# Neoliberalism Kritik

## NEG

### 1NC Shell

#### Neoliberalism has infiltrated our society – the plan’s attempts to further education will be coopted by market forces – the sole measuring stick for the success of youth is economic in nature

GIROUX ’09 (Henry A.; Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, “Commodifying Kids: The Forgotten Crisis,” 4/3, http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/83374:commodifying-kids-the-forgotten-crisis)ww

As the United States and the rest of the world enter into an economic free fall, the current crisis offers an opportunity not only to question the politics of free-market fundamentalism, the dominance of economics over politics, and the subordination of justice to the laws of finance and the accumulation of capital, but also the ways in which children's culture has been corrupted by rampant commercialization, commodification and consumption. There is more at stake in this crisis than stabilizing the banks, shoring up employment and solving the housing problem. There is also the issue of what kind of public spaces and values we want to make available, outside of those provided by the market, for children to learn the knowledge, skills and experiences they need to confront the myriad problems facing the twenty-first century. The road to recovery cannot be simply about returning to modified free-market capitalism and a re-established, utterly bankrupt consumer society. Given all the pain and suffering that the vast majority of Americans have endured, we should ask ourselves if there is not a teachable moment here. What kind of society and future do we want for our children given how obviously unsustainable and exploitative the now failed market-driven system has proven to be?

In a society that measures its success and failure solely through the economic lens of the Gross National Product (GNP), it becomes difficult to define youth outside of market principles determined largely by criteria such as the rate of market growth and the accumulation of capital. The value and worth of young people in this discourse are largely determined through the bottom-line cost-benefit categories of income, expenses, assets and liabilities. The GNP does not measure justice, integrity, courage, compassion, wisdom and learning, among other values vital to the interests and health of a democratic society. Nor does it address the importance of civic participation, public goods, dissent and the fostering of democratic institutions. In a society driven entirely by market mentalities, moralities, values and ideals, consuming, selling and branding become the primary mode through which to define agency and social relations - intimate and public - and to shape the sensibilities and inner lives of adults as well as how society defines and treats its children.

While the "empire of consumption" has been around for a long time,(1) American society in the last thirty years has undergone a sea change in the daily lives of children - one marked by a major transition from a culture of innocence and social protection, however imperfect, to a culture of commodification. This is culture that does more than undermine the ideals of a secure and happy childhood; it also exhibits the bad faith of a society in which, for children, "there can be only one kind of value, market value; one kind of success, profit; one kind of existence, commodities; and one kind of social relationship, markets."(2) Children now inhabit a cultural landscape in which they can only recognize themselves in terms preferred by the market.

Subject to an advertising and marketing industry that spends over $17 billion a year on shaping children's identities and desires,(3) American youth are commercially carpet-bombed through a never-ending proliferation of market strategies that colonize their consciousness and daily lives. Multibillion-dollar corporations, with the commanding role of commodity markets as well as the support of the highest reaches of government, now become the primary educational and cultural force in shaping, if not hijacking, how young people define their interests, values and relations to others. Juliet Schor, one of the most insightful and critical theorists of the commodification of children, argues that, "These corporations not only have enormous economic power, but their political influence has never been greater. They have funneled unprecedented sums of money to political parties and officials.... The power wielded by these corporations is evident in many ways, from their ability to eliminate competitors to their ability to mobilize state power in their interest."(4)

As the sovereignty of the market displaces state sovereignty, children are no longer viewed as an important social investment or as a central marker for the moral life of the nation. Instead, childhood ideals linked to the protection and well-being of youth are transformed - decoupled from the "call to conscience [and] civic engagement"(5) and redefined through what amounts to a culture of cruelty, abandonment and disposability. Childhood ideals increasingly give way to a market-driven politics in which young people are prepared for a life of objectification while simultaneously drained of any viable sense of moral and political agency. Moreover, as the economy implodes, the financial sector is racked by corruption and usury, the housing and mortgage market is in free fall, and millions of people lose their jobs, the targeting of children for profits takes on even more insistent and ominous tones. This is especially true in a consumer society in which children more than ever mediate their identities and relations to others through the consumption of goods and images. No longer imagined within language of responsibility and justice, childhood begins with what might be called the scandalous philosophy of money - that is, a logic in which everything, including the worth of young people, is measured through the potentially barbaric calculations of finance, exchange value and profitability. And this is part of the economic crisis that is barely mentioned in the mainstream media.

What is distinctive about this period in history is that the United States has become the most "consumer-oriented society in the world." Kids and teens, because of their value as consumers and their ability to influence spending, are not only at "the epicenter of American consumer culture," but are also the major targets of those powerful marketing and financial forces that service big corporations and the corporate state.(6) In a world in which products far outnumber shoppers, youth have been unearthed not simply as another expansive and profitable market, but as the primary source of redemption for the future of capitalism - even as it implodes. Erased as future citizens of a democracy, kids are now constructed as consuming and saleable objects. Gilded Age corporations, however devalued, and their army of marketers, psychologists and advertising executives now engage in what Susan Linn calls a "hostile takeover of childhood,"(7) poised to take advantage of the economic power wielded by kids and teens. With spending power increasing to match that of adults, the children's market has greatly expanded in the last few decades, in terms of both direct spending by kids and their influence on parental acquisitions. While figures on direct spending by kids differ, Benjamin Barber claims that "in 2000, there were 31 million American kids between twelve and nineteen already controlling 155 billion consumer dollars. Just four years later, there were 33.5 million kids controlling $169 billion, or roughly $91 per week per kid."(8) Schor argues that "children age four to twelve made ... $30.0 billion" in purchases in 2002, while kids aged twelve to nineteen "accounted for $170 billion of personal spending."(9) Molnar and Boninger cite figures indicating that pre-teens and teenagers command "$200 billion in spending power."(10) Young people are attractive to corporations because they are big spenders, but that is not the only reason. They also exert a powerful influence on parental spending, offering up a market in which, according to Anap Shah, "Children (under 12) and teens influence parental purchases totaling over ... $670 billion a year."(11)

#### Left unchecked, Neoliberalism will result in the destruction of the planet

GIROUX ’14 (Henry; McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University, “Protesting Youth in an Age of Neoliberal Savagery,” 5/21, https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/21/protesting-youth-in-an-age-of-neoliberal-savagery/)ww

Fred Jameson has argued that “that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” He goes on to say that “We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world” (Jameson 2003). One way of understanding Jameson’s comment is that within the ideological and affective spaces in which the neoliberal subject is produced and market-driven ideologies are normalized, there are new waves of resistance, especially among young people, who are insisting that casino capitalism is driven by a kind of mad violence and form of self-sabotage, and that if it does not come to an end, what we will experience, in all probability, is the destruction of human life and the planet itself. Certainly, more recent scientific reports on the threat of ecological disaster from researchers at the University of Washington, NASA, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reinforce this dystopian possibility. [1]

As the latest stage of predatory capitalism, neoliberalism is part of a broader economic and political project of restoring class power and consolidating the rapid concentration of capital, particularly financial capital (Giroux 2008; 2014). As a political project, it includes “the deregulation of finance, privatization of public services, elimination and curtailment of social welfare programs, open attacks on unions, and routine violations of labor laws” (Yates 2013). As an ideology, it casts all dimensions of life in terms of market rationality, construes profit-making as the arbiter and essence of democracy, consuming as the only operable form of citizenship, and upholds the irrational belief that the market can both solve all problems and serve as a model for structuring all social relations. As a mode of governance, it produces identities, subjects, and ways of life driven by a survival-of-the fittest ethic, grounded in the idea of the free, possessive individual, and committed to the right of ruling groups and institutions to exercise power removed from matters of ethics and social costs. As a policy and political project, it is wedded to the privatization of public services, the dismantling of the connection of private issues and public problems, the selling off of state functions, liberalization of trade in goods and capital investment, the eradication of government regulation of financial institutions and corporations, the destruction of the welfare state and unions, and the endless marketization and commodification of society.

Neoliberalism has put an enormous effort into creating a commanding cultural apparatus and public pedagogy in which individuals can only view themselves as consumers, embrace freedom as the right to participate in the market, and supplant issues of social responsibility for an unchecked embrace of individualism and the belief that all social relation be judged according to how they further one’s individual needs and self-interests. Matters of mutual caring, respect, and compassion for the other have given way to the limiting orbits of privatization and unrestrained self-interest, just as it has become increasingly difficult to translate private troubles into larger social, economic, and political considerations. As the democratic public spheres of civil society have atrophied under the onslaught of neoliberal regimes of austerity, the social contract has been either greatly weakened or replaced by savage forms of casino capitalism, a culture of fear, and the increasing use of state violence. One consequence is that it has become more difficult for people to debate and question neoliberal hegemony and the widespread misery it produces for young people, the poor, middle class, workers, and other segments of society — now considered disposable under neoliberal regimes which are governed by a survival-of-the fittest ethos, largely imposed by the ruling economic and political elite. That they are unable to make their voices heard and lack any viable representation in the process makes clear the degree to which young people and others are suffering under a democratic deficit, producing what Chantal Mouffe calls “a profound dissatisfaction with a number of existing societies” under the reign of neoliberal capitalism (Mouffe 2013:119). This is one reason why so many youth, along with workers, the unemployed, and students, have been taking to the streets in Greece, Mexico, Egypt, the United States, and England.

#### The alternative is to refuse a specific solution – opting for band-aid solutions like the plan only results in the infinite deferral of true revolutionary action

SPRINGER ‘12 (Simon; Professor of Geography at the University of Victoria, “Anarchism! Or What Geography Ought To Be,” Antipode, v. 44, n. 5)ww

The question of alternatives to the state is foremost in the minds of those skeptical of anarchism. In this vein Harvey (2009:200) asks, “How will the reifications of this anarchist ideal actually work on the ground in absolute space and time?” Although anarchists have theorized multiple possibilities ranging from collectivist to individualist, syndicalist to mutualist, and voluntaryist to communist, I advocate a non-doctrinaire, postanarchist approach and accordingly my response is to begin by refusing to offer a prescriptive overview of what forms of social organization I think should be developed. The answer to this question is not to be determined by a single individual, but rather collectively through continuous dialogue and ongoing adaptive innovation. In this sense, Harvey’s (2009) critique of anarchism is problematic on two counts. First, when have space and time ever been “absolute”, other than in the reductionist lens of positivism? This assessment belies Harvey’s own recognition for the dialectical influence of space and time, expressed as “space–time”. Second, he attempts to apply the tenets of Marxian thought and its “stage-based” thinking to a philosophical position that eschews such predetermined linearity. Harvey (2009) conceptualizes place-making as an end-state politics, which incorrectly positions anarchism as an ostensibly completable project—the shared ideal of both Marxism and neoliberalism—rather than appreciating it as a living, breathing, and forever protean process (Springer 2011). Some may view my restrained position as a copout, but I want to remind readers that any attempt to prescribe a fixed model in isolation from the larger social body recapitulates both the neoliberal project and an authoritarian disposition, as each argues in favor of one way of doing things. It also reinforces the arrogance/ignorance of the so-called “expert”, by presuming to know what is best, without appreciating one’s limitations (Mitchell 2002). Even Haraway, as brilliant a thinker as she is, once exposed her own limitations in revealing, “I have almost lost the imagination of what a world that isn’t capitalist could look like. And that scares me” (Harvey and Haraway 1995:519). The same nascent fear should be similarly evoked when one critically reflects upon the state and its seemingly all-consuming pervasiveness. We treat this particular form of hierarchical organization and territorialized dominance as though it is unavoidable, and in doing so we actively forget that the bulk of the time that humans have existed on planet Earth has been characterized by non-statist organization. The state is thus no more inevitable than it is needed. Neoliberalism is particularly virulent inasmuch as it contributes to a new element of our collective forgetting by reconfiguring the state in such a way that facilitates a failure to notice its ongoing deleterious effects (Springer 2010a). The discourse behind this illusion of dissolution attempts to convince us that neoliberalism represents our liberation as individuals, emancipating us from the chains of what it calls “big government”. Yet the literature has amply demonstrated that the state continues to matter to neoliberal modalities (see England and Ward 2007; Peck 2001). Likewise, the monopoly of violence the state claims for itself remains just as forceful and oppressive under the disciplinary logic of a neoliberal state as it does under any other state configuration—“feel good” moments of ostensible democracy (read “electoral authoritarianism”) notwithstanding (Springer 2011). What is actually lost through neoliberalism’s supposed “streamlining” of the state is most obviously the shared social provisions previously afforded to citizens. This “roll-back” results in the collapse of social trust, actively anticipating the Hobbesian- cum-Darwinian myth of all against all where only the strong survive. People are encouraged not to look to each other for support in their everyday transactions or even when the going gets tough, but to simply stop being “lazy” and get to work. Neoliberal discourse positions the system itself as being beyond reproach, so any existent “anomalies”, such as impoverishment or unemployment, are dismissed as distinctive personal failures. Those who do not “succeed” at this perverse game are easily resolved by the punitive neoliberal state through their criminalization. Incarceration is seen as a more viable solution than addressing the mounting inequalities and ongoing poverty of the majority (Peck 2003). This disciplinary stratagem is particularly debilitating because for popular power to be realized, the conditions for social co-operation must be present, meaning quite simply that people have to trust each other. Neoliberalism, in particular, and capitalism more generally, work to destroy trust by making us compete with one another and profit from each other’s vulnerability. Similarly, the state destroys trust by warning us that homo homini lupus will become the rule in the absence of sovereign power (Cohn 2010). To re-establish trust, it would seem that smashing capitalism alone is not enough. In convening a post-neoliberal reality—that is, the realization of a context that completely breaks from the current zeitgeist—sovereignty and the state itself must also be dismantled. Doing so, at first glance, appears to raise the problematic of getting from here to there and from now to then. Although positioning the idea of revolution as having fallen from view, Smith (2010) instead exemplifies the ongoing infatuation on the Left by suggesting that the recent financial crisis should be the basis upon which “the revolutionary imperative” is renewed. But wanting a global revolution to emerge from the recent economic crisis affords an instrumental role to a single global economic system, which oddly resurrects the neoliberalism-as-monolithism argument (see Springer 2010b for a critique). This criticism hints at Smith’s implicit embrace of the utilitarian role Marx afforded capitalism/colonialism, a position that anarchists find objectionable. While pitying the victims of colonialism, Marx consoled himself with the thought that its far-reaching abuses would only hasten the day when the entire world would be consumed by a single crisis, thus inaugurating the revolutionary swell he so desired. This is an overly passive approach, because if revolution is to result from a capitalist crisis, then this implies a politics of waiting for the day when “all that is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engels 2002 [1848]:223). The question of lost trust becomes particularly acute at the moment of “melting”, because as Proudhon (2005 [1864]:108) warned, there is “danger in waiting until moments of crisis, when passions become unduly inflamed by widespread distress”. In the time that has passed since the crisis first hit in late 2008, sadly it has become increasingly obvious just how possible it is—in the absence of trust—for people to accept racist, nationalist, and fundamentalist alternatives. Rather than biding our time in waiting for the levee to break, geographers could instead anarchically embrace the here and now as the space–time within which our lives are actually lived (see Vaneigem 2001 [1983]). Acknowledging the enabling power of this immediacy is emancipatory in itself as it awakens us to the possibility that we can instantaneously refuse participating in the consumerist patterns, nationalist practices, and hierarchical positionings that confer legitimacy on the existing order and instead engage a “do it yourself” culture centered on direct action, non- commodification, and mutual aid (Graeber 2009; Halfacree 2004; Trapese Collective 2007). In aligning to Gibson-Graham’s (2008) contention that “other worlds” are possible, and to Koopman’s (2011) concern for the non-violent counter-hegemonic struggle of what she calls “alter-geopolitics”, the power of here and now further allows us the freedom to imagine and begin establishing the alternative free institutions and voluntary associations that will smooth the transition towards a truly post-colonial/post-neoliberal future. Yet the significance of imagining alternatives to the current order is not to establish a fixed program for all time, but is instead to provide a point of alterity or exteriority as a way of questioning the limits of this order (Newman 2010). It is only in the precise space and moment of refusal, which is the here and now, that individuals are self-empowered to chart their own paths, free from the coercive guidance of a sovereign authority or the cajoling influence of a patronizing academic. Where geographers are actually well positioned to contribute, as feminists thinkers have demonstrated (see Lawson 2009; Nolin 2010), is towards the issue of building trust, by shattering prejudices and intervening with creative new energies rooted in the nurturing capacity of emotion and everyday life as the actual terrains of human interaction. By engaging the “affective turn” (Thien 2005) in understanding emotional connectivity and the politics of affinity as the fundamental basis upon which any lasting transformation might take place, it is to such intimacy and immediacy that the possibilities of anarchist geographies could be productively dedicated. Rather than prioritizing the particularisms of class as is the Marxian imperative, or surrendering to the politics of racism as neoliberalism would have us do (Goldberg 2009), anarchism demands that any process of emancipation must be infused with non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, and non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments (Day 2005).

### Pedagogy First

#### Using children to promote neoliberalism is pedagogically wrong

GIROUX ’09 (Henry A.; Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, “Commodifying Kids: The Forgotten Crisis,” 4/3, http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/83374:commodifying-kids-the-forgotten-crisis)ww

For the last few decades, critics such as Thomas Frank, Kevin Phillips, David Harvey and many others have warned us, and rightly so, that right-wing conservatives and free-market fundamentalists have been dismantling government by selling it off to the highest or "friendliest" bidder. But what they have not recognized adequately is that what has also been sold off are both our children and our collective future, and that the consequences of this catastrophe can only be understood within the larger framework of a politics and market philosophy that view children as commodities and democracy as the enemy. In a democracy, education in any sphere, whether it be the public schools or the larger media, is, or should be, utterly adverse to treating young people as individual units of economic potential and as walking commodities. And it is crucial not to "forget" that democracy should not be confused with a hypercapitalism.

Inevitably, humans must consume to survive. The real enemy is not consumption per se, but a market-driven consumer society fueled by the endless cycle of acquisition, waste and disposability, which is at the heart of an unchecked and deregulated global capitalism. Under such circumstances, there are few remaining spaces in which to imagine a mode of consumption that rejects the logic of commodification and embraces the principles of sustainability while expanding the reach and possibilities of a substantive democracy. Juliet Schor touches on this issue by rightly arguing that the real issue is "what kind of consumers do we want to be?"(20) Or, to put it more broadly, what kind of society and world do we want to live in? As politics embraces all aspects of children’s lives, it is crucial to make clear that the rising tide of free markets has less to do with ensuring democracy and freedom than with spreading a rein of terror around the globe, affecting the most vulnerable populations in the cruellest of ways. The politics of commodification and its underlying logic of waste and disposability do irreparable harm to children, but the resulting material, psychological and spiritual injury they incur must be understood not merely as a political and economic issue but also as a pedagogical concern.

### Education Link

#### Education is used to further neoliberalism

HILL ’06 (Dave; Professor of Education Policy at the University of Northampton, UK, “Class, Capital and Education in this Neoliberal and Neoconservative Period,” http://libr.org/isc/issues/ISC23/B1%20Dave%20Hill.pdf)ww

Capital – national and transnational corporations along with their major shareholders – has a number of plans with respect to education. Firstly, there is “The Capitalist Plan For Education.” This plan aims to produce and reproduce a work force and citizenry and set of consumers fit for Capital. According to this plan, schools must serve two overriding functions, an ideological function and a labour training function. These comprise socially producing labour-power for capitalist enterprises. This is people’s capacity to labour – their skills and attitudes, together with their ideological compliance and suitability for Capital – as workers, citizens and consumers. In this analysis, Althusser’s concepts of schools as ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) is useful here, with schools as key elements in the ideological indoctrination of new citizens and workers into thinking ‘there is no alternative’ to capitalism, that capitalism, and competitive individualism with gross inequalities is ‘only natural’ (Althusser, 1979. See also Hill, 2001, 2003 and 2004b).

### Hazelwood Link

#### The language of free speech is inundated with capitalist metaphors that uphold neoliberal principles

BROWN ’15 (Wendy; Professor of Political Science – University of California-Berkeley, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution)ww

At times, Kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government intervention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” On the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. On the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqualified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus [itself] a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 Not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democracy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice Kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrelevant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utilitarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.

What is significant about rendering speech as capital? Economization of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the Kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets consist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share capital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.

How, precisely, is speech capital in the Kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in Kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circulate, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 Speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.

Second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in principle and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, Kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. Every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as government should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, Kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “command[ing] where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, [using] censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, government distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternalistically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are politically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.

Third, Kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technology” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, Kennedy argues, specifically “counsel[s] against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.

Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, Kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, censorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and government meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of governmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy [because] it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:

The First Amendment was certainly not understood [by the framers] to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30

When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

### Inequality Link

#### Education can’t resolve inequality – the plan is built on a false promise

BACKER ’16 (David I.; Professor of Education and Human Services – Cleveland State University, “The False Promise of Education,” 11/15, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/education-reform-inequality-jobs-economy/>) ww

The positive relationship between schooling and success is widely considered a given in US society. For example, a recent FiveThirtyEight article uses 2014 data on average annual wages between 1970–2013 to claim that: “A more educated workforce would be a great boon to the economy: Scholars say more employees would earn higher wages [if they went to school], which leads to more taxes being collected and fewer Americans grappling with the challenges of poverty, among other benefits.”

But just a few weeks prior to the article’s publication the job numbers came out; they were the worst since 2010. “The US economy only added 38,000 jobs in May, according to the Labor Department. It was the worst monthly job gain since 2010.” Not only that, but the majority of jobs added were service jobs. August wasn’t much better. In September, more new jobs were available, but less than expected.

According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, “about 3.5 million students are expected to graduate from high school in 2016–17, including 3.2 million students from public high schools and 0.3 million students from private high schools,” and “during the 2016–17 school year, colleges and universities are expected to award 1,018,000 associate’s degrees; 1.9 million bachelor’s degrees; 798,000 master’s degrees; and 181,000 doctoral degrees.”

Millions of new workers will enter the job market in 2017, graduating from their “paths to opportunity.” Yet the path to opportunity might not end up anywhere in the face of sluggish to moderate job creation. The number of graduates doesn’t correlate with the number of available jobs. It’s like saying if we teach people how to play musical chairs well enough, everyone will get a seat.

As scholars like Peter Kappelli at University of Pennsylvania’s School of Management warn, having a degree will do nothing to protect you against the sometimes violent and unpredictable patterns of market activity in a capitalist economy. Kapelli’s comment sits within a long debate about the role of education in American society. Henry J. Perkinson, in The Imperfect Panacea, American Faith in Education 1865–1965, traces the centrist’s promise of education from Horace Mann to John Dewey to Lyndon B. Johnson. Summarizing this history, economists Herbert Bowles and Samuel Gintis set out two versions of the promise: democracy and technocratic meritocracy.

John Dewey argued for the democratic promise of education. In this view, schools integrate youth into adult roles required by society; schools give young people a chance to openly compete for existing positions and privileges, thereby equalizing inequality; and schools promote psychological and moral development. The integrative, egalitarian, and developmental roles schools play in society match the needs and context of democratic institutions.

The promise of school in this case is that schooling should and will prepare students to participate in a democratic society, and that by extension it serves democratic purposes.

Alongside Dewey were the functionalist sociologists and neoclassical economists who focused on industrial progress rather than democracy and promoted a technocratic-meritocratic version of schooling’s promise. According to this view, as industry becomes increasingly complex and markets require competitive production, the labor force needs to upgrade its skills. Schools provide this necessary function and, accordingly, those who study hard will be able to find work despite disruptions in the labor market caused by new technology. This view traces back to Horace Mann in the 1840s during industrialization, but continues today in the rhetoric about STEM careers, for example.

Whether rooted in notions of democracy or technology, both versions of the promise promote the notion of a compensatory education: that schools can compensate for unequal distribution of resources, rights, and recognition in American society.

But not everyone was convinced by the compensatory view. Bowles and Gintis critiqued the centrist promise in their landmark Schooling in Capitalist America. They articulated a more critical position on education, arguing that public education is part of a broader process of social reproduction: schooling activities correspond to existing echelons of social hierarchy and opportunity, preparing students for positions within that hierarchy. Schooling does not lead to opportunity in the sense that it creates opportunity; it simply prepares students to exist (or not exist) within the opportunity structure that the government and economy create.

Bowles and Gintis called this process “correspondence.” Race and class, they argued, define the positions students come to occupy in society, which largely correspond with their parents’ social positions and available opportunity. Overall, more and better schooling in an unequal society reproduces those inequalities, acting as a neutral institution, rather than a compensatory institution that equalizes them. (Some like Jonathan Kozol have argued that schooling exacerbates inequalities, though the reproductive view is more committed to schooling’s neutrality.)

Consider the job market numbers above. Schooling cannot control the number or kind of jobs available in an economy. For the last decade, for example, it was probably a good idea (in terms of potential income) to study petroleum engineering as an undergraduate. Today, given the dramatic fluctuations in oil prices, it’s perhaps not such a great idea. No matter how many people study petroleum engineering, or how good petroleum engineering education gets, it’s the petroleum industry and its fluctuations that determine how many jobs will be available and their respective salaries.

Sociological research in education supports this. Earlier this year, sociologists of education Douglas B. Downey and Dennis J. Condron published a retrospective on the Coleman Report, a large-scale research study mandated by the Civil Rights Act in 1966 to examine schooling success among the poor.

Fifty years later, the authors conclude that there is a “theoretical vertigo in the sociology of education” about the question of school’s effect on inequality. The authors even advocate for the compensatory view, and show that school can be compensatory in socioeconomic gaps in cognitive skills and child obesity, but admit there is no clear data about the relationship between schooling and income inequality.

Everyone knows that income inequality has increased exponentially between the 1970s and today. Yet at the same time that income inequality has skyrocketed, so has schooling. United States citizens are more educated than they ever have been. More people have graduated from more kinds of schools than at any point in history.

If the centrist promise were true, then greater educational attainment for the broader US population should have coincided with more economic success for more people. If schools create real opportunities for socioeconomic success, there should have been decreasing income inequality as the general population became more educated.

This is clearly not the case. As economists Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and others have shown, the share of the top 1 percent increased exponentially in the second half of the twentieth century. Consider this in relation to the following graph, which charts educational attainment in the United States between 1940 and 2014.

The graph shows the opposite: educational attainment increased markedly, even during the moments where economic inequality also greatly increased. These data show that wealth goes to the wealthy, not the educated. At the macro-level, there is no relationship between socioeconomic success and schooling.

Of course one must go to school to find a place in the economy, both in terms of job and status position. But just because getting a job requires having a degree doesn’t mean that more and better schooling will cause there to be more available positions society-wide. To get a job, you have to have a degree. But you don’t have to get a job because you have a degree.

This causal sleight of hand is symptomatic of the centrist promise. Schooling will not cause economic equality in an unequal economy, but it will certify people to find positions within that unequal economy. It may successfully lead folks to positions within society, but it won’t necessarily lead them to social success.

If you want most people to be successful in the economy, the economy itself has to work for most people. It won’t matter if most people work harder in school, or if we reform school ad inifinitum. Schools will largely reproduce the existing conditions of the economy, not serve as compensation for the economy’s faults.

### Competitiveness Link

#### Use of education to improve the US labor force drives down wages globally, competiveness creates more losers than winners

HILL ’06 (Dave; Professor of Education Policy at the University of Northampton, UK, “Class, Capital and Education in this Neoliberal and Neoconservative Period,” http://libr.org/isc/issues/ISC23/B1%20Dave%20Hill.pdf)ww

There is increasing differentiation, too, globally. Neoliberalisation of schooling services, in particular higher education, has reinforced the relegation of most developing states and their populations to subordinate global labour market positions, specializing in lower skilled services and production. This global differentiation is enforced by the World Bank and other international agency prescriptions regarding what education, and at what levels, should be provided in less developed and developing states (Leher, 2004).

Schools and universities, are increasingly run in accordance with the principles of ‘new public managerialism’ (Mahoney and Hextall, 2000) based on a corporate managerialist model imported from the world of business. As well as the needs of Capital dictating the principal aims of education, the world of business also supplies the model of how it is to be provided and managed.

A key element of Capital’s plans for education is to cut its labour costs. For this, a deregulated labour market is essential - with schools and universities able to set their own pay scales and sets of conditions - busting national trade union agreements, and, weakening union powers to protect their workforces. Thus, where neo-liberalism reigns, there is relatively untrammeled selling and buying of labour power, for a ‘flexible’, poorly regulated labour market (Costello and Levidow, 2001). Some impacts on workers’ rights, pay and what the International Labour Organisation calls `securities’ are spelt out below.

Internationally, neo-liberalism requires untrammelled free trade. Currently the major mechanism for this is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), though there are and have been many other mechanisms. (3)

One aspect is that barriers to international trade, capitalist enterprise and the extraction of profits should be removed. This applies as much to trade in services such as education and health as it does to the extraction of oil or the control of water supply. There should also be a ‘level playing field’ for companies of any nationality within all sectors of national economies. Barriers such as ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clauses should be dismantled, allowing any corporation, whether domestic or foreign or transnational, to own/run/universities, teacher education, schooling in any state.

Neoliberal Capital also demands that international trade rules and regulations are necessary to underpin ‘free’ trade, with a system for penalising ‘unfair’ trade policies such as subsidies, and such as promoting/favouring national interests or of national workforces like teachers and lecturers. Certainly, according to the GATS, this ‘level playing field’ will be legally enforceable – under pain of financial penalties, for any state that has signed up particular education services to the GATS.

There is an exception to these free trade demands by transnational Capital. The above restrictions do not apply in all cases to the USA (or other major centres of capitalist power such as the EU). Ultimately, the USA may feel free to impose the above ‘economic democracy’ and `choice’ by diplomatic, economic or military means. Ultimately peoples and states can be coerced to choose, bombed to obey.

### A/T: Permutation

#### The permutation is a form of reactionary politics – only a total break from neoliberalism will be successful

CHOI ‘16 (Jung Min; Associate Professor of Sociology – San Diego State University, “Neoliberalism and Education: The Disfiguration of Students,” in Neoliberalism, Economic Radicalism, and the Normalization of Violence, ed by Berdayes and Murphy pp 33-34) bhb

The argument, thus far, has been to show that a democratic society is not possible as long as we have an education system that is based on and organized through neoliberal policies where students are systematically disfigured from beings who are inquisitive, creative, and passionate about learning into "things" that are valued and judged solely on their worth at the market. This type of economic extremism, when dispersed throughout society, creates a form of terrorism where citizens become paralyzed, muted, and marginalized in organizing their existence. Nevertheless, as daunting as it may seem, there is a clear exit out of this bleak drama. Primarily, people need to stop organizing their lives around this extremist, unethical view of the world. Subsequent to the "linguistic turn," persons no longer have to choose between a dichotomized position of adapt or die (Murphy 2012). A new, post-market philosophy is available to guide public discourse and all other aspects of human relations. For example, John W. Murphy describes this new worldview as "earthly morality" (p. 127). According to Murphy, because all persons are basically connected at the outset and "are mutually implicated in all behavior, that bond must not be violated” (Murphy 2012, p. 135). This perspective reveals the dignity aspect of being fully human. To borrow from Erich Fromm (2005), in order to fulfill the human project where persons are able to fully engage in loving the other and are able to see the other as an intimate part of oneself, the focus necessarily has to shift from having (neoliberalism) to being (democracy). Subsequent to this philosophical and ethical gambit, all areas of social life, and education in particular, need to be reconceptualized. Persons can no longer be content with just tinkering and changing the current policy, tightening loose ends, harping on raising standards, increasing funding, while leaving an outmoded worldview intact. Changes in education cannot be simply a reaction to neoliberalism. As long as people view reality as existing on its own, with its own logic and destiny, a communal society is unlikely. Education based on realism, in other words, must be shown to be antithetical in producing responsible citizens. An alternative educational culture must be established that represents a move away from the extremist radicalism of the market toward a horizon of mutuality within multiplicity. In the words of Ignacio Ellacuria, schools must ensure that "liberty is victorious over oppression, justice over injustice, and love over hate” (1990, p. 149).

#### The perm undermines resistance by accepting small demands

PARR ’13 (Adrian; Chair of Taft Faculty and Director of the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center, The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, p. 5-6)ww

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth," as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with invest- able assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars]) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net- worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 million; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked" (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system).14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics.

Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured [END PAGE 5] and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### A/T: Neoliberalism Inevitable

#### The idea that “there is no alternative” locks student subjectivity into neoliberal coordinates, ensuring change becomes impossible

ZWICK ’13 (Detlev; Associate Professor of Marketing at Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, “The myth of metaphysical enclosure: A second response to Adam Arvidsson,” Ephemera, Vol. 13, No. 2, May, p. 413-419)

My initial response to Adam Arvidsson's excellent and provocative essay entitled 'The Potential of Consumer Publics,' was met by the author with a thoughtful response in which he provides, I think in very helpful ways, some clarification about the politico-ideological underpinnings of his notions of the productive consumer public and the reputation (or ethical) economy (see also Arvidsson, 2008; Arvidsson, 2009). As his defense against my charges illustrates, Arvidsson represents a position that, with Zizek, we could call 'Fukuyamaist'. This position holds that the collapse of the Communist Bloc put an end to the competition between ideological and economic systems, with the result that

liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society; all one can do is to render it more just, tolerant and so on. The simple but pertinent question arises here: if liberal-democratic capitalism is, if not the best, then the least bad form of society, why should we not simply resign ourselves to it in a mature way, even accept it wholeheartedly? (Zizek, 2009: 52)

Is this not exactly the question Arvidsson is posing in his response? Is he not asking us to accept the reality of neoliberal capitalism and get on with it? At his Fukuyamaist best, Arvidsson suggests that to keep criticizing what cannot be changed constitutes little more than the immature trolling of Utopian dreamers and tenured radicals, especially when unaccompanied by a clear description of the solution to the problem. In principle, there are two main charges leveled by Arvidsson against my critique of his argument.

First, he rejects my critique for being naïve and Utopian, but he does so not because I suggest that his productive consumer publics reproduce neoliberal capitalist logic. On the contrary, Arvidsson himself seems to agree with my assessment that his concepts of reputation economy and productive consumer publics are at the same time both product and producer of communicative capitalism. What he objects to is the anti-capitalist position from which I state my critique, because, as already mentioned above, Arvidsson has concluded that the rule of capitalism cannot be changed; it is, to put it in Zizek's terms, the real of our lives, a real so powerful that, as Fredric Jameson (2003: 73) puts it, 'it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism'.

Second, Arvidsson faults my response for articulating a critique without at the same time providing my own constructive vision. In other words, criticizing his neoliberal fantasies is fine as long as it is constructive, which for him means accepting his Fukuyamaist position and thus focusing one's criticism on how to make capitalism more humane and tolerable. After having been too Utopian in my anti-capitalist critique, here I am not Utopian enough for Arvidsson because I refuse to develop a vision of a more just, democratic, tolerant and environmentally sustainable capitalism.

Before I formulate a short response to these two charges, I would like to emphasize that as far as the assessment of Arvidsson's original argument is concerned, we actually do not have a substantial disagreement. My main claim has been that in his essay Arvidsson is advancing a conservative notion of social change that celebrates the global subsumption of digital labour as some kind of postmodern capitalist communism; an argument and vision that very much recalls Hardt & Negri's (2004) notion of the multitude as the new positive form of economic and social productivity and new radical political subjectivities. For Negri (2008), value forms created by autonomous digital collaboration and co- creation by the multitude - or as Arvidsson puts it, 'by putting common resources to work in processes that unfold beyond the direct control of markets and hierarchies' - are already just one small step removed from communism. No matter that the capitalists appropriate autonomous labour, commodify all forms of life and make the rules of the new productive game. Capitalists here are mere parasites leeching off the labour of the multitude and they can, at any moment, be cut off from the various forms of collaboration and common consumptive production, bringing about something we could 'call commonism if we want, or simply an "informational mode of production" to use a less loaded term'.

As I wrote in my earlier response, I see many problems with this theory of informational communism outside markets and hierarchies, not least being that the most convincing examples presented by Arvidsson of such an informal mode of production rely for their continuous existence and viability on markets and hierarchies. But again, the main point here is not that I believe Arvidsson's theory of the productive consumer public is inconsistent and in the final analysis misguided and naïve1. The main point I was trying to make in my initial response was that despite all his anti-capitalist language, Arvidsson is in actuality presenting a conservative vision of social change that takes for granted the continuation of neoliberal capitalism, albeit a version of neoliberal capitalism that over time somehow learns to accommodate and tolerate other forms of economic production and political subjectivities. In short, a neoliberalism with a human face (which is good enough for Arvidsson to move 'beyond neoliberalism', as if just saying it will make it so). And it turns out that Arvidsson, in his reply, admitted that much. Along similar lines, Arvidsson repeatedly states his disappointment about my refusal to

recognize that notions like peer-to-peer production, high-tech gift economies and the like have the power to mobilize the energies of the subjects that are most likely to become the pioneers of a new political vision - today's version of the skilled workers that have taken the lead in most modern political movements. Even though the social theory that they produce might be shallow and imperfect... we cannot simply dismiss these versions as mere ideologies to be replaced by our theoretically more refined ideologies.

I can assure you that I have no difficulty recognizing the real existence of the self- branding, entrepreneurial competitor who, via skilled knowledge work, hopes to change the world. There are plenty of them in my classroom. And I am not concerned about the depth and perfection of the social theories driving their visions for the future. What I am concerned about are the processes that constitute these students as neoliberal subjectivities in the first place and subsequently limit their desire for a better world - a desire that, of course, we should encourage and not dismiss a priori - to variations on neoliberal capitalism (variously called social entrepreneurism, corporate social responsibility, conscious capitalism and so on).

Thus, my point was not at all to moralize about the effects of communicative capitalism but to decry two things: first, that Arvidsson elevates this neoliberal subject to be the legitimate historical subject of radical transformation, and second, that Arvidsson seems to believe that the radical transformation ushered in by this subject is one we should desire. It is one thing to acknowledge the current hegemony of neoliberal governmentality. I have no problem with that. That neoliberalism is a radical social force is plain for all to see. It is something different entirely, however, to suggest, as Arvidsson appears to, that the competitive, self-branding and entrepreneurial subject is the only possible subject we can imagine today - that this subject should be allowed to create the future world. Here, we have to become normative and demand alternatives.

### A/T: Cap is Sustainable

#### Deployment of ‘sustainability’ is a tool to colonize other ways of life into capitalist modes of development. This one-size-fits-all approach guarantees extinction through constant accumulation and commodification

CLAMMER ’16 (John; teaches development sociology at the United Nations University in Tokyo, Cultures of Transition and Sustainability, 2016, p. 141-143)

Not least because in addition to pointing to such (actual) models, anthropology also posed the question of indigenous modes of sustainability that may not be the same as the ones emanating from the Western discourse. There is a danger of sustainability becoming the last term in a series reading colonialism-neo-colonialism-development-globalization-sustainability, and inheriting the fundamental problems of its predecessors—paternalism, top-down imposed solutions, lack of democracy and consultation, a one-size-fits-all mentality, and resulting injustices, including some people or groups "benefitting" from sustainability while others are excluded or cannot access it to the same degree. The actual (rather than simply nominal) incorporation of indigenous perspectives has many positive implications which include modifying global governance through engagement with local peoples in such areas as information collection and dissemination, policy development, implementation and monitoring, providing models of climate change mitigation and adaptation through methods such as traditional forestry, learning from local health systems and bringing local knowledge and "Western" science into dialogue with each other (McLean et al. 2012). But behind all these practical measures is the more philosophical question of the possible multiplicity of ideas of sustainability.

Studies have shown of course that there are many different concepts of development and sustainability between cultures, and, significantly, between the genders within cultures. These differences are based in world views—in ideas of cosmological and social order, of what is "right" in both ecological and sociological terms, in the local indigenous economy (cattle-herding peoples having rather different perceptions of the world than sedentary agriculturalists or fisher people), the ways in which growth and reproduction occur, the role of God or gods and spiritual beings, senses of body and of self, ethical systems (such as what constitutes honesty, truthfulness or honor), the relationship between individualism and the collective good, what is the content of custom and law, what makes up an education or the process of socialization, attitudes to the land (sacred and inalienable or just another commodity) and territory, and largely invisible but deeply held conceptions of time and space. In many cases these deep cultural conceptions (and their expression in practices agricultural, social, in hunting or in house building and the orientation of buildings, [END PAGE 141] in economic transactions) persist until overrun by 'development' or modernization, and often only emerge when disputes occur between the members of one culture and others, in which case these ontological dimensions begin to appear as, for example, different conceptions of law or of property (Dahl and Megersaa 2003, Clammer et al. 2004).

The failure to take seriously such alternative accounts of development has many deleterious consequences—the actual undermining and erosion of vernacular cultures, the destruction of invaluable systems of indigenous knowledge, the colonization of the mind and imaginations with alien concepts that maybe only partially assimilated, but which do not lead to the creation of a new integrated world view, new systems of domination and non-sustainable practices displacing the old and perfectly functional ones, and eroding vernacular concepts of wealth while leading to the commodification of things, arts and people themselves. At the same time, no society stands still and is outside of history, so by the same token even "traditional" or vernacular societies change. The secret then becomes to build on, not destroy, the very bases of sustainability on which those societies were built—social ties, reciprocity, popular creativity, and local conceptions of belief and knowledge (N'Dione et al. 2003). Many of the principles of solidarity economy are to be found in such societies, historical and contemporary. One often hears the objection that it would be difficult to "scale up" such examples to address larger scale problems, but this may be a mistake. The real issues are two: on the one hand the 'scaling down' of many of the gargantuan organizations that now seem to rule the world-corporations, militaries, governments, multilateral organizations-to a human scale, and on the other precisely that issue of scale. Size as such is not the issue: it is the 'fit' or appropriateness of an organization, institution, technology or process, in relationship to its environment and purposes that is the key. Hence the constant recourse to localism: small is beautiful when it is indeed of the right scale. Our cultural obsession with more/bigger/faster/expansion/growth is the essential problem here: as the dinosaurs proved, being big does not ensure survival. Nothing in fact is "too big to fail". The increasing consolidation of human units into ever larger organizations—states, empires, multinational corporations, mega-malls and mega-universities, vast bureaucracies—is a relatively recent phenomenon, and certainly not the only model of social, economic or political organization available to us. It is remarkable that our imagination is so big when it comes to technology and our toys and getting somewhere faster, but so very limited when it comes to social alternatives. [END PAGE 142] David Korten has suggested that we need "new stories". This is true, and it should be one of the key roles of the arts to suggest them, but there are already many "old stories" in existence that have been submerged under the juggernaut of modernity, but whose retrieval would point to many forms of age-old wisdom that, through one of the beneficial aspects of globalization, have become the heritage of human kind as a whole, as have the music and the other cultural expressions of cultures seemingly remote from us in space and time.

## AFF

### No Link

#### Use of the state to promote education is key to fighting neoliberalism

GIROUX ’09 (Henry A.; Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, “Commodifying Kids: The Forgotten Crisis,” 4/3, http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/83374:commodifying-kids-the-forgotten-crisis)ww

At the same time, simply criticizing the market, the privatization of public goods and the commercialization of children, while helpful, is not enough. Stirring denunciations of what a market society does to kids do not go far enough. What is equally necessary is developing public spaces and social movements that help young people develop healthy notions of self, identities and visions of their future no longer defined - more accurately, defiled - by market values and mentalities. Obama's road to recovery must align itself with a vision of a democracy that is on the side of children, particularly young children in need. It must enable the conditions for youth to learn, to "grow," as John Dewey once insisted, as engaged social actors more alive to their responsibilities to future generations than contemporary adult society has proven capable. Such a project requires constructing a politics that refuses to be animated by populist rage so easily misdirected, or by a disdain for the social state, for mutuality, reciprocity and compassion, among other democratic values. In short, it must reject a society whose essence is currently refracted in the faces of children compelled to confront a future that as yet offers very little hope of happiness, or even survival.

### Permutation

#### Permutation – combining the plan and the alternative is best

FERGUSON ’11 (James; Stanford University, USA; University of Cape Town, South Africa and University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; “Toward a Left Art of Government: From ‘Foucauldian Critique’ to Foucauldian Politics,” History of the Human Sciences, 24:4, p. 61-68)ww

This is the sort of rethinking that will be necessary if we are to get beyond the politics of the ‘anti’ and arrive at a convincing response to Foucault’s challenge to develop a true left art of government. Such rethinking will have to be willing to decenter the two sacred touchstones of 20th-century progressive politics – the worker and the nation-state – while finding or reinventing techniques of government that can gain traction in settings where most of ‘the masses’ are not workers, and most social services are not delivered by states. In such circumstances, simply attacking ‘neo-liberalism’ and defending ‘the welfare state’ is not terribly helpful. What is needed instead is a revitalized notion of the political good – and of what ‘social assistance’ might mean in a world where so many of the assumptions of the Keynesian welfare state no longer obtain. In matters of ‘social policy’, Foucault’s 1983 observation remains true nearly a quarter-century later:

We are still bound up with an outlook that was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of Beveridge, a man who was born over a hundred years ago. For the moment . . . we completely lack the intellectual tools necessary to envisage in new terms the form in which we might attain what we are looking for. (Foucault, 1988b: 166)

My recent work is concerned with empirical domains in which some of the conceptual innovation that Foucault called for may be under way. Perhaps the most provocative finding to date is that some of the most interesting and promising new forms of government being devised seem to be taking market mechanisms that we are used to associating with neo-liberalism, and putting them to new political uses.

Consider, for instance, new anti-poverty programs in southern Africa that seek to provide cash support for incomes, and thus (in theory) harness markets to the task of meeting the needs of the poor. This is happening in several African countries, but also in a great many other postcolonial states – from Brazil and Venezuela to Mexico and Bangladesh – where leftist and rightist regimes alike have seen fit to introduce policies that transfer cash directly into the hands of the poor (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; cf. Ferguson, 2010). The South African Basic Income Grant campaign is the example I know best. This involves a proposal to deal with a crisis of persistent poverty by providing a small unconditional minimum monthly payment to all. The argument goes like this: markets are not working for poor people because they are too poor to participate in them. Government programs are not working for them because the state is inefficient.

So: provide income support directly, in the form of cash, then say to the poor: ‘You are now empowered to solve your own problems in the way you see best.’ In contrast to older forms of ‘welfare’ assistance, the claim is that such grants rely on poor people’s own ability to solve their own problems, without imposing the policing, paternalism and surveillance of the traditional welfare state. The ‘social’ of the social welfare state is largely discarded, in this scheme. Assistance is largely decoupled from familistic assumptions and insurance rationality alike, while the state is imagined as both universally engaged (as a kind of direct provider for each and every citizen) and maximally disengaged (taking no real interest in shaping the conduct of those under its care, who are seen as knowing their own needs better than the state does). (See Standing and Samson, 2003; Barchiesi, 20007; Ferguson, 2007.)

Similar new lines of thought are visible in recent campaigns for an increased role for direct cash transfers in many forms of social and humanitarian policy. For instance, an increasingly influential argument in the area of humanitarian assistance maintains that hunger is best dealt with by boosting the purchasing power of those at risk, rather than by distributing food aid. The current international food aid system involves taking excess grain (produced under subsidized conditions in rich countries) and transporting it to places (largely in Africa) where people are at risk of hunger. Following Amartya Sen, critics have long noted the perverse effects of this: depressing producer prices for local farmers, and damaging the local institutions for producing and distributing food crops. Once food aid has arrived, local food production often never recovers, and the ‘temporary’ crisis becomes permanent. As an alternative, Sen’s followers have pushed for cash payments to be made directly to those at risk of food deficit. People with money in their pockets, Sen points out, do not starve. And the economic chain of events that is set in motion by boosting purchasing power leads (through market forces) to increased capacity for local production and distribution (Sen, 1983; Dreze and Sen, 1991).

The argument recalls Jane Guyer’s groundbreaking work on feeding African cities (1989). Consider, Guyer suggests, how food ends up in bellies in the vast mega-cities of West Africa such as Lagos. The logistical task of moving thousands of tons of food each day fromthousands of local producers to millions of urban consumerswould be beyond the organizational capacity of any state (to say nothing of the less-than-exemplary Nigerian one). Here, market mechanisms, drawing on the power of vast self-organizing networks, are very powerful, and very efficient. Such forms of organization must appear especially attractive where states lack capacity (and let us remember how many progressive dreams in Africa have crashed on the rocks of low state capacity).

Why should relying on this sort of mechanism be inherently right-wing? Well, the answer is obvious: markets serve only those with purchasing power. But the food aid example shows a way of redirecting markets toward the poor, by intervening not to restrict the market, but to boost purchasing power. I have become convinced that (at least in the case of food aid) this is good public policy. Is it also neo-liberal? Perhaps that is not the right question. Let us rather ask: Are there specific sorts of social policy that might draw on characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’ (like using markets to deliver services) that would also be genuinely pro-poor? That seems to me a question worth asking.

It seems clear that the governmental programs I have discussed here do draw on recognizably neo-liberal elements (including the valorization of market efficiency, individual choice and autonomy; themes of entrepreneurship; and skepticism about the state as a service provider).2 But those who advocate and fight for these policies would insist that they are, in fact ‘pro-poor’, and that they are ways of fighting against (rather than capitulating to) the growing inequality that recent ‘neo-liberal’ economic restructuring has produced. These claims, I think, are not easily dismissed. And this, in turn, raises the fascinating possibility that the ‘neo-liberal’ and the ‘pro-poor’ may not be so automatically opposed as we are used to supposing. What is of special interest here is the way that certain sorts of new progressive initiatives may involve not simply ‘opposing the neo-liberal project’, but appropriating key mechanisms of neo-liberal government for different ends. This does not mean that these political projects are therefore suspect – ‘contaminated’ by their association with neo-liberal rationality. Rather, it means that they are appropriating certain characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’ (and I think of these discursive and programmatic moves as analogous to the moves one might make in a game) that while recognizably ‘neo-liberal’, can be used for quite different purposes than that term usually implies.

As I have argued in a related paper (Ferguson, 2010), this situation may be analogous to the way that statistical techniques that were developed in the 19th century for calculating the probabilities of workplace injuries eventually became building blocks of the insurance techniques that enabled the rise of the welfare state. Such techniques were originally developed in the 19th century by large employers to control costs, but they eventually became the technical basis for social insurance, and ultimately helped enable unprecedented gains for the working class across much of the world (Ewald, 1986). Techniques have no necessary loyalty to the political program within which they were developed, and mechanisms of government that were invented to serve one purpose can easily enough be appropriated for surprising other uses. ‘Market’ techniques of government such as those I have discussed were, like workplace statistics, undoubtedly conservative in their original uses. But it seems at least possible that they may be in the process of being creatively appropriated, and repurposed for different and more progressive sorts of ends.

To be sure: we need to be skeptical about the facile idea that problems of poor people can be solved simply by inviting them to participate in markets and enterprise. Such claims (which often ascribe almost magical transformative powers to such unlikely vehicles as ‘social entrepreneurship’ or ‘microcredit’) are almost always misleading, and often fraudulent. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the coupling of pro-poor social policy with market mechanisms out of hand, out of a reflexive sense that the latter are ‘neo-liberal’ and thus ‘bad’. Again, my interest here is in the potential mobility of a set of governmental devices. These devices originated within a neo-liberal project that deserves all the criticism it gets. But they may be in the process of being redeployed in creative ways. If so, some emergent political initiatives that might appear at first blush to be worryingly ‘neo-liberal’ may, on closer inspection, amount to something a good deal more hopeful.

This leaves us with a politics that requires more of us than simply denouncing neo-liberalism. The political demands and policy measures I have mentioned here (whether conditional cash transfers, basic income, or cash-based food aid) do not merit, I think, either wholesale denunciation or uncritical acceptance. Instead, they call on us to remain skeptical and vigilant, but also curious and hopeful. They leave us less with strong opinions than with the sense that we need to think about them a bit more, and learn a bit more about the specific empirical effects that they may produce.

### Neoliberalism Doesn’t Exist

#### Neoliberalism doesn’t exist – the concept isn’t useful for describing and thinking about the world

BARNETT ’05 (Clive; Faculty of Social Sciences – The Open University, “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism,’” Geoforum, 36)ww

The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives take in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ as a coherent ‘‘hegemonic’’ project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ and ‘‘neoliberalization’’ in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors ‘‘out there’’, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ as a ‘‘hegemonic’’ project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about ‘‘neoliberalism’’ manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about ‘‘neoliberalism’’ pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a ‘‘hegemonic’’ project of ‘‘neoliberalization’’, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, womens health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b).

None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular ‘‘hegemonic’’ project of ‘‘neoliberalization’’. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottomup. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as ‘‘hegemonic neoliberalism’’ is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to ‘‘hegemonic neoliberalism’’. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of ‘‘democracy’’ (see Barnett and Low, 2004).

Recent theories of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of ‘‘individualized collective-action’’ (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of ‘‘neoliberal hegemony’’: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucaults ideas into the Marxist narrative of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001).

Theories of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure.

The recurrent problem for theories of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ and ‘‘neoliberalization’’ is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between topdown initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of ‘‘neoliberalism’’. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify ‘‘the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale’’ (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of ‘‘getting-at’’ ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how ‘‘hegemonic’’ projects of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucaults ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the ‘‘freedom to be formed and normed’’. Over time, Foucaults own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

### Neoliberalism is Inevitable

#### Neoliberalism is natural and inevitable – capitalism, human nature and technology

HEYWOOD ’14 (Andrew; author, Professor and University Administrator, “The Economy in a Global Age,” in Global Politics, p. 99)ww

In practice, complex economic developments such as the emergence of the global capitalist system are best explained through the dynamic relationship between structures and agents (O'Brien and Williams 2013). The most influential structuralist explanation of the emergence of a global economy is the Marxist argument that capitalism is an inherently universalist economic system. In short, globalization is the natural and inevitable consequence of the capitalist mode of production. As Marx (see p. 72) put it in the *Grundrisse* ([1857—58] 1971), the essence of capitalism is to 'pull down every local barrier to commerce’ and, 'to capture the whole world as its market'. This occurs because the underlying dynamic of the capitalist system is the accumulation of capital, which, in turn, creates an irresistible desire to develop new markets and an unquenchable thirst for new and cheaper economic resources. According to Marxists, just as imperialism in the late nineteenth century had been fuelled by the desire to maintain profit levels, the acceleration of globalization from the late twentieth century onwards was a consequence of the end of the post-1945 'long boom’ and the onset of a global recession in the 1970s.

Although liberals fiercely reject the critical Marxist view of capitalism, they nevertheless accept that globalization is fuelled by an underlying economic logic. In their case, this is linked not to the impulses of a capitalist enterprise but, in essence, to the content of human nature, specifically the innate and rational human desire for economic betterment. In this view, the global economy is merely a reflection of the fact that, regardless of their different cultures and traditions, people everywhere have come to recognize that market interaction is the best guarantee of material security and improved living standards. This is particularly expressed in the doctrine of free trade and the theory of competitive advantage, examined more closely in Chapter 19. As far as explaining when and how this inclination towards 'globality’ started to be realized, liberals often emphasize the role of technological innovation. Technology, needless to say, has long played a role in facilitating transborder and even transworld connections between peoples - from the introduction of the telegraph (1857), to the telephone (1876) and the wireless (1895), the development of the aeroplane (1903), television (1926) and the liquid-fuelled rocket (1927), and the introduction of containerization in sea transport (1960s and 1970s). However, advances in information and communications technology (ICT) - notable examples include the invention of optical fibres in the late 1960s, and the introduction of commercial silicone chips in 1971 and of personal computers (PCs) in 1981 - have played a particularly important role in spurring progress towards globalization, especially by facilitating the development of global financial markets and the global administration of corporations. In the view of so-called ‘hyperglobalists’, globalized economic and cultural patterns, in effect, became inevitable once technologies such as computerized financial trading, mobile phones and the Internet became widely available.

### Capitalism is Sustainable

#### Predictions of capitalism’s demise are over-stated – innovation will ensure it endures

MEAD ’12 (Walter Russell; Editor at Large – The American Interest Online, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” 7/28, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/)ww

Over a series of recent posts, I’ve been looking at the energy revolution that is changing the look of the 21st centuries. Some countries are losers, but the US in particular stands to make big gains at home and in its foreign policy.

On the whole, this news is about as good as it gets: trillions of dollars of valuable resources are now available to power the US economy, cut our trade deficit and reduce our vulnerability to Middle East instability. Hundreds of thousands of well paid blue collar jobs are going to reduce income inequality and help rebuild a stable middle class. Many of the resources are exactly where we would want them: in hard hit Rust Belt states.

World peace is also looking more possible: the great powers aren’t going to be elbowing each other as they fight to control the last few dribs and drabs of oil. Nasty dictatorships and backward-facing petro-states aren’t going to be able blackmail the world as easily.

But there is one group (other than the Russians and the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians) that isn’t sharing in the general joy: the greens. For them, the spectacle of a looming world energy crisis was good news. It justified huge subsidies for solar and wind power (and thereby guaranteed huge fortunes for clever green-oriented investors). Greens outdid themselves year after year with gloom and doom forecasts about the coming oil crunch. They hoped that public dislike of the Middle East and the costs of our involvement there could be converted into public support for expensive green energy policies here at home: “energy independence” was one of the few arguments they had that resonated widely among average voters.

Back in those salad days of green arrogance, there was plenty of scoffing at the ‘peak oil deniers’ and shortage skeptics who disagreed with what greens told us all was settled, Malthusian science. “Reality based” green thinkers sighed and rolled their eyes at the illusions of those benighted techno-enthusiasts who said that unconventional sources like shale oil and gas and the oil sands of Canada would one day become available.

Environmentalists, you see, are science based, unlike those clueless, Gaia-defying technophiles with their infantile faith in the power of human creativity. Greens, with their awesome powers of Gaia-assisted intuition, know what the future holds.

But those glory days are over now, and the smarter environmentalists are bowing to the inevitable. George Monbiot, whose cries of woe and pain in the Guardian newspaper have served as the Greek chorus at each stage of the precipitous decline of the global green movement, gave voice to green grief at the prospect of a wealthy and prosperous century to come: “We were wrong,” he wrote on July 2,”about peak oil. There’s enough to fry us all.” Monbiot now gets the politics as well:

There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world’s most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour [a reference to Canada] is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty.

In other words, a newly oil rich United States is going to fight even harder against global green carbon policies, and the new discoveries will tilt the American political system even farther in the direction of capitalist oil companies.

Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly.

Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011:

I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth.

Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into?

A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.”

Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record.

Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had.

The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found.

Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator.

The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan.

The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works.

The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks.

The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn.

Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night.

An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them.

But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs.

A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one.

When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared.

A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do.

Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties.

But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods?

Instead, the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. This won’t satisfy McKibben and Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing.

Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good. In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have gone flat out for coal. Now, that is much less likely.

And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them.

Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else.

Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.

### A/T: Root Cause

#### Capitalism isn’t the root cause of social **ills** and knee-jerk solutions risk exacerbating them

LARRIVEE ’10 (John; Professor of Economics at Mount Saint Mary’s University, “A Framework for the Moral Analysis of Markets,” 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf)ww

Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have also been problematic in other systems and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

### Alt Fails

#### Specific alternatives are key to evaluate whether the critique is better—don’t optimistically assume that dismantling capitalism will solve all social ills

SAYER ’95 (Andrew; Reader in Social Theory and Political Economy at Lancaster University, Radical Political Economy: A Critique, 1995, p. 33-34)

Any criticism presupposes the possibility of a better way of life; to expose something as illusory or contradictory is to imply the possibility and desirability of a life without those illusions and contradictions. This much has been established by critical theorists such as Habermas and Apel. Yet the notion that critique implies a quest for the good is a highly abstract one. Up to a point, particular critiques do imply something a little more specific than the standpoint of a better life. The critique of capitalism's anarchic and uneven development implies a critical standpoint or contrast space of an imagined society with a rationally ordered and even process of development. The critique of class points to the desirability of a classless society. Naturally, society would be better if its illusions, conflicts and contradictions were reduced, but we naturally want to know how this could be achieved. The desirability of a life without contradictions or illusions does not make it feasible.

Critical social science does not merely identify illusions, irrationality or contradictions but attempts to provide explanations of their sources, locating the 'unwanted determinations' of behaviour, as Bhaskar (1989) puts it. It would be strange, to say the least, if an analysis of the causes of problems such as hunger and exploitation were unable to indicate anything about alternatives which would eliminate them. If a critical theory cannot begin to indicate how to eliminate problems we must inevitably be suspicious of its claims to have identified their causes. If the alternative implied by a critical standpoint is not feasible, then any critique made from that standpoint is thereby seriously weakened. Not to put too fine a point on it, the critique of, say, capitalism's anarchic and uneven development would lose much of its force if all [END PAGE 33] advanced economies were necessarily anarchic and uneven in their development, though one could still criticize advanced economies - not just capitalist ones - from the very different standpoint of a 'deep ecology', calling for a return to small-scale, more primitive economies (Dobson, 1990).

We need to know enough about the critical standpoint and the implied alternative to be able to judge first whether it really is feasible and desirable. Since knowledge is 'situated' and bears the mark of its author's social position, this includes assessing whose standpoint it is made from. Does it privilege the position of a particular group (e.g. male workers, advanced countries)? Does it imply a society without difference? If it suggests greater equality on whose terms is equality to be defined?7 We have also to ask whether remedying one set of problems would generate others (it usually does), and whether these would be worse than the original problems. This is rarely considered in radical political economy, the usual implicit assumption being that all bad things go together in capitalism and all good things under socialism/communism. Yet it is possible that some of the 'contradictions' involve dilemmas which can't be eliminated along with capitalism. Evaluations in terms of desirability therefore need to be cross-checked with assessments of feasibility, and optimistic assumptions of inevitable improvement suspended.

There are two kinds of feasibility which might be considered:

1 whether a certain desired end-state or goal can be realized - for example, how people can be politically mobilized to make it happen; and

2 whether, assuming enough people are willing to try to make it happen, the goal or end-state is feasible in itself, e.g. could one have an advanced economy without money?

It is usually only the first of these questions that radicals address, the standard response to utopian discussions being not 'would it work?' but 'yes but how are you going to get from here to there?' But while many might think it idle to ignore (1), it is surprising how little attention is given to (2), as if the journey mattered more than the destination. I fully accept that I am not offering suggestions on (1) in this book, and only ideas pertinent to (2): but then I don't see how large-scale political mobilization can precede a well-worked out conception of a feasible alternative.

#### Radical economic critiques *must* provide specific alternatives. Failure to specifically explain an alternative crushes hope for transition

SAYER ’95 (Andrew; Reader in Social Theory and Political Economy at Lancaster University, Radical Political Economy: A Critique, 1995, p. 33-34)

Radical political economy is of course a critical social science, both explaining and criticizing the practices it studies, with the explicit aim of reducing illusion and freeing people from domination and unwanted forces. But it can only hope to have an emancipatory effect if it considers its own critical standpoints and the alternative social arrangements they imply. Unfortunately it rarely does this, with the result that its standpoints and implicit alternatives are often contradictory, infeasible, or undesirable even if they are feasible. Marxist-influenced work still bears the traces of the tension between the standpoints of a socialist or communist society which has pre-industrial communitarian qualities and one in which the forces of production are developed beyond current levels of industrialization. More generally, there is a strong modernist tendency in which it is assumed that problems can be progressively unravelled without creating new ones at the same time, as if eventually all trade-offs or dilemmas could be overcome through a triumph of reason. We shall argue through substantive examples that such optimism is not only misplaced but likely to be counterproductive, limiting [END PAGE 7] progress. There are always likely to be 'dilemmas of development' (Toye, 1987).

The problem of critical standpoints has become more acute in recent years, indeed it is central to the crisis of the Left. There is no longer a single standpoint or alternative (socialism/communism) counterposed to a single, overarching target (capitalism). Now there are many targets – patriarchy, racism, homophobia, militarism, industrialism – and correspondingly many critical standpoints with complex relations between them. That critical social science is no longer seen as synonymous with a socialist perspective is a sign of considerable progress, and cause for optimism too, as failure on the traditional front of class politics is compensated by progress on other, newer fronts such as the politics of gender. But it is also a source of heightened uncertainty. While there was always a problem of inconsistencies between critical standpoints, it has deepened and widened with the rise of 'green' concerns, for they bring into question the feasibility and desirability of non-capitalist as well as capitalist industrial societies. Is the problem capitalism, industrial society in general, or modernity?; and what are the alternatives? Equally, increasing awareness of problems of ethnocentrism and value pluralism throws doubt over the familiar, implicit critical stand- points of Western radical social science. How do we decide what is a problem? What if we cannot reach a consensus on this? Until recently, it seemed that the problems or targets of critical social science could be relied upon to emerge from the investigation of existing practices, where one would encounter the felt needs, frustrations and suffering of actors, and in discovering the sources of these problems, work out what changes would lead towards emancipation (e.g. Fay, 1975, 1987; Collier, 1994b). This was coupled with an implicit view that emancipation was a form of escape from domination, illusion and unwanted constraints, with little or no acknowledgement that it depended on the construction of superior, alternative, progressive frameworks which could replace the old ones. But it is now increasingly apparent that normative questions of possible alternatives and what is good or bad about them cannot be evaded. How, without addressing such questions, could one decide what constitutes a superior alternative? Should there be a presumption in favour of community as a basis of social organization over other forms? Does liberalism provide the best framework for multicultural societies? What should be people's rights and responsibilities? What are our responsibilities to distant others, future generations, and to other species? There is little hope of achieving the goal of an emancipatory social science if it shuns normative discussions of issues such as these.