# Taiwan Negative (On-Case)

## WAR ADVANTAGE ANSWERS

### 1NC – Taiwan War

#### China’s deterred now – arms sales are key magnify their fear

Greer 18 ---- Tanner, writer and analyst for Foreign Policy, “Taiwan Can Win a War With China,” 9/25, *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/> \*\*\*Modified for language

This sketch makes sense of the anxiety the PLA officer manuals express. They know war would be a terrific gamble, even if they only admit it to each other. Yet it this also makes sense of the party’s violent reactions to even the smallest of arms sales to Taiwan. Their passion betrays their angst. They understand what Western gloom-and-doomsters do not. American analysts use terms like “mature precision-strike regime” and “anti-access and area denial warfare” to describe technological trends that make it extremely difficult to project naval and airpower near enemy shores. Costs favor the defense: It is much cheaper to build a ship-killing missile than it is to build a ship. But if this means that the Chinese army can counter U.S. force projection at a fraction of America’s costs, it also means that the democracies straddling the East Asian rim can deter Chinese aggression at a fraction of the PLA’s costs. In an era that favors defense, small nations like Taiwan do not need a PLA-sized military budget to keep the Chinese at bay. No one needs to hear this message more than the Taiwanese themselves. In my trips to Taiwan, I have made a point of tracking down and interviewing both conscripts and career soldiers. Their pessimism is palpable. This morale crisis in the ranks partly reflects the severe mismanagement of the conscription system, which has left even eager Taiwanese patriots disillusioned with their military experience. But just as important is the lack of knowledge ordinary Taiwanese have about the strength of their islands’ defenses. A recent poll found that 65 percent of Taiwanese “have no confidence” in their military’s ability to hold off the PLA. Absent a vigorous campaign designed to educate the public about the true odds of successful military resistance, the Taiwanese people are likely to judge the security of their island on flawed metrics, like the diminishing number of countries that maintain formal relations with Taipei instead of Beijing. The PLA’s projected campaign is specifically designed to overwhelm and overawe a demoralized Taiwanese military. The most crucial battlefield may be the minds of the Taiwanese themselves. Defeatism is a more dangerous threat to Taiwanese democracy than any weapon in China’s armory. Both Westerners and Taiwanese should be more optimistic about the defense of Taiwan than is now normal. Yes, the Taiwanese Army projects that it can only hold off its enemy for two weeks after the landing—but the PLA also believes that if it cannot defeat the Taiwanese forces in under two weeks, it will lose the war! Yes, the disparity between the military budgets on both sides of the strait is large, and growing—but the Taiwanese do not need parity to deter Chinese aggression. All they need is the freedom to purchase the sort of arms that make invasion unthinkable. If that political battle can be resolved in the halls of Washington, the party will not have the power to threaten battle on the shores of Taiwan.

#### Tenions low now – Status quo solves Taiwan war.

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U.S. President Donald Trump had a “lengthy” telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday night and agreed to honor the “one China” policy, according to a press statement by the White House. “President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping of China had a lengthy telephone conversation on Thursday evening,” the press release stated. “The two leaders discussed numerous topics and President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our ‘one China’ policy.” The statement went on to add that “Representatives of the United States and China will engage in discussions and negotiations on various issues of mutual interest. The phone call between President Trump and President Xi was extremely cordial, and both leaders extended best wishes to the people of each other’s countries. They also extended invitations to meet in their respective countries.” “President Trump and President Xi look forward to further talks with very successful outcomes,” it said. Relations between China and the U.S. appeared to get off on the wrong foot after president-elect Trump held a 10-minute telephone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on Dec. 2, the first such conversation between a Taiwanese president and an elected American president since the U.S. severed official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1979. Weeks later, Trump again “angered” Beijing by telling an interview that the U.S.’ “one China” policy was negotiable, comments that suggested the possibility of both closer engagement with Taiwan and apprehensions that Taiwan’s status, and U.S. assistance to the democratic island-nation, could also be used as a bargaining chip during negotiations between Washington and Beijing. President Trump’s assurances to President Xi follow a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson earlier this month that that the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances constitute the foundations of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. Tillerson added that the U.S. should continue to uphold its “one China policy,” in which the U.S. acknowledges Beijing’s position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. While vague, the White House statement’s reference to President Trump’s agreeing to honor our — that is, the U.S.’ — “one China” policy should be sufficient to please Beijing while reassuring Taipei that Washington has no intention to revise its official position, such as adopting the more definitive language contained in Beijing’s “one China” principle. Although Mr. Trump’s apparent (and not entirely unexpected) shift toward continuity may disappoint the more impatient segment of Taiwan’s green camp who were hoping for a break with the longstanding status quo, his decision to do so should dispel fears in Beijing and remove some of the incentives it had for punishing Taiwan. By doing so, President Trump may therefore have removed some of the variables that could have contributed to instability in the Taiwan Strait at a time when Washington is still fleshing out its policies for the wider Asia Pacific.

#### No Trade-Off – their authors assume no defense spending increases

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Our team agreed on two assumptions at the project’s outset: first, that Taiwan’s conventional deterrence posture will be more credible if it can function without U.S. intervention during a crisis; and second, that Taiwan’s defense budget will not significantly increase in the near term. We must emphasize that these assumptions do not necessarily reflect our beliefs about whether the United States might intervene in a crisis. Some of us firmly believe the United States will come to Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and even military aid. Similarly, we have no doubt that the Tsai Administration and its successors can generate the political support necessary to increase Taiwan’s defense spending. Instead, we adopted these assumptions to identify a strategy by which Taiwan might enhance its conventional deterrence posture to the maximum extent possible under “worst case scenario” conditions. If Taiwan’s political and military leaders are confident that the United States will intervene in a crisis, and/or if defense budgets increase significantly, then some of our recommendations are “overkill.” However, we think that the logic of deterrence means it is better to plan for the worst—and then adjust those plans when better conditions present themselves—than the other way around.

#### No US/China war – relatively high relations/low hostility, trade networks, cooperation on mutual issues, peaceful military postures, lack of public support for conflict and empirics – answers miscalc and accidental war

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Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely.

In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.

However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.

By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation.

To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one

featuring an elevated risk of conflict.

### --Ext: Deterrence High

#### Taiwan can win the war now – China knows it – no surprises, infiltration of Chinese intelligence means no surprise, geography, and established invasion plan – counter-invasion is already the norm

Greer 18 ---- Tanner, writer and analyst for Foreign Policy, “Taiwan Can Win a War With China,” 9/25, *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/> \*\*\*Modified for language

Two recent studies, one by Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts University, and the other by Ian Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, provide us with a clearer picture of what a war between Taiwan and the mainland might look like. Grounded in statistics, training manuals, and planning documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements. Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better trained, better motivated, and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. A cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly risky gamble. Chinese army documents imagine that this gamble will begin with missiles. For months, the PLA’s Rocket Force will have been preparing this opening salvo; from the second war begins until the day the invasion commences, these missiles will scream toward the Taiwanese coast, with airfields, communication hubs, radar equipment, transportation nodes, and government offices in their sights. Concurrently, party sleeper agents or special forces discreetly ferried across the strait will begin an assassination campaign targeting the president and her Cabinet, other leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, officials at key bureaucracies, prominent media personalities, important scientists or engineers, and their families. The goal of all this is twofold. In the narrower tactical sense, the PLA hopes to destroy as much of the Taiwanese Air Force on the ground as it can and from that point forward keep things chaotic enough on the ground that the Taiwan’s Air Force cannot sortie fast enough to challenge China’s control of the air. The missile campaign’s second aim is simpler: ~~paralysis~~ [delaying action]. With the president dead, leadership mute, communications down, and transportation impossible, the Taiwanese forces will be left rudderless, demoralized, and disoriented. This “shock and awe” campaign will pave the way for the invasion proper. This invasion will be the largest amphibious operation in human history. Tens of thousands of vessels will be assembled—mostly commandeered from the Chinese merchant marine—to ferry 1 million Chinese troops across the strait, who will arrive in two waves. Their landing will be preceded by a fury of missiles and rockets, launched from the Rocket Force units in Fujian, Chinese Air Force fighter bombers flying in the strait, and the escort fleet itself. Confused, cut off, and overwhelmed, the Taiwanese forces who have survived thus far will soon run out of supplies and be forced to abandon the beaches. Once the beachhead is secured, the process will begin again: With full air superiority, the PLA will have the pick of their targets, Taiwanese command and control will be destroyed, and isolated Taiwanese units will be swept aside by the Chinese army’s advance. Within a week, they will have marched into Taipei; within two weeks they will have implemented a draconian martial law intended to convert the island into the pliant forward operating base the PLA will need to defend against the anticipated Japanese and American counter-campaigns. This is the best-case scenario for the PLA. But an island docile and defeated two weeks after D-Day is not a guaranteed outcome. One of the central hurdles facing the offensive is surprise. The PLA simply will not have it. The invasion will happen in April or October. Because of the challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only make it across the strait in one of these two four-week windows. The scale of the invasion will be so large that strategic surprise will not be possible, especially given the extensive mutual penetration of each side by the other’s intelligence agencies. Easton estimates that Taiwanese, American, and Japanese leaders will know that the PLA is preparing for a cross-strait war more than 60 days before hostilities begin. They will know for certain that an invasion will happen more than 30 days before the first missiles are fired. This will give the Taiwanese ample time to move much of their command and control infrastructure into hardened mountain tunnels, move their fleet out of vulnerable ports, detain suspected agents and intelligence operatives, litter the ocean with sea mines, disperse and camouflage army units across the country, put the economy on war footing, and distribute weapons to Taiwan’s 2.5 million reservists. There are only 13 beaches on Taiwan’s western coast that the PLA could possibly land at. Each of these has already been prepared for a potential conflict. Long underground tunnels—complete with hardened, subterranean supply depots—crisscross the landing sites. The berm of each beach has been covered with razor-leaf plants. Chemical treatment plants are common in many beach towns—meaning that invaders must prepare for the clouds of toxic gas any indiscriminate saturation bombing on their part will release. This is how things stand in times of peace. As war approaches, each beach will be turned into a workshop of horrors. The path from these beaches to the capital has been painstakingly mapped; once a state of emergency has been declared, each step of the journey will be complicated or booby-trapped. PLA war manuals warn soldiers that skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords strung between them to entangle helicopters; tunnels, bridges, and overpasses will be rigged with munitions (to be destroyed only at the last possible moment); and building after building in Taiwan’s dense urban core will be transformed into small redoubts meant to drag Chinese units into drawn-out fights over each city street.

### --Ext: Tensions Low

#### No Taiwan invasion

Babones 15 Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology & social policy at the University of Sydney, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12, 2015, “Is China a threat? The Devil’s in the details”, http://salvatorebabones.com/is-china-a-threat/

What about regional conflict? China’s growing military certainly sounds like a regional menace. But a menace to whom? Here again the details get in the way of the China threat story. To the east, Japan’s government is responding to Chinese expansion by boosting its own defense spending to record levels, proposing to change its pacifist constitution to allow greater military flexibility, and making a renewed push to resolve the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute with Russia. If Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally succeeds in making peace with Russia, that would leave China and its ally North Korea as the sole focus for Japan’s entire military capacity. Japan is a rich, technologically advanced country of 127 million people. It can look after itself. For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan. Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950. For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq). The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible. The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto. China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They’re all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw.

#### No Taiwan invasion – too difficult and economic ties

Thim 15 Michal Thim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Taiwan Studies Program at the China Policy Institute (CPI), University of Nottingham, a CPI blog Emerging Scholar, and a Research Fellow at the Prague-based think-tank Association for International Affairs, Thinking Taiwan, January 21, 2015, “Can China Take Over Taiwan by Force?”, http://thinking-taiwan.com/can-china-take-taiwan-by-force/

However, taking Taiwan by force presents a greater challenge for the modernizing PLA than most observers assume. To begin with, geographical conditions are favorable to the defense of Taiwan. This may appear incredible, since geographically Taiwan lacks strategic depth since its entire territory is within range of PLA’s advanced combat jets and cruise and ballistic missiles. However, Taiwan’s rugged coastline lacks suitable landing beaches and its mountainous landscape offers natural defensive advantages, especially given the weather conditions in the Strait. If defended by a determined population, Taiwan can be quite inhospitable to any external power attempting to land its forces. Three scenarios are most frequently considered for possible use of force by China against Taiwan. Air/missile strikes The first scenario involves missile and air strikes against key military and civilian infrastructure, including government buildings, communication nodes, ports, and airports. Those would aim to cripple air defenses, the Navy and communication systems, while blinding defenders and subjecting the political leadership to “shock and awe.” Beijing would thus hope to force Taipei to accept China’s terms without a costly invasion. This is arguably a tempting option for Beijing. It has many benefits for the attacker: rapid, decisive action with minimal losses, resulting in the opponent’s surrender. Hence, it is commonly held that should Beijing decide to use force, missile strikes would be the preferred option. Proponents of this scenario argue that in recent conflicts, air strikes (including use of guided missiles) proved decisive, forcing opponents to surrender without the need to conduct ground operations. NATO’s intervention against Serbia in 1999 is sometimes cited as an example. However, this assumes nearly perfect execution of the plan, and as Von Moltke once observed “No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Moreover, NATO’s Kosovo campaign took nearly three months of sustained bombardment before Belgrade capitulated and withdrew from Kosovo. Air power’s importance rose prominently throughout the 20th and into 21st century, but careful examination of individual cases reveals that air forces have never truly won conflicts on their own. Even in the face of considerable losses, there would be no guarantee that the Taiwanese government would simply surrender without PLA boots on the ground. Further, while the Second Artillery Corps may field over 1,600 ballistic missiles, it is limited by the number of launching platforms it possesses, allowing it to fire “only” a few hundred missiles in each wave. Even that would be a feat that the PLA has never performed. Moreover, Taiwan is preparing extensively for this scenario, establishing rapid runway repair capability, redundant communication infrastructure, and underground bases, all designed to survive a first strike. Some of the expensive platforms that have been criticized as a waste of resources have potentially great value in preventing the effects of “shock and awe.” The long-range early-warning radar at Leshan in Hsinchu County will buy additional time, while a missile defense centered on the U.S.-made Patriots and Taiwan’s Tien-Kung III, although doomed to destruction in the process, will limit the impact of a first strike. The psychological effect of images of successful interceptions could provide balance to the destruction caused by airborne and land-based missiles. Beijing’s hope that Taiwan would quickly surrender therefore does not rest on a strong foundation. Naval blockade/quarantine A naval blockade is often regarded as a viable option for Beijing. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has benefitted greatly from ongoing modernization, with the recent introduction of new submarines and guided missile destroyers. A naval blockade (likely called a quarantine by Beijing, implying action within its territory rather than blocking a sovereign nation) is that it could be a relatively bloodless action, with the exception of likely exchanges between the Taiwanese Navy and the PLAN. The disadvantage is that naval blockades lack efficiency and take time. Moreover, they are logistically complex if the goal is total isolation. The PLAN, undergoing transformation from an offshore navy to ocean-going navy, is wanting in experience in exercising this type of sea-control. Moreover, a blockade would be a prolonged effort that lacks the advantage of surprise. Should a blockade fail to persuade Taiwanese leaders to give up, the PLA would have to strike against alerted defenders. Amphibious assault An amphibious invasion is the most radical option of all, and it is also in many ways a poor option for Beijing. However, given the problems with the first two options, this measure appears ultimately necessary if Taiwan is to be incorporated into the People’s Republic of China. Currently, the PLA is still far from having sufficient capacity to land forces and reinforce them with sufficient manpower to secure a beachhead. The element of surprise would be a challenge because of the necessary preparations resulting in concentration of transport ships and the PLA troops in civilian ports in proximity to Taiwan. The first phase would be similar to the missile and air attack scenario, except that this time there would be a continuous action aimed at achieving complete control of the sea and air and destruction of Taiwan’s key assets on the ground. This is a necessary condition before attempting to traverse the unkind waters of the Taiwan Strait in slow, vulnerable, troop-carrying landing ships. Moreover, even with the sea and air secured, the danger of lurking mobile land-based anti-ship missiles would remain. Finally, the conditions of Taiwan’s coastline would make it easy for Taiwan’s defense planners to determine where the landings could take place. If Beijing’s preferred option is a quick victory, an amphibious attack does not offer it. Ultimately, Beijing would prevail, perhaps even if the U.S. intervenes. However, the cost of victory would inevitably be high. China is no longer the China of the 1950s, when it could send hundreds of thousands of volunteers to die, as it did in the Korean War. This time its soldiers would be the only sons or daughters of parents who are reluctant to see them die. The CCP’s attempt to consolidate its power by “returning” Taiwan to China’s bosom could very well backfire and mark the end of its rule. Chinese generals also face an additional dilemma: Whether to strike against U.S. bases in Japan to take them out pre-emptively, gaining additional time before Washington can dispatch new forces to the area, or refrain from striking in the hope that the U.S. will not intervene. The former option makes the U.S. (and Japanese) intervention a certainty, while the latter gives the U.S. the initiative with its bases intact. Possible assistance to Taiwan in the case of a cross-Strait conflict is understandably a thorny issue, and Washington keeps its intentions deliberately ambiguous. However, while preventing the forceful seizure of Taiwan by China is too important for the U.S. (and even more so for Japan), assistance to Taiwan does not have to take the form of a full-scale intervention. The U.S. could limit itself to providing real-time intelligence or supplying war materials to Taipei. Though U.S. intervention should not be taken for granted, by the same token, it would be unwise to underestimate the value of Taiwan for Washington and Tokyo. Though the most feasible, the three scenarios outlined above do not cover all the cards that Beijing has at its disposal. Two other options have been discussed lately: “Salami-slicing” and “Crimea-style” scenarios. Salami-slicing Some observers argue that Beijing is already using the salami-slicing method in the South China Sea, taking assertive steps that are not provocative enough to prompt a forceful reaction. In a Taiwan scenario, the PLA could opt for a phased invasion divided into three stages, using the time between respective stages to break Taiwan’s will to resist. The first stage would begin with the occupation of Kinmen and Matsu, two island groups near the Chinese coast. The second stage would be aimed at seizing the Penghu islands in the middle of the Strait, while the third stage would constitute the final attempt to take Taiwan proper if negotiations failed to convince Taipei of the futility of resistance. It is a possible though not optimal option, one that entails the loss of the element of surprise and prolonged operations, which Beijing does not appear to find palatable. However, seizing part of the territory governed by Taipei may be enough to satisfy Beijing’s short-term intentions. In fact, the time span between the respective stages could involve years. The ultimate downside of such action is that after the first move, Taiwan’s population would never again trust any “goodwill” moves by Beijing. Crimea-style/hybrid warfare The Crimea-style/hybrid warfare scenario, with “little green men” operating behind enemy lines, gives the intruder plausible deniability and is a tempting option. However, there is crucial element missing in the case of Taiwan: widespread local support. Support for unification is extremely low in Taiwan. Even if we take into consideration that a United Front could mobilize manpower within Taiwan and manufacture perceptions of higher support, the emergence of an armed militia to protect “Chinese citizens” from the “separatist” central government in Taipei is hardly conceivable. This option is likely feasible only for Kinmen and Matsu, where both local support and ease of resupply is possible. The relevance for a Taiwan scenario lies not in the tactics used by Moscow in Crimea, but in the blatant disregard for Taiwan’s sovereignty. China does not have many options for a rapid victory. Its best bet is to strike hard and hope that united front efforts and asymmetrical economic interdependence will do the rest. However, a United Front, relying on pro-Beijing sympathizers, will likely fade in strength once missiles start to fly. Economic leverage and exploiting cross-strait integration are arguably also part of the United Front’s arsenal. However, if economic factors alone could compel Taiwanese to accept Beijing’s rule, no use of force would be needed. In other words, use of force would ultimately mean that Beijing failed to absorb Taiwan by other means. If a quick victory is out of reach, Beijing may still consider a prolonged costly campaign with amphibious invasion as the ultimate option. However, the longer the campaign, the more problematic it will become. Naturally, these are not all the options. Beijing may also choose to use a combination of individual elements for each scenario (e.g., a naval blockade and seizure of offshore islands). Special Forces deployed in Taiwan prior to the outbreak of hostilities to strike at key targets, kidnap or kill political leaders, and secure airstrips for the PLA’s airborne soldiers is another option. This is a more traditional version of “little green men” deployment and presumably part of larger military operations. However useful Special Forces may be, their greatest utility lies in their ability to conduct hit-and-run operations, not holding ground awaiting relief. Arguably, Beijing could simultaneously land its airborne forces in some of the regular cross-strait flights and perhaps sneak-in military transport planes carrying armored personnel vehicles or light tanks for greater mobility and firepower, but further resupply would become difficult once Taiwan’s armed forces are alerted. Nevertheless, Beijing may opt for Special Forces reinforced by airborne troops to maximize the element of surprise, destroy key infrastructure, seize key government buildings, and quickly install a puppet government. If successful, it would undoubtedly become the greatest operation of its kind in history. Cyber warfare One last option that has not been mentioned so far is cyber warfare. For example, large-scale cyber-attacks could damage the electric power grid, resulting in considerable economic losses for Taiwan. However, as an asymmetrical method, cyber war does not give Beijing the qualitative and quantitative advantages found in the previous options. Taiwan could retaliate with its own offensive cyber campaign, since the advantage that China enjoys in traditional military power would be irrelevant. In any case, cyber attacks would be part of each of the above outlined options, differing only in scale, adding a new element to the traditional three domains (land, air, sea) of war. \* \* \* What else is missing in the equation? Discussing strategic, tactical, and operational aspects, comparing capabilities and outlining scenarios of their use notwithstanding, the will to resist is a crucial aspect of armed conflict, essential part for weaker actors to prevail over stronger. It is also one that is inherently difficult to assess prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Taiwan’s conscript-based armed forces have not received much credit in that respect. Young Taiwanese are often criticized for being too soft and comfortable, and unwilling to face hardship. As if this were not enough, the loyalty of their commanders has been called into question by the seemingly endless string of arrests for espionage for the China. However, everything would change after the first shot is fired. Recall that the famous “this house will not fight for King and Country” resolution at the Oxford Union in 1933. Six years later, when war broke out, undergrads at Oxford flocked to volunteer. Thus, along with military options, non-military scenarios should be considered. Numerous observers often echo a sentiment that is recurrently shared by general public: Beijing would not need to fire a single shot to take over Taiwan. Economic interdependence would tie hands of even the most determined government in Taiwan. Furthermore, the prospect of economic breakdown should Taiwan refuse to follow Beijing’s dictates would be enough for a majority of Taiwanese to do Beijing’s bidding. That could happen despite the fact that nations have historically resisted rather than surrender.

### --Ext: No Tradeoff

#### Taiwan will increase defense spending

Asia Times 19 ---- “Taiwan: Incremental Rises in Defense Spending,” 4/16, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/taiwan-incremental-rises-in-defense-spending/

The Taiwanese military can expect more cash and resources as the self-governed island is planning, amid recent menacing gestures from Beijing, to devote more than US$13 billion annually on defense within the next decade. This is the main thrust of Taiwan’s new military spending plan spanning the next 10 years. It represents the latest bid by President Tsai Ing-wen to drum up resistance to Xi Jinping’s renewed threat to annex the island. Taiwan remains, in Beijing’s view, a breakaway province that must be brought back under its suzerainty either through peaceful reunification or by force. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry announced on Monday an incrementally rising 10-year budget aimed at breaking the NT$400 billion (US$13 billion) mark by 2027 and further growing to NT$420 billion by 2029. Part of the money will be spread over the years to fund Taiwan’s bid to procure 66 F-16V fighter jets from the US, in addition to 108 M1A2 assault tanks, should Washington approve the deals.

### --Ext: No China War

#### Chinese military inferiority, economic interdependence, and US alliances

Artyom Lukin 14, Professor @ Far Eastern Federal University (Russia), “Imagining World War III -- In 2034,” 8/4/2014, The World Post (partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/world-war-iii_b_5646641.html>

There are **three reasons war is unlikely anytime soon**. First, despite the double-digit annual growth in its defense budgets, China's military still significantly lags behind the U.S.' It will take China 15 to 20 years to attain parity or near-parity with the U.S.-Japan allied forces in the East Asian littoral. Second, for all the talk of mutual interdependence, China **depends on America** much more than the other way round. China is still critically reliant on the U.S and its allies, the EU and Japan, as its **principal export markets** and sources of advanced technologies and know-how. Overall, China's dependence on international markets is **very high**, with the trade to GDP ratio standing at 53 percent. China imports many vital raw materials, such as oil and iron ore. As most of its commodity imports are shipped by the sea, China would be **extremely vulnerable to** a **naval blockade**, which is likely to be mounted by the U.S. in case of a major conflict. Both for economic and strategic reasons, the Chinese government pursues policies to reduce the country's reliance on foreign markets, trying to shift from an export-oriented model to domestic sources of growth. It is also making efforts to secure raw materials in the countries and regions contiguous to China, like Central Asia, Russia or Burma, so as to reduce dependence on sea-born shipments. However, at least for the next 15 to 20 years China's dependency on the West-dominated global economic system is going to stay very significant. Third, China would have to confront not the U.S. alone but also America's Asian allies, including Japan, Australia and perhaps India. Thus China needs at least one major power ally and some lesser allies. Whether China dares to pose a serious challenge to the U.S. will, to a large extent, hinge upon Beijing and Moscow forming a Eurasian geopolitical bloc. This is already happening now, but it is going to take some more time. The bottom line: over the next 15 to 20 years a **major war in Asia is highly unlikely because Beijing will be playing a cautious game**. Even if a military clash does occur, it will be **short**, with China being **quickly routed** by the **preponderant American force**. However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo considerable changes, if China is successful in: 1) closing military gap with the U.S.; 2) making its economy less reliant on the Western markets and overseas raw resources; and 3) forming its own alliance structure.

#### Tensions won’t escalate to conflict – geography, lack of motive, and resilient relations-- answers China rise, their historical appeals, new weapons, and either US or Chinese-initiated war

Moeller 15 ---- Joergen Oerstroem, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore), Adjunct Professor (Singapore Management University & Copenhagen Business School), 10/29, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joergen-oerstroem-moeller/war-in-asia-unthinkable_b_8415838.html>

What does vital interest plus capability and willingness to challenge or defend supremacy tell us looking at the U.S. and China through today’s periscope? First of all they do not threaten each other’s vital interest. They are safe. Geography makes an armed conflict impossible. Militarily the U.S. enjoys a colossal geographic benefit ensconced in the Western Hemisphere with no enemies. Recalling the time it took and the drain on logistics to move half a million men into the Middle East to wage war in 1991 and 2003 a U.S. military attack on China falls in the category of not thinkable. China is surrounded by India, Russia, and Japan with a land border traditionally difficult to defend and the sea offering trade routes as well as invasion routes. China’s military capability may be growing but recalling necessity to defend China’s borders, the advantages geography offer to the U.S., and the starting positions for measuring relative military power any rational analysis concludes that no military threat to U.S. vital interests is thinkable. Comparing China today to Germany and the U.S. to Britain 100 years ago is fascinating, but not relevant. So far, if a comparison is sought, China is much more akin to Bismarck’s Germany moving slowly and weighing every step fully aware of the balance of power not wishing to upset it even if striving to enhance its own role. The Napoleonic wars, the run up to World War I, and the run up to World War II reveal that the established power and the rising power do not bump into each other with a bang in the revolving door. In all three cases a string of negotiations and attempts to find a modus vivendi dominated the picture. The Napoleonic Wars included the Revolutionary Wars stretched from the beginning of the 1790s to 1815, but it was not one long war — far from it. There were seven coalitions whereof five from 1803 when Britain entered the arena in earnest; periods of peace, admittedly unstable, interrupted war. The question was whether France and Britain could find out how to live with each other; only when that proved impossible was the war taken to a battle for supremacy with Britain as the winner. Prior to 1914 the same pattern is visible. Numerous publications including Norman Angell’s ‘The Great illusion’ from 1909 classified war as futile explaining that no advantages or benefits flowed from waging major wars in an era of strong trade and investment links. The book influenced British political thinking prior to 1914 and despite rising tensions with Germany successive governments tried to shape a mutually acceptable power balance. An example of this maneuvering was the British proposal in 1912 (the Haldane mission) for a moratorium on battleship building. It failed for various reasons, but underline that great powers actually diagnose confrontations and implement policies to prevent them from escalating. The appeasement policy pursued by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the late 1930s illustrates the same behavior. He went a long way to see whether Britain could accommodate Nazi-Germany. The by far most likely scenario for U.S.-China relationship over the next decades is continued negotiations to adjust and adapt to a new power balance. There may be skirmishes also of military character but with lightning speed diplomacy will be mobilized to contain such events. There may be armed conflicts using proxies to test each other but kept under control. In new areas such as cyber warfare and space ‘rules of engagement’ or ‘conduct’ - written or unwritten - will be formulated as nuclear weapons not only introduced MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), but also common understanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union about how to manage the power game under such conditions. Cyber warfare and space may technologically be new, they do not, however, change the parameters of the power game: Measure capability and willingness of your ‘enemy’ to threaten vital interests. It seems a fair bet to rule out major armed conflicts in Asia while a merciless rivalry about trade, investment, money and probably also societal model will rule the agenda.

### 1NC – Deterrence Turn

#### The plan destroys deterrence

#### a. US strength and coop with Taiwan high – ending arms sales collapses deterrence of China – causes invasion of Taiwan, broader aggressionism because of collapsed resolve, and collapse of heg – offensive realism best

Wang 18 ---- Yuan-Kang, Professor of Political Science (Western Michigan University), Ph.D. in Political Science (University of Chicago), M.A. in International Relations (Johns Hopkins University), former International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, “The 'Realist' Case for the US to Keep Supporting Taiwan,” *The News Lens*, 9/28, <https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917> \*\*\*Modified for language

Unfortunately, realism is often associated with the “abandon Taiwan” arguments. Yet realism, properly understood, actually does not call for the United States to ~~weaken~~ [decrease] its security commitment to Taiwan. Instead, as China rises in power, realism predicts a strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations, a trend that is becoming increasingly apparent today. The changing international structure is pushing Washington and Taipei into closer security cooperation. One vocal “abandon Taiwan” argument employs a version of realism known as “defensive realism.” This version holds that the structure of the international system does not necessarily favor competitive policies; that the system is generally benign because it is often easier to defend than to attack; that security is plentiful, competition unnecessary; and rational states can credibly convey information about their non-aggressive motives and intentions through costly signals and policy choices. To avoid conflict, the United States can signal its benign intentions by scaling back its security commitment to Taiwan. If China reciprocates, such as on the South China Sea or other issues, it would convey information about the limited extent of China’s foreign policy aims. China’s rise, therefore, need not be competitive and dangerous. But the problem is that the historical record often contradicts the dictates of defensive realism: states often behave in ways contrary to the theory’s prescriptions. Defensive realism is a normative theory that prescribes what states should do to achieve their goals, not how they actually behave. It is, in essence, idealism with a realist facade. As such, it is not a useful guide to state behavior. As John Mearsheimer points out, defensive realist theories “do a poor job of accounting for the past and present actions of the major powers in the international system.” A more useful strand of realism is offensive realism, which posits that international structure often favors competitive policies. To be secure in an anarchic world, states need to maximize relative power and compete for dominance. Given the limits of geography and technology, the practical outcome for a state is to become the hegemon in its own region. In the 19th century, the United States accomplished this feat in the western hemisphere through a series of determined pursuits of power. As the regional hegemon, Washington enforced the Monroe Doctrine to exclude outside powers from meddling in its backyard, while making sure no other great power dominates another region. China is now trying to do the same in East Asia. Generations of Chinese leaders recognize that a strong, powerful China is the best guarantee of national survival. The “century of humiliation,” when a ~~weak~~ [constrained] China was invaded repeatedly, validates the imperatives of power. Beijing goes to great lengths to dismiss any hint of a future Chinese hegemony. But if Chinese power grows to surpass that of the rest of East Asia combined, it will, by definition, become a regional hegemon. This outcome would go against U.S. national interest. As the regional hegemon, the United States does not want peer competitors. There is consensus among U.S. policymakers and commentators that it is in the national interest to prevent any power from dominating Asia (and Europe). Even Henry Kissinger, whom China considers an “old friend,” stresses that “it is in the American national interest to resist the effort of any power to dominate Asia” (emphasis original). Thus, the changing international structure foretells a competitive dynamic between the United States and China. China’s suspicions of U.S. motives and intentions are structurally-driven, just as U.S. suspicions of China are driven by the same structural conditions. Uncertainty about intentions is a built-in characteristic of an anarchic system, generating the security dilemma and mutual distrust. How, then, does Taiwan fit into this? In the context of U.S.-China security competition, Washington will have strong incentives to ramp up security cooperation with Taiwan in order to contain the growth of Chinese power. First, Taiwan’s geostrategic location is of particular value to U.S. national security interests. The island controls the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) extending from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China’s maritime expansions into the East and the South China Seas. If Washington wishes to maintain its preeminent position in Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to include Taiwan (along with Japan, South Korea, and other allies) in its overall Asia strategy. It makes good strategic sense for the United States to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing from attacking the island. Strong U.S.-Taiwan security ties ameliorate the power asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait and thereby increase the costs of China’s military coercion. Second, defending Taiwan is linked to the credibility of the United States for protecting allies and partners in Asia. If Washington abandons Taiwan, Beijing would likely view the concession as a ~~weakening~~ [softening] of U.S. resolve for protecting other interests in Asia. Seeing the United States as a “paper tiger,” China might become more aggressive in pursuing territorial interests in maritime Asia.

#### b. Jets key to deterrence – aff’s porcupine strategy fails and is more escalatory

Mazza 19 ---- Michael, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, M.A. in international relations (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies), B.A. in history (Cornell University), studied Chinese language (Tsinghua University in Beijing), “Assessing the Utility of New Fighter Aircraft for Taiwan’s Defense Needs,” AEI, 3/13, <http://www.aei.org/publication/assessing-the-utility-of-new-fighter-aircraft-for-taiwans-defense-needs/>

Apple Daily broke the news last week that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has submitted a formal letter of request (LOR) to the United States for new fighter jets. Although Apple Daily reported that the request was specifically for 66 new F-16Vs, MND denied that. According to the head of Air Force Command’s Planning Division, “The F-15, F-18, F-16, and even the F-35, are all among our options, as long as the jets help to strengthen our air defense capabilities. […] We are still awaiting a US response on what kind of aircraft it is willing to sell us before we evaluate if that model fits our needs and if we can afford it before making a final decision.” MND has long had a stated requirement for new, modern fighter aircraft and has been seeking to purchase them from the United States since President George W. Bush’s second term. The requirement has been a controversial one, less so in Taiwan than in the United States, where some see new fighters as a waste of money and apparently question MND’s ability to conduct honest, thorough assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs. Christopher Twomey, a well-respected professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, was quick to disparage Taiwan’s Air Force following news of the LOR, tweeting: “Note to ROCAF: the 1990s called and they want their net assessment of the [military balance] across the Taiwan Strait back. Taiwan needs a thicket of mobile SAMs to defend air sovereignty. Don’t play the PLA’s game. Go porcupine or go home!” The so-called “porcupine strategy” was first popularized by US Naval War College professor William S. Murray in a 2008 article in the Naval War College Review. Professor Murray described the strategy in this way: More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless available, but to take advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies. Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs [surface-to-air missiles], Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range precision bombardment. Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade, Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Finally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam. By adopting such a strategy, Taiwan “would be able to thwart a decapitation attempt,” and thus deter Beijing from making the attempt in the first place. Put another way, Taiwan would make itself impossible to swallow, thus making invasion and occupation an unappealing option for the People’s Republic of China. Unfortunately for proponents of the “porcupine strategy,” invasion and occupation are not the only, or perhaps even the most likely, option for a Beijing that determines that a resort to force across the Taiwan Strait is necessary. Nor do their assumptions about how a war would go necessarily hold up to close scrutiny. Consider, for example, an increase in Chinese military pressure that falls short of violence, such as repeated transgressions of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and incursions of Taiwan airspace by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force fighter aircraft. If Taiwan were to depend on surface-to-air missiles to defend its air sovereignty, its only option in such a scenario would be for SAM batteries to light up the offending aircraft with targeting radar. Such is a highly escalatory step, which would risk inviting Chinese strikes on those batteries. It would be far better for Taipei to instead dispatch fighter jets to intercept, warn, shadow, and, if ultimately necessary, lock on to Chinese fighters. In this case, Taiwan’s Air Force (Republic of China Air Force, or ROCAF) fighters provide Taiwan with the ability to respond proportionately to the PLA offense and to more gradually escalate the engagement. Importantly, Taiwan’s fighters must be able to match their Chinese counterparts in speed and combat power. If they do not, Chinese pilots will not take Taiwan’s warnings seriously. Indeed, a mismatch in capability would invite Chinese hot-dogging, in which PLA pilots have previously indulged, particularly over the South China Sea. Hence, the need for a modern fighter jet. Fighter jets would likewise be useful in more stressful scenarios, like during an air or maritime blockade. A Taiwan military that relied predominantly on land-based missiles to defend itself during such operations would, again, have limited options to respond and to escalate and it would, in fact, invite more widespread Chinese strikes on the island in a scenario in which Beijing apparently prefers to minimize escalation.

#### c. Subs are key to deterrence – prevent a blockade

Cheng 15 ---- Dean, former senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corporation, former senior analyst for the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, bachelor's degree in politics (Princeton University), “Why Taiwan Needs Submarines,” 1/12, Heritage, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

Thirteen years later, Taiwan’s submarine arm still consists of two ex-Dutch submarines and two boats most of whose peers are now museum exhibits. Years of on-again, off-again discussions have not resulted in an actual sale from the United States or any other nation. More seriously, there has also been no movement in facilitating American shipwrights’ and experts’ engagement with their Taiwanese counterparts to allow Taiwan to build its own boats. Taiwan’s Maritime Security Situation An island nation, Taiwan is one of the most densely populated territories on earth, with over 630 persons per square kilometer. The 23 million people on the island are almost wholly dependent on imports for both food and energy. Equally important, Taiwan’s security depends on the ability to challenge the ability of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to cross the islands and mount an invasion, or impose a blockade that would leave the residents starving and in the dark. The PLA’s main planning guidelines appear to focus, still, on taking Taiwan. The PLA’s best forces, and much of its strategic and operational thinking, appear to be oriented toward either taking Taiwan or countering any American attempt to prevent such Chinese actions. Because of the disparity in physical size, economy, and geography, Taiwan’s maritime security in the face of the Chinese threat is a challenging problem. China has the wherewithal to simultaneously bombard Taiwan (especially with its large arsenal of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles), while also being able to deploy forces farther afield of Taiwan’s immediate environment. For Taipei, the key to a successful defense of the island is to hold out long enough for the United States to intervene decisively. Taiwan’s military must therefore be able to simultaneously defend the island, while also nonetheless being able to deny the Chinese regime the ability to easily or rapidly isolate the island. Submarines have long played a role in Taiwan’s defense calculations. Given the relative weakness of China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, submarines would pose a significant threat to any amphibious force. Indeed, the record of the British Royal Navy during the Falklands would suggest a disproportionate effect from even a handful of modern submarines. On the one hand, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano led the Argentines to withdraw all naval forces from the British-declared exclusion zone. At the same time, however, even though the Royal Navy was considered the premier anti-submarine force in NATO, it failed to find the Argentine sub ARA San Luis.[1] That boat managed to remain at sea for over a month, and despite the best efforts of NATO’s premier anti-submarine force, was apparently able to operate relatively unhindered. The Royal Navy expended substantial amounts of ordnance against a variety of false contacts, depleting its stocks for no real effect.[2] Indeed, but for problems with its fire control system, that Argentine sub might well have changed the course of the battle, as it repeatedly achieved firing solutions on elements of the British task force.[3] In light of the importance of submarines, and given Taiwan’s aging fleet, the U.S. in April 2001 committed to helping Taiwan acquire up to eight diesel-electric submarines. This commitment was complicated by the reality that the United States has not built diesel-electric submarines since the 1950s, as the U.S. Navy transitioned to an all-nuclear power submarine force. As the U.S. has no intention of transferring nuclear-powered subs to Taiwan, the United States was, in effect, promising to help Taiwan acquire such systems from third parties.

### --Ext: US Committed

#### US deterrence efforts high now – new, take-no-business approach

Carpenter 19 ---- Ted Galen, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history (University of Texas), “Forget the U.S.-China Trade War: Is a Conflict Over Taiwan the Real Threat?” 6/8, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forget-us-china-trade-war-conflict-over-taiwan-real-threat-61627

There are multiple signs from various sources of growing U.S. backing for Taiwan’s de facto independence. Congress certainly is stepping up its support. By a unanimous voice vote in early May, the House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Assurance Act, which expresses firm support for Taiwan while urging Taipei to increase its own defense spending. The legislation also recommends that Washington continue “regular sales of defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation in international organizations—something Beijing emphatically resists.

The Trump administration doesn’t seem to need much prodding. U.S. warships have transited the Taiwan Strait on several occasions over the past year to demonstrate military support for Taipei. At the Shangri-La Dialogue session, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that the United States would no longer “tiptoe around” destabilizing Chinese behavior regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea.

### ---Ext: Arms Sales Key

#### Arms sales are vital to deter a Chinese attack.

Bandow 15 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“Arm Taiwan, America. But Don’t Defend It.,” *The National Interest*, December 21st, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/arm-taiwan-america-dont-defend-it-14695?page=show, Accessed 10-27-2016)

Enabling Taiwan to defend itself is the best way out of this conundrum. So long as the residents of Zhongnanhai value prosperity and stability, they have reason to avoid costly conflict. No arms sales would enable Taipei to defeat a determined PRC in war. The former’s objective, however, should be deterrence, not victory. “The idea is to complicate China’s scenarios, to make them pause, to get them to think twice before they attack,” explained Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. The higher the price any PRC government would pay for attempting to coerce Taipei, the less likely it would try to do so. Continued patience would remain good sense.

#### Ending arm sales legitimizes Chinese military aggression – DA’s link alone turns US/China relations

USTBC ’12 (The US - Taiwan Business Council, a non - profit, member - based organization dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and Project 2049 Institute, seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid – point, 3-12, “Chinese Reactions to Taiwanese Arm Sales,” p. 2, <http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf>)

Over the past five years, senior members of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have exercised extreme caution when evaluating Taiwan ’ s requests for defense articles and services. These policymakers may believe that China ’ s cooperation on a range of global issues – and/or the ongoing progress in cross - Strait relations, such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) – warrants withholding release of any new or significant military equipment to Taiwan. These U.S. policymakers may also be hoping for a substantive draw - down of China ’ s military posture opposite Taiwan, and may believe that they are providing sufficient time for such a move to take place. Beijing should be rewarded for cooperation with the U.S. on non - proliferation issues, global economic security, climate change, and other issues. However, such rewards should not include U.S. abandonment of our security commitments to Taiwan. Potential PRC reactions to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan may warrant some caution, and Washington has to expect some manner of chastisement by Beijing when the U.S. provides Taiwan with significant security assistance. Nevertheless, China should also expect that its continued reliance on military instruments of coercion to resolve political differences will come at a cost. Sound U.S. - China relations rest upon the assumption that Beijing will adopt peaceful means to resolve differences with Taiwan. A de facto freeze on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, imposed while the PRC continues to expand its military capabilities opposite Taiwan, legitimizes military coercion as a valid tactic for China.

### --Ext: Jets Key

#### Jets are valuable even if China targets them – successful attack is easier said than done, Chinese leaders don’t think they can take them all out, jets can be hidden, and other systems support them

Mazza 19 ---- Michael, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, M.A. in international relations (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies), B.A. in history (Cornell University), studied Chinese language (Tsinghua University in Beijing), “Assessing the Utility of New Fighter Aircraft for Taiwan’s Defense Needs,” AEI, 3/13, <http://www.aei.org/publication/assessing-the-utility-of-new-fighter-aircraft-for-taiwans-defense-needs/>

Even in the invasion scenario, fighter jets have a role to play. “Porcupine strategy” adherents generally argue that the PLA will target bunkers, aircraft shelters, and runways in the early stages of a conflict—many jets would be destroyed on the ground and those that survived would be unable to take off. Certainly, this would be a PLA priority.

The Project 2049 Institute’s Ian Easton, however, persuasively argues in his book, The Chinese Invasion Threat, that this is not such a simple task for the PLA and that even PLA commanders believe they will ultimately have to contend with ROCAF fighter jets taking to the sky. On the one hand, Easton admits, “No one in Taiwan’s defense planning circles harbors any illusion that the air force could emerge from ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks in the same fashion it went into them. […] Early losses are expected to be heavy.” But not so heavy as to effectively eliminate the air force as a factor in the fight:

Steps taken during the mobilization and force preservation stage of the anti-invasion plan are intended to ensure that China would stand little chance of seizing air superiority in the first days of conflict. In the minds of even optimistic PLA planners, the ROC Air Force represents a fleet-in-being, a vague menace whose full strength and wartime role cannot be calculated out of the equation. Only the most foolish of generals disregards a mighty air force hiding dispersed and deep in the mountains, waiting to strike out at a time and place of its choosing.

And strike out they would. In addition to striving to deny PLA air superiority, Taiwan’s fighters would be tasked with striking airfields, docked ships, ground transportation infrastructure, logistics, and radars in China as well as amphibious assault ships, escort vessels, minesweepers, and helicopters approaching Taiwanese shores. Fighters would not be alone in those tasks, with surface-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, capital ships, small missile boats, submarines, attack helicopters, multiple launch rocket systems, and drones all contributing to the fight. This diversity of strike options vastly complicates PLA planning in a way that a predominant or sole reliance on land-based missiles would not.

### --Ext: Subs Key

#### Modern subs are key to Taiwan’s defense – arms sales shape deterrence when China is becoming extremely aggressive

Cheng 15 ---- Dean, former senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corporation, former senior analyst for the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, bachelor's degree in politics (Princeton University), “Why Taiwan Needs Submarines,” 1/12, Heritage, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

It is in U.S. security interests to ensure that Taiwan maintains a sufficiently robust defense that it can deter Chinese aggression, especially as China has become increasingly assertive throughout the East Asian littoral in recent years. The relatively quiet state of the Taiwan Straits may well change after the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections, particularly given likely Chinese reaction to a Democratic Progressive Party victory. Recent Chinese actions toward Hong Kong have probably torpedoed any prospect of the “one country, two systems” approach that Beijing has long proffered to Taiwan. The United States should: Allow the “Conception Definition and Design Source Selection” phase to proceed promptly. Congress should direct the Department of State to either allow this to move forward, or provide a formal explanation on why it is failing to do so. Allow American shipbuilders and weapons manufacturers to cooperate with Taiwanese corporations in assessing Taiwan’s capabilities and forward bids on relevant sensors and weapons systems. At the same time, the U.S. should also allow the sale of additional submarine weapons (e.g., submarine-launched Harpoon missiles) that are already in the Taiwanese inventory. Continue to encourage other manufacturers of conventional (diesel-electric) submarines to cooperate with Taiwan. The prospect of Japan engaging in arms sales, and specifically the export of submarines to Australia, raises the possibility of additional, non-traditional suppliers who might be additional sources of either submarine technology, or even completed boats. Taiwan’s defense would be strengthened with more modern submarines. The U.S., as Taiwan’s best, and often only, friend, should help Taipei acquire an underwater force, which would benefit not only Taiwan, but America’s defense posture in the western Pacific. To this end, the United States should provide options that enable Taiwan to meet its requirements in the most cost-effective way possible. Because leaving Taiwan with a single—extremely costly—option for fulfilling its defense needs puts Taiwan’s democracy and defense in a very precarious position.

### --Ext: US Signal Key

#### Arms sales are key to signal of US resolve and willingness to support Taiwan

Mazza 19 ---- Michael, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, M.A. in international relations (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies), B.A. in history (Cornell University), studied Chinese language (Tsinghua University in Beijing), “Assessing the Utility of New Fighter Aircraft for Taiwan’s Defense Needs,” AEI, 3/13, <http://www.aei.org/publication/assessing-the-utility-of-new-fighter-aircraft-for-taiwans-defense-needs/> \*\*\*Modified for language

Despite the real military requirement for fighters, a common refrain of the “porcupine strategy” crowd is that Taiwan seeks the aircraft purely for their symbolic value. While this is patently not the case, it is important to consider that symbolic value is, in fact, value. Indeed, Taiwan’s purchase of new fighter aircraft from the United States would serve a couple of important symbolic purposes. Most obviously, an American decision to make the sale would be a clear statement of American commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Indeed, it is worth considering that the sale would include not only the aircraft themselves, but logistical support and pilot training—which means that ROCAF pilots would be flying ROCAF fighters on American air bases alongside US ~~airmen~~ [pilots]. This would make for undoubtedly useful signaling at a time when Beijing seems increasingly eager to snuff out Taiwan’s de facto independence.

### A2: Nuke Umbrella Solves

#### Nuclear umbrella alone is insufficient – three warrants – stability/instability paradox renders massive retaliation not credible, conventional means resolve de-coupling risks, and US opposition to mutual vulnerability

Roberts 13 ---- Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam), M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf

The comprehensive approach to strengthening extended deterrence clearly embeds the nuclear component of the strategy in a larger policy construct. As one analyst has described it, “the nuclear umbrella has become the pinnacle of a security dome.”13 The United States has set out this comprehensive approach as opposed to relying on nuclear means alone for three basic reasons. First, the threat of U.S. nuclear use may not always be credible in the eyes of the individual(s) the United States might seek to deter. Some enemy may convince itself that there are forms of nuclear attack (or other forms of attack) that fall beneath the U.S. response threshold. For example, an enemy might believe that nuclear attack primarily to generate electromagnetic pulse effects on nearby conventional forces might escape a U.S. nuclear response. This could be a serious miscalculation but, from a deterrence perspective, this scenario highlights the value of supplemental non-nuclear elements in the deterrence architecture. Second, whether or not nuclear threats are credible, the non-nuclear components of this strategy offer valuable deterrence benefits. For example, ballistic missile defense of the U.S. homeland mitigates de-coupling risks by greatly reducing if not eliminating risks run by the United States in defending its allies. And ballistic missile defense within the region protects key assets from an enemy’s preemptive strikes, enables offensive operations to begin at a time of our choosing rather than the enemy’s, and raises the scale of attack that an attacker must attempt if it wants to overwhelm the defense (severely limiting the credibility of threats to launch a small number of weapons while holding more in reserve). These strategic benefits help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in regional deterrence architectures even while a core element remains, given the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear attack. Third, the United States flatly rejects mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship with states like North Korea and Iran that violate international obligations, destabilize their regions and threaten their neighbors, and threaten the United States with nuclear attack. The global security environment would become deeply unstable if such states were to conclude that they are free under their own nuclear umbrellas to coerce their neighbors and commit aggression.14

### A2: No Impact

#### Lack of Asian ally confidence in US triggers multiple wars throughout the region and wrecks global leadership

Goh, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. **Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions.** 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

#### Ending arms sales to Taiwan makes US look weaker than China, incentivizing further Chinese aggressiveness internationally

Rigger 11 (Shelley Rigger, the Brown Professor and chair of political science at Davidson College, 11-11, “Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China,” p. 3-4, <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/-why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china_163406442997.pdf>)

Another strategic interest the United States has in maintaining close ties to Taiwan rests with Taiwan’s position on the front line of China’s rise. China’s behav- ior toward Taiwan indicates how it will perform its role as a lead actor on the world stage. As Randall Schriver, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, put it, “Beijing’s ambitions go beyond Taiwan, but right now, it’s the Taiwan issue that drives their military modernization, so it’s very important to us. Taiwan is a prism through which we can understand China’s evolution, and gain insights into it.” Richard Bush, a leading analyst of the US-PRC-Taiwan relation- ship, summarized these concerns when he said, “How the Taiwan Strait issue is resolved is an important test— perhaps the most important test—of what kind of great power China will be and of how the US will play its role as the guardian of the international system.” By exten- sion, how the United States and its allies treat Taiwan is an important indicator of what other countries in the region can expect from Washington as the PRC’s influ- ence expands. They may ask, if the United States acqui- esces to a rising China on the Taiwan issue, will it also acquiesce on issues important to them?

## RELATIONS ADVANTAGE ANSWERS

### 1NC – No Solvency

#### Alt causes – passage of US ships through the Strait

Maizland 19 ---- Lindsay, Asia writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, B.A. in international relations (American University), “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?” 4/3, <https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump>

For three months in a row this year, U.S. military ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait, seen as a show of support for Taipei and a challenge to Beijing. They are just one aspect of Trump administration’s backing for Taiwan, and combined with China’s more aggressive approach to the democratic island, many analysts fear a cross-strait crisis. Trump Is Raising the Stakes In the past nine months, U.S. ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait six times. During the Obama administration, passages were far less frequent, at just one to three times per year. Even though the Taiwan Strait is an international waterway, China is sensitive to the U.S. military’s presence and considers any transits of U.S. ships through the strait “provocative actions.”

#### US-China relations are resilient – structural factors outweigh political disputes.

Ronkin ‘19 (Noa, Associate Director of APARC, “U.S.-China Relations Fractious, Not Fragile, Says APARC Fellow,” 6/12/2019, <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/us-china-relations-fractious-not-fragile-says-aparc-fellow>, SHD)

Forty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the two superpowers are competing and contesting every arena, from trade to AI research and from space exploration to maritime rights. Instead of what Americans referred to as engagement and Chinese called reform and opening, many experts and analysts now characterize the relations between the two countries as dangerously brittle. Some see a new kind of Cold War in the making. Such assertions, however, argues Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, “both ignore history and impute a level of fragility that has not existed for many years.”∂ Fingar reflects on the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in a new article, “Forty years of formal—but not yet normal—relations,” published in the China International Strategy Review. He claims that the relationship is resilient and not destined for conflict, albeit it is beset by a host of aspirational, perceptual, and structural differences.∂ A political scientist and China specialist who served over two decades in senior government positions, Fingar urges readers to remember that assertions of fragility of the U.S.-China relationship undervalue the strength, scope, and significance of interdependence, shared interests, and constituencies in both countries. These, he says, have a substantial stake in the maintenance of at least minimally cooperative relations.∂ U.S.-China relations are indeed highly asymmetrical: Chinese citizens and organizations have far greater access to the United States than Americans do to China, notes Fingar. He also recognizes that the troubles that have soured the relationship are more intricate and often more sensitive than those of the past. Decades ago, most of the issues that arose were handled at the governmental level. But now “the number and variety of players with stakes in the relationship and disputes with counterpart actors are much greater.” Furthermore, explains Fingar, the U.S. business community is expressing a stronger voice for government action to change Chinese behavior and is not as consistent an advocate of stability in U.S. policy toward China as it used to be. “This is an extremely important development,” he says, “because it reverses a key dynamic in the U.S.-China relationship.”∂ Ultimately, however, the two countries and our institutions and people are linked by myriad ties that bring mutual benefits as well as the constraints of interdependence. “I remain confident that we will continue to be able to manage the relationship,” concludes Fingar. He expresses disappointment, though, that normalization of U.S.-China relations remains a work in progress and cautions that merely managing the relationship to prevent it from deteriorating is an unsatisfactory goal that should be unacceptable to both sides. Not only does such a low bar limit what each counterpart can achieve, but it also inhibits the kind of cooperation required to address transnational challenges like climate change, infectious disease, and proliferation of dangerous technologies.

### --Ext: Alt Causes

#### Tons of other thorns in relations – call with Tsai and embassy upgrades

Maizland 19 ---- Lindsay, Asia writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, B.A. in international relations (American University), “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?” 4/3, <https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump>

Aside from military contacts, President Donald J. Trump has bolstered Taiwan through other measures. After the 2016 election, for example, he talked to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on the phone in what was believed to be the first time a U.S. president or president-elect spoke directly with a Taiwanese leader since at least 1979. In 2018, the United States unveiled $250 million worth of upgrades to a de facto embassy in Taipei despite Chinese objections.

#### Tensions high – reunification threats, trade, technology, and security

Maizland 19 ---- Lindsay, Asia writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, B.A. in international relations (American University), “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?” 4/3, <https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump>

The clouds over Taiwan have grown darker in recent months. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping said Taiwan must be unified with the mainland and urged Taipei to embrace the 1992 Consensus. It states that there is only “one China” and Taiwan belongs to it but allows different interpretations of which is the governing entity. China “will not rule out the use of force” against foreign intervention, Xi said. Tsai reiterated that her government will never accept the “one country, two systems” model and defended the democratic island’s sovereignty.

The worrisome China-Taiwan tensions come as the U.S.-China relationship has deteriorated, with the two rivals engaged in major disputes over trade and technology and jostling for power in the western Pacific. During this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meetings in Washington, threats from China reportedly featured more prominently than ever before. Experts say all of these factors are increasing the risk of a cross-strait crisis. “The status quo is admittedly imperfect,” wrote CFR President Richard N. Haass, “but it is far less imperfect than what would follow unilateral actions and attempts to resolve a situation that doesn’t lend itself to a neat solution.”

### --Ext: Resiliency

#### Trade disputes are being resolved.

Cheng ’19 (Evelyn, Reporter for Rueters, “US-China relations could get better despite trade tensions, analysts say,” JUL 1 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/01/us-china-relations-could-get-better-despite-trade-tensions-analysts-say.html)

DALIAN — The U.S. and China are headed for greater cooperation, even if the ongoing trade dispute takes years to resolve, some analysts said Monday. “I think we’re really in for a process that might take three or four years,” Timothy Stratford, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, told CNBC’s Geoff Cutmore during a panel Monday at the World Economic Forum in Dalian, China. “I’m more optimistic on the mid term, that both governments and both countries will move into a better situation,” said Stratford, who is also a partner at Covington & Burling and a former Assistant United States Trade Representative. Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump agreed on Saturday to proceed with trade negotiations, after talks took a turn for the worse in early May. Trump said the U.S. would hold off on new tariffs on Chinese goods, and that he would consider allowing American companies to sell to Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, which the U.S. put on an effective blacklist in May. Beijing, for its part, has taken a tougher stance against the U.S. in the last several weeks, and threatened the release of its own version of a blacklist. “In restarting the trade talks, (there’s a) new starting point, a greater common understanding,” Wei Jianguo, a former vice minister at China’s Ministry of Commerce, said Monday in a Mandarin-language phone interview, translated by CNBC. “I think it will be resolved very quickly,” Wei said, but he declined to give a specific time frame. He is now vice chairman and deputy executive officer at Beijing-based think tank China Center for International Economic Exchanges.

#### High-level political commitments ensure strength

Hammand 15 (Andrew, Associate at the Centre for International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy at the London School of Economics and a Former UK Government Special Adviser, "US-Beijing Links Relatively Upbeat," 2/4, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/02/04/2003610759>)

Yet, despite the irritation of some in Beijing toward these events, US-China relations remain on at least a modest upswing. This was symbolized during Obama’s visit to China in November last year, when he and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) showed international leadership by announcing a bilateral climate change agreement that could help catalyze a new global treaty later this year. Moreover, yesterday, on the same day that Obama was to see the Dalai Lama, top US and Chinese military officials were to meet at the Pentagon for Defense Policy Coordination Talks, addressing confidence-building measures including joint training exercises and exchange programs. While fragility and disagreements remain in bilateral relations, with potential setbacks on the horizon, the outlook for this year is relatively positive. There are multiple reasons for this from the vantage points of Washington and Beijing. While China continues to build its international influence, it has recently softened its stance on some foreign policy issues. In part, this reflects the influence and changed calculations of Xi, now two years into his presidency, who has gradually extended his writ, including over the military. In the US context, he has called for a “new type of great power relationship” to avoid any sense of the inevitability of conflict between Beijing and Washington. While this new idea is an audacious goal that is unlikely to be fully realized, it reflects his desire to try to take unnecessary confrontation off the table. To this end, while assertiveness will not disappear from Chinese policy, partly because of domestic public appetite for it, there has recently been reversion to greater diplomacy and defusing of tension. One example was the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Defense in December last year to hold an unprecedented meeting between the two nations’ defense policy planning staffs. Moreover, a party from Beijing visited Washington last fall to discuss cybersecurity issues — a regular bilateral irritant. While Washington does not necessarily believe that this conciliatory behavior will last, it does appear to represent a break with the first 18 months of Xi’s presidency, when Beijing’s foreign and military positions and rhetoric were more pugnacious. This was showcased by the near-collision between a Chinese warship and the USS Cowpens in the South China Sea in December 2013, which then-US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel blamed on “incendiary” and “irresponsible” Chinese behavior, and in August last year, when a Chinese fighter jet carried out what the Pentagon termed a “dangerous intercept” of a US surveillance aircraft, again over the South China Sea. From Washington’s standpoint, this warming in relations is to be welcomed, especially when crises in the Middle East and Ukraine will continue to receive the bulk of high-level US attention and considerable military resources this year. While the US’ long-term pivot towards Asia-Pacific will continue, Obama is keen to avoid a major spike in bilateral tensions. Washington will thus seek to avoid too many clear “red lines” in the region to provide greater latitude and to encourage Beijing to the view that the US is not trying to contain a rising China. Nevertheless, even in this relatively cooperative context, there are still potential icebergs on the horizon that could see a freeze in relations. First, China’s animus toward US sea and air maneuvers near its borders is growing. As with the naval and air incidents near the South China Sea, further (potentially more serious) spats cannot be ruled out this year. However, perhaps the biggest source of risk lies in relation to Japan, where nationalist Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was re-elected in a landslide victory in December last year. A key part of his conservative agenda of emphasizing Japanese pride in its past is overturning the remaining legal and political underpinning of the nation’s post-war pacifist security identity, so that it can become more actively engaged internationally. This includes building up military capabilities. This is perceived as a threat in Beijing, exacerbated by Washington’s close security ties with Tokyo. And while no country desires conflict, serious misjudgement by one or more sides cannot be ruled out. Taken overall, the short-term outlook for China-US relations is relatively positive, despite regular bilateral irritants. Significant downside risks remain, but both Beijing and China appear to have resolved to manage tensions better, while cooperating more in areas, such as climate change, where there are potentially significant overlapping interests.

chief of general staff.

### 1NC – Disease

#### Disease impacts are unlikely and would be small.

Farquhar 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Leader of the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

### --Ext: No Impact

#### No disease impact – Burnout and variation check.

York 14 (Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at Michigan State, “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4/2014, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species)

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way.¶ Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive.¶ We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. ¶ We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

#### No global pandemics – other international actors solve – US efforts solve globalization and trade warrants

Wayne 14---- Alex, syndicated columnist on US health policy, “Global Effort Signed to Halt Spread of Infectious Disease,” Bloomber, 2/13, [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html#THUR)

The U.S. won commitments from 25 countries and the World Health Organization to work together on systems to better detect and combat outbreaks of infectious diseases such as H7N9 avian flu and Ebola virus. The Obama administration plans to spend $40 million in 10 countries this year to upgrade laboratories and communications networks so outbreaks can be controlled more quickly, Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said today in an interview. President Barack Obama will seek another $45 million next year to expand the program. Infectious diseases account for about 1 in 4 deaths worldwide, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. While diseases such as Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome haven’t posed a threat to the U.S., lapses in other countries may allow an outbreak to spread rapidly, Frieden said. “No country can protect itself solely within its borders,” Frieden said. “We’re all only as safe as the weakest link out there. This is an effort to essentially make the U.S. safer and make the world safer, to improve countries’ capacity to better find, stop and prevent health threats.” Frieden and Kathleen Sebelius, the U.S. health secretary, held a videoconference today with the partners in the effort. While no other country made a specific financial commitment today, Frieden said, all the nations at the conference including China, Russia, France and the U.K. agreed to “accelerate progress and address not just the health sector but include security in health in new ways.” First Consensus “For the first time, really, we have a consensus on not only what are the threats, but what do we have to do to address them,” he said. As an example, Frieden said Turkey’s government agreed to host a WHO office to respond to outbreaks in its region. The agreement will also target emerging infections such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. The 10 countries in line for the U.S. investment, which will be funded by the CDC and the Department of Defense, weren’t identified. The CDC plans to build on test projects last year in Uganda and Vietnam, where the agency helped the two nations’ health officials improve systems to detect and combat outbreaks of dangerous pathogens that include drug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola virus and exotic flu strains. In Uganda, CDC officials helped the country’s Ministry of Health upgrade laboratories where tissue samples would be tested in the event of an outbreak, and developed a system for local doctors to report cases of illness by text message, according to an article published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Uganda now is able to quickly transport tissue samples from rural outbreaks to a high-security lab in the capital, Kampala, by motorcycle courier and overnight mail, Frieden said. A mobile phone network-connected printer then texts lab results back to rural hospitals, he said. “Ultimately every country in the world should have this kind of system,” Frieden said. The $40 million, he said, “is certainly enough to make a good start.”

### 1NC –Terrorism

#### No terrorism impact – reject their fear-mongering – no motive, lack of means, and barriers to acquisition

Weiss 15 ---- Leonard, visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, former staff director on the Governmental Affairs Committee for the US Senate, former tenured professor of applied mathematics and engineering (Brown and Maryland), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins University), “On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71.2, 3/3, [http://thebulletin.org/2015/march/fear-and-nuclear-terrorism8072](http://thebulletin.org/2015/march/fear-and-nuclear-terrorism8072#THUR)

Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data. The debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat.

### --Ext: No Terror

#### No impact – data and experts - no linkages, your evidence is alarmism

Mueller 14, John political scientist at Ohio State and co-author of Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security “Has the threat from terrorism been exaggerated?” The Commentator 1/8 <http://www.thecommentator.com/article/4579/has_t>he\_threat\_from\_terrorism\_be en\_exaggerated

Two years after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideaway, terrorism alarmists remain in peak form explaining that although al-Qaeda has been weakened it still manages to present a grave threat. Various well-honed techniques are applied to support this contention. One is to espy and assess various “linkages” or “connections” of “ties” or “threads” between and among a range of disparate terrorists or terrorist groups, most of which appear rather **gossamer** and of only limited consequence on closer examination. Another is to **exaggerate the importance and effectiveness** of the “affiliated groups” linked to al-Qaeda central. In particular, alarmists point to the al-Qaeda affiliate in chaotic Yemen, ominously hailing it as the “deadliest” and the “most aggressive” of these and a “major threat.” Yet its chief efforts at international terrorism have **failed abysmally**: an underwear bomb and laser printer bombs on cargo planes. With that track record, the group may pose a problem or concern, but it **scarcely presents a “major threat”** outside of war zones. More generally, “**al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy**,” as Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official, notes. “Where they have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves.” Any terrorist threat within the developed world seems even less impressive. The Boston terrorists of 2013 were the first in the United States since 9/11 in which Islamist terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate bombs -- albeit **very primitive ones**. But except for that, they do not seem to have been more competent than most of their predecessors. Amazingly, they apparently thought they could somehow get away with their deed even though they chose to set their bombs off at the most-photographed spot on the planet at the time. Moreover, they had no coherent plan of escape and, as commonly found, no ability to explain how killing a few random people would advance their cause. While the scope of the tragedy in Boston should not be minimized, it should also be noted that if the terrorists’ aim was to kill a large number of people, their **bombs failed miserably**. As recent cases in Colorado and Connecticut sadly demonstrate, far more fatalities have been inflicted by gunmen. Before Boston, some 16 people had been killed by Islamist terrorists in the United States in the years since 2001, and all of these were murdered by people who were essentially acting alone. By contrast, in the 19**70s**, organized terrorists inflicted hundreds of attacks, mostly bombings, in the United States, killing 72. As concern about organized attacks has diminished, fear of “lone wolf” attacks has grown in recent years, and one official assessment contends that “lone offenders currently present the greatest threat.” This is a reasonable observation, but those concerned should keep in mind that, as analyst Max Abrahms has noted, while lone wolves may be difficult to police, they have carried out only two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist attacks over the last four decades. The key question, at least outside of war zones, is not, “are we safer?” but “how safe are we?” At current rates, an American’s chance of becoming a victim of terrorism in the U.S., even with 9/11 in the calculation, is about **1 in 3.5 million per year**. In comparison, that same American stands a 1 in 22,000 yearly chance of becoming a homicide victim, a 1 in 8,000 chance of perishing in an auto accident, and a 1 in 500 chance of dying from cancer. These calculations are based, of course, on **historical data**. However, **alarmists** who would reject such history need to explain why they think terrorists will suddenly become vastly more competent in the future. But no one seems to be making that argument. Indeed, notes one reporter, U.S. officials now say that al-Qaeda has become **less capable of a large attack like 9/11.** But she also says that they made this disclosure only on condition of anonymity out of fear that “publicly identifying themselves could make them a target” of terrorists. In contrast, one terrorism specialist, Peter Bergen, has observed in heroic full attribution mode that, “The last terror attack (in the West) was **seven years ago** in London,” that there “**haven’t been any major attacks in the U.S.**,” and that “they are recruiting no-hopers and dead-enders.”

#### You’re more likely to die in your bathtub

Brookings 8 (Institution, Independent Research and Policy Institute, “Have We Exaggerated the Threat of Terrorism?”, 7-18, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0221\_terrorism.aspx)

One participant argued that terrorism presents **minimal** cause for concern. Discounting war zones, studies show that there have been **very few** people killed by “Muslim extremists” each year—in fact, more people drown in bathtubs each year in the United States. The FBI reported in 2005 that it had not found an al-Qaeda presence in the United States. Additionally, terrorism, by its very nature, can be self-defeating: many attacks by al-Qaeda have caused the group to lose popularity. This participant questioned both the intentions and capability of al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden has threatened many attacks that he has not been able to execute. In specific, this participant thought it unlikely that that al-Qaeda would obtain nuclear weapons, despite fears to the contrary. Another participant agreed that the fears about terrorism are **exaggerated** and differentiated between the actual campaign against al-Qaeda and its supporters and the idea of a general “war on terrorism.” However, participants also detailed the larger problems that terrorism can create, regardless of the numbers it kills directly: terrorism often leads to insurgencies or civil wars; it could destabilize U.S. allies in the Middle East and the whole Middle Eastern architecture; terrorism keeps oil prices high; and it has psychological effects beyond the actual death tolls. Additionally, many planned attacks have been stopped before they were carried out; one participant noted that there have been several near-misses recently. One participant argued that the war on terrorism is actually about an ideological battle between the United States and its allies and radical forces. Another participant agreed with this assessment of the general struggle between the United States and “radical Islamic extremism.” This participant noted that the larger struggle is much more complicated to understand than terrorism in specific and that this leads to a disproportionate focus on terrorism and the accompanying misallocation of resources. Participants highlighted the difference between the risks presented by terrorism in the United States and around the world. The impact of terrorism in Iraq and Lebanon, for instance, is completely different than the impact in the United States, which one participant categorized as being essentially psychological. The relevance of the capability of governments at preventing terrorism was also addressed. Terrorism is particularly dangerous in places where there is weak government capacity and rule of law. Participants discussed why has there not been another terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. One participant presented several reasons: the **U**nited **S**tates has a supportive domestic Muslim population; the would-be terrorists in the United States are not skilled; and U.S. counterterrorism policy has made it more difficult for the al-Qaeda core to plan complex attacks. This participant argued, however, that there are risks that this situation may change going forward. As the al-Qaeda core reconstitutes itself in Pakistan, it may be able to plan more complex attacks again. Additionally, the U.S. Muslim population may become less supportive overtime as a result of U.S. homeland security policy. However, another participant did not think the attitudes of the U.S. Muslim community were particularly relevant to this debate.

### 1NC – Trade Deal

#### No trade deal regardless and it wouldn’t solve their impacts

Palmer 5/10 ---- Doug, senior trade reporter for *Politico*, Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and Management (University of Missouri – Kansas City), “Trump's Trade Agenda on the Verge of Imploding,” *Politico*, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/10/trump-china-trade-1422319>

President Donald Trump is heading toward his 2020 reelection campaign with virtually nothing to show for his big trade promises — except for angry farmers and a jittery stock market. A long-sought deal with China appears to be falling apart, exposing businesses on both sides of the Pacific to more tariffs and steep losses for farmers. His new pact with Canada and Mexico is facing significant opposition in Congress even from Republicans, who are demanding that he lift steel and aluminum tariffs before they’ll vote on it. Deals with the European Union, Japan and Great Britain are also stalled by politics here and abroad. Trump’s failure to reach agreements with America’s trading partners could have a brutal impact on the economy and his reelection effort, even if his base likes his tough talk on China. By the time voters head to the polls in 2020, the prices of consumer goods could be skyrocketing. Farmers may be swamped with products they can’t sell abroad. And a bear market could be shrinking everyone’s retirement savings. So far, Trump has only one trade agreement to his name after two years in office: A relatively minor agreement with South Korea that didn’t require approval from Congress. What he has achieved are mostly unilateral actions: imposing tariffs on more than $50 billion of steel and aluminum imports from both allies and adversaries and tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods. He's also threatening to raise tariffs on a remaining $325 billion of China's exports. “He’s a one-trick pony. He only knows how to do one thing: impose tariffs,” said Bill Reinsch, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The White House did not respond to a request for comment, but did put out a press release Friday listing statements of support for Trump's handling of the trade talks. Reinsch, a former Commerce Department official, said he sees only a slight chance of Trump eking out a political victory in the China talks, which grew more tense Monday after Beijing pledged to retaliate against the U.S. with fresh tariffs on $60 billion in American goods. He's more likely to come back with a deal that Democrats will be able to successfully portray as too weak and a cave to Beijing, Reinsch said. Or he'll walk away from the talks, leaving tariffs in place on potentially $575 billion worth of Chinese goods — everything from clothing and toys to Apple iPhones and computers. In that scenario, China is expected to increase its already substantial retaliation on U.S. exports, such as farm goods, seafood and chemicals. Boeing aircraft, which Beijing has spared so far, could also face increased duties. That would allow Democrats to accuse Trump of being a terrible trade negotiator who has inflicted pain on U.S. farmers and businesses without achieving his goal of forcing China to make trade reforms, Reinsch said. Trump has repeatedly stressed his desire for an agreement that reins in China's trade and intellectual property abuses. But he also seems content with simply imposing higher duties on all Chinese goods.

#### Economy resilient – their impacts are epistemologically faulty and exaggerated – durability of macro-economic trends, empirical examples of the policy/economic disconnect, offset uncertainty for households/businesses, and faith in intervening actors

SEB 17 ---- Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Group, “Global Economy Resilient to New Political Challenges,” 2/22, https://sebgroup.com/press/news/global-economy-resilient-to-new-political-challenges

The interplay between economics and politics was undoubtedly a dominant feature of analyses during 2016. As we know, it was difficult to foresee both election results and their economic consequences. It was certainly not strange that economists were unable to predict the Brexit referendum outcome or Donald Trump’s victory, when public opinion polling organisations and betting firms failed to do so, but lessons might be learned from the economic assessment impacts they made. Economists probably tend to exaggerate the importance of more general political phenomena. While in the midst of elections that appear historically important, it is tempting to present alarmist projections about election outcomes that seem improbable and/or unpleasant. But once the initial shock effect has faded, more ordinary economic data such as corporate reports and macroeconomic figures take the upper hand.

Psychological effects often exaggerated

One important observation is that it is difficult to find any historical correlation between heightened security policy tensions and economic activity. Households and businesses do not seem to be especially sensitive in their consumption or capital spending behaviour. This is perhaps because uncertainty is offset by investments in a defence build-up, for example. Only when the conditions that directly determine profitability and investments are affected, for example via rising oil prices or poorly functioning financial markets, will the effects become clear.

Markets also seem to have a general tendency to assume that the economic policy makers can actually behave rationally in crisis situations, until this has been disproved. Both during the US sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008 and the euro zone's existential crisis a few years later, for a rather long time the market maintained its faith that a response would come. Not until after a lengthy period of inept actions by decision makers did these crises become genuinely acute, with large secondary effects as a consequence. This market "patience" is presumably based on a long-time pattern of recurring bailout measures by governments and central banks, which usually benefit risk-taking at the expense of caution or speculation that policy responses will not materialise.\

### --Ext: No Trade Deal

#### No deal – China won’t backdown – latest White Paper

Stevenson 6/2 ---- Alexandra, business correspondent for the New York Times, B.A. in political science (McGill University), “China Strikes Defiant Stance on Trade Against Trump,” New York Times, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/business/china-trump-trade-fedex.html>

BEIJING — China struck a defiant stance on Sunday in response to President Trump’s growing pressure on trade, blaming the United States for a breakdown in negotiations and saying it must withdraw its latest round of tariffs before a deal can be reached. In a white paper released Sunday morning, Chinese officials showed little indication that they would back down, sending a signal that confrontation is the government’s formal approach to its trade dispute with Washington. The white paper came less than two days after the Chinese government threatened to put American companies and individuals on a blacklist if they stopped supplying their Chinese partners, without citing specifics. “China will never give in on major issues of principle,” the white paper said. “China isn’t willing to fight a trade war, but it isn’t afraid to fight and will fight if necessary. That attitude has not changed.” The white paper was released at a hastily arranged news conference on Sunday morning featuring Wang Shouwen, the Chinese vice minister of commerce and deputy China international trade representative. “When you give them an inch, the U.S. wants a yard,” Mr. Wang said, adding that the United States insisted on “unreasonably high demands” that crossed over into the area of “intervening with China’s sovereignty.” The Trump administration’s latest efforts to ramp up pressure on China “show very clearly who should take responsibility” for the current state of relations, he added. While the white paper did not list any specific new threats, it showed an “alarming” amount of defiance, said Diana Choyleva, chief economist at Enodo Economics. “It’s not necessarily an escalation as such, but a confirmation that China is now digging its heels in and preparing for a drawn-out conflict,” Ms. Choyleva said. “There won’t be any papering over the cracks as any potential trade deal would have been.” China uses white papers to detail and formalize its response to often contentious issues, indicating that the government holds a singular and unified view on the matter.

### --Ext: No Econ Impact

#### Their ev can’t explain 2007 – this also answers any possible aff warrants (gambling for resurrection, diversion, prolif, lash out, nationalism, ethnic exclusion, and protectionism all did not happen)

Drezner 14 (Daniel, Professor of International Relations (Tufts), Nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, former international economist at the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of International Banking and Securities Markets, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, B.A. in political economy (Williams College), M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science (Stanford), World Politics, 66.1, January)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause conflict

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with **conciliatory policies between strategic rivals.** For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from **109 distinct rival dyads** since 1950, **67 of which terminated,** the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately **twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns** than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for **all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes** (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international **systemic changes),** as well as **many** **other** possible **confounding variables**. This research **questions existing theories** claiming that economic downturns are associated with **diversionary war**, and instead argues that in certain circumstances **peace may result from economic troubles**.