington needs clear thinking about its vital interests and foreign policy priorities. Above all, a successful U.S. grand strategy must identify where the United States should be prepared to wage war, and for what purposes. For all the talk of how U.S. foreign policy and the country’s place in the world will never be the same after the presidency of Donald Trump, the best strategic road map for the United States is a familiar one. Realism—the hard-nosed approach to foreign policy that guided the country throughout most of the twentieth century and drove its rise to great power—remains the best option. A quarter century ago, after the Cold War ended, foreign policy elites abandoned realism in favor of an unrealistic grand strategy—liberal hegemony—that has weakened the country and caused considerable harm at home and abroad. To get back on track, Washington should return to the realism and restraint that served it so well in the past. If Washington rediscovered realism, the United States would seek to preserve the security and prosperity of the American people and to protect the core value of liberty in the United States. Policymakers would recognize the importance of military strength but also take into account the country’s favorable geographic position, and they would counsel restraint in the use of force. The United States would embrace a strategy of “offshore balancing” and abstain from crusades to remake the world in its image, concentrating instead on maintaining the balance of power in a few key regions. Where possible, Washington would encourage foreign powers to take on the primary burden for their own defense, and it would commit to defend only those areas where the United States has vital interests and where its power is still essential. Diplomacy would return to its rightful place, and Americans would promote their values abroad primarily by demonstrating democracy’s virtues at home.

(continued)

Despite the disappointments of the past 25 years, the American foreign policy elite remains convinced that global leadership is their birthright and that Washington must continue trying to force other countries to conform to U.S. dictates. This perspective is an article of faith at almost every foreign policy think tank inside the Beltway and is repeatedly invoked in task-force reports, policy briefs, and op-eds. A similar groupthink pervades the U.S. media, where unrepentant neoconservatives and unchastened liberal internationalists monopolize the ranks of full-time pundits; proponents of realism, restraint, and nonintervention appear sporadically at best. The result is that foreign policy debates are heavily skewed in favor of endless intervention. Moving back to a more realist grand strategy will require broadening the parameters of debate and challenging the entrenched interests that have promoted and defended a failed foreign policy. The clubbiness of the foreign policy establishment has also produced a disturbing lack of accountability. Although the community contains many dedicated, imaginative, and honorable individuals, it is dominated by a highly networked caste of insiders who are reluctant to judge one another lest they be judged themselves. As a result, error-prone officials routinely fail upward and receive new opportunities to repeat past mistakes. Consider the officials responsible for (and the commentators who cheered on) the bungled Middle East peace process, the misguided expansion of NATO, the botched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA’s torture of detainees in the war on terrorism, the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance of Americans, the disastrous NATO intervention in Libya, and the American machinations in Ukraine that gave Russia a pretext to seize Crimea. None of those officials or commentators has suffered significant professional penalties for his or her mistakes or malfeasance. Indeed, nearly all of them still enjoy prominent positions in government, think tanks, the media, or academia. No one is infallible, of course, and a desire to hold people accountable could be taken too far. Policymakers often learn from past mistakes and become more effective over time. But when the same people keep making the same errors and neither recognize nor regret them, it is time to look for new people with better ideas. Despite the stagnation within the foreign policy establishment, the prospects for a more realist, more restrained U.S. foreign policy are better today than they have been in many years. For all his flaws, Trump has made it easier to propose alternatives to liberal hegemony by expressing such disdain for the elite consensus. Younger Americans are more skeptical of their country’s imperial pretensions than are their elders, and some new members of Congress seem bent on clawing back some of the control over foreign policy that presidents have amassed over the past 70 years. Furthermore, powerful structural forces are working against liberal hegemony and in favor of offshore balancing. China’s rise and the partial revival of Russian power are forcing the United States to pay closer attention to balance-of-power politics, especially in Asia. The intractable problems of the Middle East will make future presidents reluctant to squander more blood and treasure there—especially in chasing the siren song of democracy promotion. Pressure on the defense budget is unlikely to diminish, especially once the costs of climate change begin to bite, and because trillions of dollars’ worth of domestic needs cry out for attention. For these reasons, the foreign policy elite will eventually rediscover the grand strategy that helped build and sustain American power over most of the nation’s history. The precise path remains uncertain, and it will probably take longer to get there than it should. But the destination is clear.

### Alt Fails-Liberaism

#### Critics agree- no viable alternative to liberal peace

Njeri, PhD Candidate, 15

(Sarah, A Minefield of Possibilities: The viability of Liberal Peace in Somaliland, with particular reference to Mine Action. Sarah NJERI Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Social Science Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford)

What has emerged from within these critical scholars is that they never outline an alternative set of principles and ideals for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction and therefore they do not advocate a strict non-involvement of interveners. However the debate can be best described as less about the validity of the liberal peace and more of how to conceive of it and implement it. The critics argue that Liberal Peacebuilding is based on the fact that human security guides the Liberal Peace thesis in conceptualising a framework for peacebuilding and maintenance of the global order. The conceptualisation and practice of human security has been criticised as lacking in political strategy (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). This means that while concepts such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the European Union doctrine for Human Security (2004) place ethical responsibility on the international community to protect individuals where states have failed or are unwilling to protect them, they ignore the importance of political deconstruction of the politics of securitisation and militarised peacebuilding. Thus, peacebuilders are accused of embracing the hoary “Liberal Peace approach” uncritically and as a consequence they have often designed peacebuilding strategies that actually destabilised fragile transitional polities such as in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Burundi and Iraq (Doyle and Sambanis, 1999; Newman et al., 2009; Paris, 1997). Sending (2011) acknowledges that these critical debates have brought to the fore the importance of issues on context sensitivity, local ownership, bottomup and hybrid forms of peacebuilding; however, there are limitations to these critiques as outlined in the next section. Mac Ginty (2010; 2008) explores an alternative conception of peace-building through indigenous approaches to conflict resolution and localised responses to conflict (2008; 2010). He proposes a hybrid peacebuilding that acknowledges that the ‘local’ has agency and hence “ability to hybridise the Liberal Peace by enforcing some change on it” (Mac Ginty, 2011 p. 84). This hybrid approach has also been proposed by other authors (Boege et al., 2009; Pugh et al., 2008; Richmond, 2010b). Others such as, Boege et al (2009)propose “hybrid political orders” that combine governance strategies of governments and of indigenous communities (2009, p. 24). Richmond has explored the more elusive concept of ‘an everyday “post-Liberal Peace” and critical policies for peacebuilding’ and, together with Franks, they propose an emancipatory model that seeks local consent with full ownership of the peacebuilding process, while critical of external international impositions, conditionalities and dependencies expressed in the conservative and orthodox models, however, this model takes a bottom up approach. Even then they fault this by highlighting that the underlying fact is that Liberal Peace is externally driven with the intention of ‘stabilising’ states towards democracy and local participation (Richmond and Franks, 2007 p. 30) Liberal peacebuilding’s most trenchant critics offer little in the way of alternatives. However, some of them have begun to discuss alternative approaches to liberal peacebuilding. Having been one of the major critics of Liberal Peace building, Paris acknowledges that there is no realistic alternative to some form of Liberal Peace strategy, and that efforts should be geared towards improving its applied approaches rather than dismissing it entirely (Paris, 2012). This view is challenged by Cooper et al (2011) who observe that such a view fails to take cognizance of the common prescriptions of Liberal Peacebuilding, particularly in political economy. Instead they propose a welfare based approach, arguing that this will incorporate the wellbeing of the individual and community within the political economy of peacebuilding (p. 11). In conclusion, the critics see international interventions as neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist (Bellamy and Williams, 2004; Chandler, 2013; Duffield, 2002), based on Western liberal norms that orient international interventions toward the implementation of a liberal agenda (Paris, 2002; Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2002; Pugh, 2005), an extension of the western hegemonic powers over developing nations; and unsuited to the realities of post-conflict environments, arguing for external actors to be more context-sensitive and supportive of local ownership (Pouligny, 2009); they call for ‘bottom-up’ and ‘hybrid’ forms of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009; Schia and Karlsrud, 2013). (50-2)

\*Proof its Citing Same Cooper

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